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Introduction 
 
 
 
This is a book about responsibility and organization in hyper-capitalism. Hyper-
capitalism is characterized by excess; that is, the absence of scarcity. The hyper-
capitalism studied was a product of ‘resource curse’ economics (Ndhlovu & 
Cameron, 2013). The United Arab Emirates (UAE) are characterized by a single 
sector export economy. Oil revenues are almost unlimited; all other economic 
activity remains secondary. Social cohesion for the nationals is bought with the 
provision of material excess; the expatriates are kept in line through high wages 
and/or repressive labor practices (such as the selective use of ‘exit visas’ or other 
impingements on individual freedom). Economics, as ‘the provision of material 
goods which satisfy wants’ (Polanyi, 1959), is taken care of. It is a society whose 
macro economics exceeds demand. My experience has to do with the 
anthropology of its micro economics. In the industrial market economy of the 
20th century, persons had to sell something of market value to acquire their 
means of existence. The goods and services sold, provided necessary income. 
Most of the time there was scarcity – i.e. income did not match perceived needs. 
The market exchange of goods and services left large numbers of people 
disadvantaged, poor, needy or unsatisfied.  
Polanyi distinguished between the formal and substantive meanings of 
economics. The formal meaning of economics has to do with ‘different uses of 
means induced by an insufficiency of the means’ (Polanyi (1959) as reprinted in 
LeClair (1962) p. 1181). In this sense, there is next to no economics in the UAE. 
The other, substantive concept of economics refers to man’s relationship to 
nature and society ‘insofar as this results in supplying him with the means of 
material wants satisfaction’ (loc. cit.). My study focuses on the relationship 
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between these two. Initially, it was assumed that companies in UAE would be 
‘economical’ in both the formal and substantive sense. As such, companies 
would exist to reduce scarcity by producing products and services of value to be 
traded in the marketplace. It was also assumed that companies would be 
organized substantively around meeting their formal goals efficiently and 
effectively.  
At first glance, the end of scarcity seems an almost universal human ideal. Social 
life imprisoned to the logic of scarcity seems thwarting, violent, insecure and 
demeaning. Society without economic scarcity would seem not (or much less) 
competitive and potentially advantageous to human harmony. Of course, 
insufficient effective demand, over-supply and a general glut of products and 
services would lead to economic crisis. Over-supply and under-consumption 
spells disaster in capitalism. That said, there were no such problems on the 
substantive level in effective aggregate demand in the UAE. The desire to 
modernize and to construct outstanding contemporary cities kept more and 
more expats at work while the citizens enjoyed extraordinary levels of 
consumption.  
Thus, I was working in a sort of economic paradise, where scarcity was near 
irrelevant. But as will be illustrated in this book, this ‘paradise’ was not what I 
thought it would or should be. I would typify my experience more as being of a 
society that was ‘stuck’ where relationships were characterized by ‘guile’, rather 
than as desirable. In this book, society-without-scarcity will be described in 
terms of its substantive economy, i.e. how people acted in regards to one another 
in their work. The book is grounded in an empirical case study, which in turn is 
grounded in my consultancy experience in Abu Dhabi. The study centers on 
ITCO; this is the name I give to the UAE IT (Information Technology) company 
with which I was engaged in for many years. My access to ITCO was 
outstanding; I had all their email material as well as frequent visits as my 
resources. But understanding ITCO was another matter. As a consultant, I 
wanted to ‘save’ ITCO: make it stable, profitable, effective and sustainable. I 
wanted ITCO to be a ‘good’ place to work and a satisfying setting for employee 
development.   
ITCO was mainly indifferent to my goals. I discovered that top management did 
not really care very much if the firm was ‘successful’ in terms of my criteria. As 
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long as cash throughput grew they were happy. If accounts receivable, but not 
and never to be received, grew even faster they did not care. That means that as 
long as what was billable grew and grew, management was happy; even if what 
was ‘billable’ was never really incoming. Put bluntly, ITCO could ‘objectively’ be 
bankrupt – what was owed to suppliers, personnel, etc. being larger than what 
would ever come in – and management still would see itself as successful and 
would be entirely content with itself and the company. As long as sales increased 
and the amounts of money passing through the bank account grew, the ‘real’ 
economic situation stayed invisible. In this sense, ITCO was a giant Ponzi (or 
pyramid) scheme.  
When I arrived at ITCO I did not know all of this or had ever imagined it. I 
thought I was dealing with a major UAE1 IT company – which indeed I was – 
that needed better managing. Middle management seemed indifferent to the 
quality of work actually delivered. ITCO sold major IT implementation projects 
to big players in the region, for example Oracle or SAP to major banks, airports, 
and telephone companies, etc. These were multimillion dollar contracts. But the 
projects were never completed on time or to contract specifications, requiring 
arbitrage and/or repair work. When it was all done with, almost every project 
had lost money! But the cash flow of new projects just kept coming, so there was 
no cash flow problem. In reality, however, the company was not actually making 
any money at all! It was only when the economic crisis of 2008 (in 2010) hit the 
UAE that I was asked to look in detail at the company’s books and I discovered 
just how bad things really were. What I had seen when I started at ITCO was a 
seemingly successful, rapidly growing IT conglomerate. ITCO not only 
undertook large-scale, sophisticated IT projects, it also imported IT products. 
They were the exclusive regional agents for companies like Lenovo and Erikson, 
who at the time were sure-fire profit makers.  
What I saw when I arrived at ITCO in 2003 was that in the over-heated market 
of the UAE, skilled employees were in short supply and employee loyalty was 
nonexistent. If ITCO was unwilling to give bonuses or raises, all eyes were on 
other employers who would. But the work ethic was lost. Everyone wanted lots 
of money, but no-one wanted to work hard. In comparison to Europe, the 
consultants’ IT skills were mediocre and their willingness to improve was very 
                                                            
1 Refer to the end of the book for abbreviations and their meaning. 
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limited. It was a seller’s market; there was more than enough money about and a 
huge shortage of skilled personnel. The IT professional, or anyone who could 
make others believe that he/she (but it was almost always a ‘he’) was an IT 
professional, could make lots of money. But ITCO was in some trouble and I was 
asked to improve matters. ITCO was not delivering what was promised on time 
in the large projects and this could endanger future business. So I was asked to 
look into it and to make recommendations for improvement.  
I was a skilled Oracle project implementer who had already worked for some ten 
years in the region. But I had decided to move; I left the Middle East to settle in 
Canada. Consulting for ITCO was ideal for me. It provided me with a cash flow 
during the move. With regular visits to ITCO and lots of online support from 
Canada, I could earn enough to finance my personal transition. But I was 
shocked at what I discovered. Later, while working on this book, I came to call 
the dominant work culture at ITCO ‘guile’ and ‘stuckness’. Consultants and 
(middle) managers could claim anything and say anything, irrespective of the 
truth, in order to convince everyone that ‘Things are alright’. A project could 
have stagnated completely, the client organization could have refused to sign off 
deliverables and the ITCO consultants/managers would bold-facedly tell me 
‘Everything is just fine’. There seemed to be little or no sense of, accountability. 
If one could say it, and it was in one’s own interest to say it, one said it. 
Seemingly there was no fear of being found-out or disciplined. It was a culture 
of: ‘One can get away with anything’. After all, if one got caught-out and fired, 
one could find another job in hours. Despite this, it almost never occurred that 
anyone was dismissed for incompetence. Employees were dismissed for 
insubordination or for outing criticism of the local powers that be, but not for 
not doing their job. There were lots of IT consultants about who were very 
poorly skilled and never delivered, but seemed to always get away with it. If 
challenged, they seemed to have no difficulty claiming that the problems were 
not their fault and that they were highly skilled in the matters involved. 
My second key concept was ‘stuckness’. No matter what I did in skill training, 
managerial change or organizational reorganization, things largely stayed the 
same. You could make (really minor) changes in the decor, but the drama did 
not change. Fundamentally, no matter what I did, ITCO remained cash-flow 
centred and without a record of truly successful projects. Professionalism of 
delivery did not improve in any significant way. The attitude of ‘winging it’ 
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without care, discipline or concern for the quality of results remained. 
Management knew that project results were inadequate, but as long as the 
money kept pouring in, they did not care. I felt an ethical imperative to deliver 
as promised. I thought that the quality of workmanship was somehow crucial to 
one’s professional identity and existential well-being. But the others did not 
share these assumptions with me. So I engineered some minor, but helpful, 
changes in the organizational structure and sponsored some training sessions 
but these made little or no difference. After the fact, I suspect that ITCO knew 
that a modern company ought to have skilled foreign consultants and evidently 
they saw me as fitting the bill. I was ‘window-dressing’ and what little I achieved 
was fine in so far as it went, but not really very important to anyone in ITCO. 
As a consultant the situation was frustrating and, moreover, for my professional 
pride it was not very supportive. Nevertheless, I was adequately paid, and 
probably because I was not really important I was allowed to see almost anything 
I wanted to see. Thus, my position was ideal for undertaking research. This book 
is as a result of having enjoyed such excellent access to ITCO.  
I have already indicated that ITCO has to be understood in the context of the 
UAE. Outside of the oil rich Middle East, I do not think that ITCO could have 
ever existed as it existed. The hyper-capitalist context of Dubai and Abu Dhabi 
play a key role in this story. There was no shortage of money in the UAE at the 
time. Quite the opposite, there was more money about than anyone knew what 
to do with, not that the local owners and powerbrokers were generous with their 
foreign personnel. They paid as they needed to, and that was much better than 
what one could earn in one’s home country, but the real riches were only for the 
native citizens. A European foreign hire could easily earn  2 ½ times what he/she 
had earned at home. A Lebanese or Egyptian hire probably earned even more in 
comparison to their wages in their native home, but significantly less than a 
European. The expats were all in the UAE because they could earn so much 
better there than at home. No-one came because the culture or society of Abu 
Dhabi was attractive; they all came for the money. Once in the UAE each group 
tended to socialize only with its own. I, with a Lebanese background, had almost 
all of my contacts in the Lebanese community. That was also how it was with 
every other group. Thus at work, the managers and consultants were socially 
organized along ethnic lines. Where in Europe you might have unions, politics 
or other forms of social cohesion, in the UAE there was only one’s expat status 
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and ethnic identity. Significantly, the Lebanese who were (at some moments 
literally) at war with one another in Lebanon, would stick together as a more or 
less cohesive group in the UAE. The fact that ITCO’s senior management was 
Lebanese also had to do with my role. The only UAE presence in ITCO was the 
owner; everyone else was foreign.  
I call Abu Dhabi hyper-capitalist because of its enormous rapid economic 
growth; from 2001 to 2008 its GDP tripled (ADCED, 2012). Business was 
booming. Even now, for 2013, the economic growth was above 5%. Only in 2009 
was there a recession for one year, and that was caused by an enormous drop in 
oil sales which in turn was caused by the recession elsewhere; domestic non-oil 
economic activity continued to grow in 2009. Thus, Abu Dhabi was and is a 
boom economy. This is apparent in its huge construction projects: museums, 
airport terminals, shopping centers, etc. Wealth is generated and consumed on a 
scale unheard of elsewhere. UAE knows economic growth at an unimaginable 
pace for the rest of the world. Life in Abu Dhabi is dominated by making, 
consuming and hamster-ing that wealth. Happy with a mid-size auto elsewhere, 
one has at least a Mercedes in Abu Dhabi. Housing, clothing, servants, eating 
out are all on a scale far in excess to life elsewhere. Being in Abu Dhabi is like 
being at the center of a wealth-producing tornado. There is a sort of stillness and 
order at the center of it all; but around it there is frenetic activity. All that 
activity has to do with wealth production and consumption. There are no 
traditions, culture or higher values in evidence. Everything rotates around 
money-making. The expats are all there to make money. None of them feel 
much of any loyalty to the UAE. Expats have no rights, cannot gain citizenship 
and remain, always, total outsiders. The nationals who form a small minority are 
only linked to the expats via money. There is no social or cultural cohesion. The 
one is related to the other by money-making and/or consuming, and nothing 
else. The only link between ‘me’ and ‘them’ is financial. Thus, this is existence as 
capitalism and as capitalism only and it is capitalism as rapid growth. Thus, 
UAE is hyper-capitalist. The UAE and Abu Dhabi as a hyper-capitalist context 
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1 –  CONTEXT.  
In my consultancy at ITCO as already stated, I discovered that two features of 
the organization were crucial: ‘guile’ and ‘stuckness’; these will be described in 
detail in Chapter 2 – THE CASE: ITCO. I arrived at these descriptors via 
grounded theory; they are inductive descriptors of the social behavior I 
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experienced. But they produced an enormous challenge for me. How can I 
understand these findings?  
How does one analyze substantive economics? Economic anthropology focuses 
more on Africa (in work such as that of Marshall Sahlins (1972, 2000)) or on 
Europe (as in the work of Paul Jorion (2003) or Luc Boltanski and Eve Chaipello 
(2007)) than on the economies of the UAE. In Chapter 3 – FROM ‘ME’ to 
‘HABITUS’ I try to understand what I have described using modernist social 
studies. Thus, there is an attempt to categorize key aspects of the case study and 
to determine the relationships between these aspects. Firstly, there is an attempt 
to understand identities from ITCO via psychological anthropology and 
secondly from the perspective of sociability. I focus on ITCO from the 
perspective of Mead’s social interactionism and how identity is socially 
constructed in interrelationship. Subsequently, the research turns to Bourdieu’s 
study of economic, social and cultural capital, and how ITCO’s actants are (or 
are not) represented in symbolic capital, in the specific fields of action that 
define their habitus. In this chapter, ITCO is examined from a systems and 
(post-)structuralist perspective. The version of ITCO this produces is fairly 
static. ITCO existed thanks to the local owners will and social power to let it 
exist. The expat president, vice presidents, managers and consultants are all, in 
effect, dependent upon the local owner’s patronage. ITCO never produced 
significant wealth, instead, it consumed it. The mad rush for self enrichment 
produced bitter little renewal, creativity or ingenuity. I had misinterpreted 
ITCO; I had thought it was a capitalist firm like any other that needed to be 
profitable to exist. What value, thus, did ITCO represent if it was not money 
making for its owners?  
While Chapter 3 does produce many insights into the rigidities of ITCO, it 
creates, I believe, a description that is too formal and one that is inadequately 
substantive. Thus, the fundamental question of Chapter 4 – COMPLEXITY OF 
ITCO is what can we learn in terms of process or occurrence from this study of 
hyper-capitalism? I had started the research planning to use complexity theory. 
But this was abandoned when I discovered how un-dynamic ITCO seemed to be. 
Ultimately, this study concludes that the strands of existing social complexity 
theory are far too Eurocentric and, therefore, not applicable to a UAE case. 
Complexity theory focuses on causality as attractors of which there are three 
stipulated in the theory: point, cyclical and strange attractors. My data does not 
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appear to fit any of these. In Chapter 3 an attempt was made to understand 
ITCO via modernist systems focused theory. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus was 
helpful. A habitus is a place of social-cultural existence; a place that is a way-of-
being. ITCO can be understood as a habitus. Hereby, I gained a better ability to 
examine the ‘systemness’ of ITCO. But ITCO drifts. There is movement and 
ultimately I am more interested in the movement than in the stasis. Even if 
ITCO is, from some perspectives, more static than dynamic its actants do ‘live’ 
there. There is life in ITCO; it is not all structure. With Mead/Bourdieu I end up 
in formal economics at too great a distance from the substantive. ITCO drifts via 
constant movement and small steps of change. The same stays the same by 
drifting to another place and form. Context or environment changes, and even 
to stay the same, the system has to change. Sameness is a form of change. Drift is 
a good way to name this process. ITCO drifts; it flows through social processes 
staying in many crucial ways the same. Its ‘systemness’ is strong and, in many 
ways, consistent. Eurocentric organizational studies assume the economic 
emergence of added-value. The substantive economy exists to provide the 
products and services necessary for life. In meeting human needs, economic 
organizations produce added-value. How that added-value is distributed is a 
crucial political question. But in ITCO the logic is all haywire. The products and 
services are already provided for. The added-value precedes production. It was 
already there before we ever went to work. ITCO’s ‘production’ really was 
‘consumption’. ITCO’s consultants and managers really did live in a ‘consumer 
society’ where they had little or no responsibility to create the means of existence 
of themselves or of others. This was the reign of excess with little or no scarcity. 
But the actants did not think about all of this and did not want to think about it. 
The social regime wherein they and ITCO existed was black boxed. The actants 
did not want to know about it, think about it or really have anything to do with 
it. The substantive economy without scarcity emerged as much more dystopic 
than I had ever imagined.  
This book is iterative. Chapters 1 and 2 are essentially descriptive; Chapter 3 
provides an analysis that I ultimately find illuminating, but which overstates the 
‘systemness’ of the case. Chapter 4 illuminates the drift into ‘stuckness’ and 
culture of ‘guile’ which I have found as characteristic of ITCO. And, ultimately, 
it opens the way to seeing ITCO in terms of substantive economic anthropology. 
  
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
Context 
 
This is a Chapter about scarcity and excess on three different levels. Firstly, Abu 
Dhabi is introduced to the reader and its hypermodern, hyper-real and hyper-
capitalist circumstance. My focus is particularly on business and expats. This is 
the success story of glitter, money and more money. But it is also the story of a 
hyper-stratified society, where every class and group is assigned a place on the 
social ladder, which is meant to be immobile. Abu Dhabi is a sort of 
‘Disneyland’, i.e. it is artificial, planned, regimented and defined by its 
appearances.  
Secondly, I introduce myself the researcher. I am a product of hard work and 
struggle. I have a Lebanese background. Lebanon is a fairly ‘modern’ society 
based on trade and business; the financial sector is large, services are 
economically important and it is a ‘free market’ country. Traditionally one ‘can 
get ahead’ in Lebanon through education and hard work. I have a strong work 
ethic and believe that exploitation is neither desirable nor sustainable. This 
applies to social relations but also to an economy such as the UAE’s, which is 
solely based on the exploitation of fossil fuels. Work, I believe, can and should 
give meaning to life. I have never really been poor, but I have also not been rich. 
Lebanon’s political crises and violence drove me to work in the UAE. I have 
always had to work for my livelihood. Scarcity as the need to work, as dependent 
on having a job, and as the lack of social and political security, plays a key role in 
my life.  
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Thirdly, there is the context of social studies. Chapter Two is an extensive case 
study. It attempts to be ‘realist’. In that way, ITCO is described with the 
intention that the reader will become convinced that ‘I was there’ and that (more 
than) enough information and description is provided for the reader to be 
convinced that he/she can perceive key aspects of ITCO. I wanted to do Action 
Research, i.e. to change ITCO via my work but this did not happen. I am present 
in the account, my ‘I’ or persona does play a role, but I did not want to present 
an autoethnography. It is not a story about ‘me’ but about ITCO. 
Context:  UAE 
Between 2005 and 2011 the UAE was transformed from a traditional way of 
living to hypermodernity. The spectacle of a dynamic and postmodern 
environment engulfed the UAE, as if orientalism2 was running in reverse. The 
UAE jumpstarted the industrial revolution and reached a stage of economic 
welfare comparable to western countries. The UAE created an ‘ideal type’ 
economy that appeared hyper-modern and even more perfect than in the West.  
The theory of hyper-modernity argues that we are currently witnessing the 
obliteration of time-space in private and public spheres (Graham, 2005). The 
hyper-modernity of the UAE applies to the period of 2005 until 2011, when the 
exchange of material and immaterial goods took off with unparalleled urgency 
and intensity, directed to the fast accumulation of wealth. Western modernist 
capitalism can be characterized by stability, predictability, manageability and 
control, while hyper-modernity is characterized by change and inconstancy 
(Gleick, 1999).  
“‘Hyper’ is an idiom that designates the excessive, reaching beyond a norm. It is 
located in the field of signification of superlatives, with a connotation of 
constant overreaching, of maximum, of extreme conditions” (Gottschalk, 2009, 
p. 309 translated from; Rheaume, 2005). Many social scientists have used the 
‘hyper’ prefix to discuss contemporary social trends. Phil Graham’s 
Hypercapitalism (2005), Gilles Lipovetsky’s Hypermodern Times (2005), and 
John Armitage’s Project(ile)s of Hypermodern(organ)ization (2001), are but a few 
                                                            
2Refers to Edward Said’s Orientalism (1995) that depicts aspects of how the West portrays Middle 
Eastern culture as static and underdeveloped. 
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examples of this trend. Most of these authors agree on some core aspects that 
distinguish hyper-modernity from postmodernity. Hyper emphasizes 
experiences of urgency, intensity, instant gratification and especially excess. The 
focus on excess seems especially significant, and has been a topic of research in 
areas as varied as occupational therapy and competition, consumption and 
marketing information theory and communication studies, crises and risk 
theory (Gottschalk, 2009). According to Armitage (2001), the key components 
or ‘project(ile)s’ of hyper-modernity are ‘hyper-capitalism’, ‘globalitarianism’ 
and ‘militarization’. Rifkin (2000) suggests that hyper-capitalism corresponds to 
a broad process that homogenizes various aspects of western society, spreading 
the principles of efficiency and speed. Hyper-modernity proliferates with 
globalization, sweeping across the globe in every industry and sector. The 
macro-sociological forces giving rise to and shaping the hyper-modern moment 
are numerous, dynamic and interact in complex, accelerating and unpredictable 
ways. Attempting to unravel them is beyond the scope of this research which 
focuses on the articulations and experiences associated with hyper-capitalism in 
Abu Dhabi. 
Ahmed Kanna, in Dubai, the City as Corporation (2011), examines the political 
implications of the practice of framing hypermodern development with the 
language of ‘utopia’ or ‘Disney.’ Kanna argues that the language of utopia is a 
political practice where the ‘imaginary’ and the ‘real’ become entangled. Coupled 
with ethnographic data from fieldwork in the UAE, Kanna demonstrates how 
the narratives of hypermodernity and utopia by the rulers, media and Western 
consultants have become the dominant processes of meaning construction: 
showing pride, indifference and prestige against the background of all those 
others who do menial work and just do not count in the UAE. Orientalism in 
reverse puffs up UAE importance, obscuring the more complex geographies of 
power and state-society relations. ‘Utopian’ UAE hides exploitation, extreme 
inequality and massive indifference.  
Previous researchers of the UAE and its social construction have ended up 
deported (Ali, 2010). There are limits on the ability of intellectuals to debate the 
issues at hand. My ethnography is not a (un-)sympathetic reading and it is not 
sanitized to please anyone. I present the culture as I see it, and I offer some 
critiques of people who have read parts of the manuscript.  
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I refer to the hypermodern in the UAE as a short-hand for the present historical 
and social period, primarily in the advanced information and consumer-driven 
societies. As discussed above ‘hypermodern’ emphasizes the experience of 
urgency, intensity, and especially excess. Hyperreality is characterized by the way 
consciousness defines what is actually ‘real’ in a world where a multitude of 
media shape and filter original events or experiences (Höpfl & Kostera, 2003). 
To some researchers e.g. Kanna (2011), the current hypermodernity in the UAE 
is viewed as a means to enforce the symbolic power of its rulers. The 
hypermodern entails a sense of infinite possibility, where each possibility is 
rooted in what Baudrillard called ‘spectacle’.  Baudrillard (1993) states, “Since it 
is no longer possible to base any claim on one’s own existence, there is nothing 
for it but to perform an appearing act without concerning oneself with being — 
or even with being seen.  So it is not: I exist, I am here! Rather: I am visible; I am 
an image — look! Look! 
In the UAE, hyper-capitalism has brought opportunities and challenges, 
allowing local firms to increase their leverage and create enormous lines of 
credit. Investment in real estate and information technology moved at a faster 
pace than ever before. As hyper-capitalism unfolded, the UAE’s traditional 
culture was displayed and acted out as a spectacle for visitors. For instance tribal 
dances are performed in airports, a fifteen minute show for travelers. The years 
from 2005 until 2009 can be characterized as years where an abundance of 
resources and fast growth were overwhelming. Building, creating an IT and 
telecommunications infrastructure, constructing roads and cities, often occurred 
within a few months. An observer might ask for whom and why all of this was 
being built? Was the rapid growth just risky excess? But the UAE nationals felt 
proud, associating their new identity with capitalism. Many companies in the 
UAE, and the one studied here (ITCO) in particular, grew their revenues into 
the multi-millions. The UAE was going (post-) (hyper-)modern (see Figure 1). 
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      (c)   Naufal MQ / Shutterstock.com  
Figure 1. Aerial View of Abu Dhabi before and after 2003. 
 
Landing at Abu Dhabi Airport you see spots of greenery in the midst of a desert. 
The majority of people coming to the UAE are foreigners, who are either visiting 
or living in the UAE. Entering the passport control, only UAE nationals sit 
behind the desks, but everyone else from the baggage handlers, to the airline 
officials, to the taxi drivers, are foreigners. Of the five million population 9% are 
nationals and 91% are expats. Non-UAE residents, or ‘expats’, or ‘wafeedeen’ as 
they are called, cannot obtain citizenship. 
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For the past three decades, UAE has been in a constant state of change, due to 
increased oil revenues and the effects of globalization (Ortega, 2009). The UAE 
is attributed with having successfully utilized its resources to establish a stable 
and fairly flexible economic and political system, compatible with growth 
(Forum, 2011-2012). Abu Dhabi is the largest oil producer in the UAE, 
exporting more than 85% of the UAE's total oil output. Historically, the UAE 
had been a land of trade. In the early 1960s, oil started to become the main 
source of revenue. The rulers have distributed portions of the wealth to the 
national population, often as a means of buying loyalty and preventing turmoil; 
in a system referred to by some as ‘sheikhism’ (Kanna, 2011). 
UAE nationals own all the firms where the expats work. Expatriates cannot own 
any assets or property in the UAE as per the Federal Laws. Thus, the wealth 
remains with the owners while expatriates accumulate compensation from their 
salaries and bonuses. The right of use of common lands likewise belongs to the 
rulers of the Emirates, who grant it to other UAE nationals. Business is 
organized along family-based social networks of nationals.  
The current UAE rulers and their extended families were allied with the British 
mandate during the 1970s, allowing them to effectively oppose other UAE 
nationals who demanded a fairer distribution of revenues. Maintaining close ties 
with the West has allowed the continuation of their rule. On the one hand, oil 
revenues are mostly distributed to UAE citizens through bidding for major 
projects in the oil and gas industry, and for lucrative construction projects. UAE 
citizens are the primary beneficiaries of these revenues and the opportunities 
they bring. On the other hand, foreigners (or wafeedeen) are mostly uncritical of 
their lack of rights and citizenship, because they gain wealth, security and leisure 
unlike anything they would have achieved in their own country. 
UAE nationals claim that two global events reversed the fortune of the UAE and 
in particular that of Dubai. The first was the collapse of the USSR causing 
thousands of Russians, with hundreds of millions of dollars, to come to the UAE 
to exchange and launder their money for goods and to create legitimate bank 
accounts. The other event was the British decision to hand over Hong Kong to 
the Chinese. This led many British or Commonwealth citizens to leave Hong 
Kong for the UAE. An expat from South Africa said he adores living in Dubai: 
“[It] being much different from living in South Africa nowadays.” He mentioned: 
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“…perfect security, kids enjoying the beach, and going to school. It looks as if every 
tree has a gardener attending to make it live! For my wife and me, the UAE shows 
a perfect desert-living environment with all modern and postmodern assemblages. 
People enjoy all kinds of entertainment found in different parts of the world 
converged into one location, where services and help-labor are cheap and you live 
a life without taxes.”  
The UAE enjoys a privileged position that few western countries can match: 
incentives offered by political and economic stability, tax-free incomes, 
sophisticated high tech infrastructure, good business support facilities and a 
high quality of life. The UAE has succeeded in exploiting these advantages and 
has established itself as a leading location for western and regional corporate 
businesses as well as a preferred tourist destination.  
The UAE maintains a stable and flexible federal governmental system, based on 
ethnocracy (Kanna, 2011). The government meets to formalize laws, which have 
previously been agreed upon in separate family and independent meetings. Since 
there is no elected parliament, meetings are conducted unofficially among the 
rulers and other influential UAE families. Several social strata exist in the UAE: 
the ruling family, influential UAE nationals, the expatriates as the main 
administrators and technicians; and the non-influential UAE national groups 
comprising of farmers, smaller merchants, and managers in government 
institutions.  
A significant sociological feature that strikes any newcomer to the UAE is the 
social stratification in each of the UAE’s seven emirates. The UAE’s national or 
local society consists of: (1) the rulers, usually called sheiks, who belong to the 
first families who settled in the UAE. Members of this group hold the highest 
political positions and have immense wealth and prestige. (2) The supporting 
families who out-number the ruling families, but are closely related through 
marriage. These, in turn, hold political positions, but all decision making has to 
be endorsed by the ruling family. (3) The trader class who are usually linked to 
the sheikhs and hold power over the major trading agencies that control the 
import of brand name goods and services from key world corporations. In 
addition, there are (4) the new middle class professionals, who have studied 
abroad in English-language western universities, and have returned to the UAE 
to be appointed to high-ranking positions; and, finally (5) the lower-income 
16  Chapter 1   
 
groups, mainly newly settled Bedouins who flock to the UAE when conflicts or 
struggles happen between tribes in the neighboring countries.  
The groups of companies that UAE nationals own usually carry their family 
names. Some examples are Bin Buti, Al Majed, BINHOOMODA and Al Hamed. 
People describe how, for example, the Audi brand is associated with the name of 
BINHOMOODA, and has been for several decades. Driving through the streets 
in Abu Dhabi or any other Emirate, large advertising signs from these groups of 
companies, and the brands they represent, are a ubiquitous feature. The brands 
range from automobile companies to construction companies, to electronics and 
IT. Wealth and family position in the UAE is based on how large the groups of 
companies are that you control and who you represent.  
Status among UAE nationals is linked to their relationship to the ruling families. 
Familial status is seen as part of UAE citizens’ social identity and hence helps to 
define one’s relationships to and expectations of others. Those with higher status 
are more trusted by the ruling families and are able to accumulate wealth faster. 
In some cases, the ruling sheikhs transfer ownership of their assets to higher 
status members to be managed by them inconspicuously.  
After many years of very conservative rule, the UAE leadership started to 
implement a market economy with assistance from international organizations, 
consultants, and governments. What was regarded as necessary for a functioning 
market was constructed from scratch: stock exchanges, financial regulations, 
judicial system, duty-free operations, etc. By 2005, the UAE was a global 
destination for individuals from all around the world. Its proximity to oil rich 
countries, like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, and by being close but outside of 
several regional conflicts, attracted capital, investment, talent, tourists and 
prestige. Capital started to flow into the UAE and the fortunes of many in the 
UAE grew. In the years after the wars in Iraq, the UAE focused on showcasing 
itself as the spearhead of modernization in the Persian Gulf. Dubai supposedly 
could be anywhere; the city claimed to be the ideal case of globalization. The 
UAE nationals wanted to catch up with (hyper)modernity. 
The UAE was seen, by expatriates and visitors alike, as an agglomeration of 
internationally oriented businesses and financial services, an example of ‘post-
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Fordist capitalism3.’ In a short period of time, global companies began to locate 
in order to provide services and earn profits. The rapid flows of capital, 
information, goods and services across national lines allowed for the production 
and consumption of modernity. The UAE maintained these rapid movements to 
allow for more capital flow and economic growth. This dependency on rapid 
movement brought the UAE into the hypermodern and made the UAE into an 
exemplar of hyper-capitalism. With the advent of triple digit growth, during the 
years 2005 till 2009, in the real estate and construction industry (valued at over 
US$ 600 billion), hyper-capitalism allowed for fast flows of capital and financing 
to reach the UAE. 
The pace of change had been extremely fast. Pre-modern cities were subjected to 
waves of newcomers. Rapid population growth through the importation of labor 
put great pressures on society. Social differentiation, however, was apparent. 
You are a UAE national or an expat, a professional or a skilled or unskilled 
laborer. As such, the traditional structure of cities such as Dubai may have been 
ruptured; but visible segregation exists between where nationals live, where 
professionals can rent and where laborers can stay.  
By 2007, the hypermodern environment became quite apparent. The rapid 
execution of projects costing billions of dollars produced luxury buildings and 
resorts. In addition there was the construction of world-first projects, such as a 
huge palm island in the sea, or the ‘World in Islands’, dozens of the world’s 
largest shopping malls including an artificially constructed ski hill. Ski Dubai 
(see Figure 2) is located in the largest retail complex in the region, and operates 
at a temperature below zero, being more like a ‘ski in a box’ adventure. The ski 
area is covered with real snow year-round. Of course, the ski hills are fake 
mountains built from concrete, covered with snow in an air-conditioned 
environment. Everything inside the resort is so ‘real,’ however, that it seems 
more real than real. Ski Dubai is an imitation of something that never actually 
existed in the Gulf region, but once inside the resort, one experiences a ski resort 
more perfect than the thing it represents.  
                                                            
3 In a Post-Fordist regime of accumulation, firms exhibit a penchant for ‘flexibility’ to meet 
demands of changing consumer requests and continuously improve processes (Amin, 1994). 
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(c) David Parker Brown,  
Figure 2. Dubai Mall hosts the only ‘in-ski’ mini resort. 
The construction sites in and around Dubai and Abu Dhabi witnessed 24-hour 
work shifts in which thousands of buildings were erected during a three-year 
period (see Figure 3). 
 
(c) N Richani.A.Saab, Connect Creative Services 
Figure 3. Skyscrapers under construction, UAE, 2008. 
A rapid inflow of international companies occurred. These companies built 
offices and employed almost anyone with experience in an effort to capture a 
piece of the investment cake. The government allowed off-shore companies to 
set up offices without a local UAE sponsor.  
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Hypermodernity in the UAE mediates many processes. Organizations thrive on 
radically different notions of time, space, work, identity and relationships than 
do organizations in Western societies, which value modernity. Pre-modern 
values of tradition, watchfulness, stability and adaptability remain strong.  
Hypermodernity has brought opportunities for the ruling elite and influential 
family members to be recognized globally. Luxury and first-of-a-kind projects, 
like a palm island of a constructed ‘world’ of dredged islands made from sea 
sand, create symbols that make UAE nationals content, allowing them to display 
a new identity to the world that is very different from the archaic desert tribal 
culture held by many. The old buildings and sites became heritage sites, 
displayed as tourist areas. In contrast, professionals and foreigners caught up in 
the hypermodern UAE economy earn money and acquire whatever they can buy 
with it. An ever-increasing proportion of life is spent in malls, airports, hotels 
and restaurants, or in front of TVs and computers.  
Some people living in the UAE view the hypermodern as mere appearance. Daily 
conversations between expatriates and newcomers to the UAE focus on the 
hyper speed of change. It seems as if the UAE and its rulers keep demanding the 
latest technologies in every domain: construction, IT, finance and education. A 
question that is constantly asked is: “How fast can anyone adapt and cope with 
these changes?” The lack of integration of the hyper-change in the UAE’s laws 
and processes elicits a feeling of uncertainty. Expats try to maximize their 
earnings, while the consequences of individual or corporate failure are still 
unclear. A media manager in Dubai commented on his experience of accelerated 
living: “This nation is living in a fantasy world; we do not have the time to acquire 
either the knowledge or ability to impact human experience.” 
Some of the most expensive projects during the last ten years have focused on 
sustainability and IT. A media expert, N Madi, talked to me about how 
government and semi-government organizations were advised to assist in 
building the country. She recounted4: 
“The UAE initially tried to follow the developing world in building skyscrapers 
and urban villages, assuming that people will come to buy and invest. The 
numbers of these living units exceeded demand. Over one million newcomers 
                                                            
4 This and other quotes are transcribed from interviews. 
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aren’t coming now to the country. Having succeeded in its real estate projects, 
the need to have a comparable industrial infrastructure was the second wave 
that UAE rulers began to invest in.  
Dubai’s impatience to have the first metro in the Gulf is an example of the need 
to have the best at whatever cost. The metro cost tens of billions of dollars 
without reasonable or coherent planning on whom and for what purpose such 
infrastructure would be built. One could consent that eventually tourists and 
some laborers and low-income residents might use it. But when it comes to 
investing billions into a nuclear plant that from examples from all around the 
world show their extravagant costs and risks, you are left to wonder why they 
would do so. The pride of having a zero-carbon emission or zero-waste, as 
promoted by the Masdar City project in Abu Dhabi, sits in controversy to the 
tons of carbon emissions from drilling and extracting oil, while at the same 
time Dubai’s project of the artificial islands pose sustainability challenges by 
disturbing the habitat of the sea and all these were overlooked for the 
irresistible lust to be the first and to have the best. But when it comes to art, I 
was stunned to know that Abu Dhabi is building a cultural city full of the 
greatest museums of the world. The Guggenheim Abu Dhabi, for example, is a 
planned museum that will be the largest in the world covering, a 30,000-
square-metre building by the sea, when culturally the country's repository of 
art is purely natural history.” 
Jead a project manager based in Lebanon and staying temporarily in Abu Dhabi 
discussed his experience: 
“The UAE today looks and feels like Disneyland. You have all the areas for 
entertainment, eating, partying, skiing, meeting people and even dining 
between the clouds in a hot-air balloon. There are always festivals going. But 
because of these possibilities, it has become very expensive to live and save 
money here.” 
Another expat: 
“Everything changes from week to week and you tend to feel indecisiveness 
about almost everything. You are encouraged to invest in those new built 
apartments and make some fast money by selling them before they are 
completed, especially when the banks call you to give you money without even 
demanding a salary certificate or an account on their premises. Other times, 
you feel that new companies are flocking to the UAE and hence you should look 
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for better opportunities, as you hear that many have doubled their salaries by 
doing so.” 
The media heavily advertised the ‘dreams’ of the UAE lifestyle. Banks provided 
liquidity and easy credit to buy houses and cars. Most of the expats’ real 
purchasing power did not include such up-market investments (though some 
did invest in real estate or buy luxury cars). Everyone felt the drive to be part of 
what was going on in some way or other; that much was apparent. There was no 
doubt that what was being offered in credit and products was significant.  
As the real estate market boomed (see Figure 4), nationals could buy shares in 
new real estate companies that were showing profit growth in the triple digits. 
All the new companies were owned by the government and were called semi-
government enterprises, but had a special status granted by the rulers allowing 
them to issue shares to the public. Expatriates originally were not allowed to buy 
and sell securities except through brokers that were mainly UAE nationals. 
Shares of companies could triple in value in a matter of weeks. Many UAE 
nationals and expats were encouraged to invest in shares of these companies. 
 
Figure 4.  A booming real estate race, UAE, 2008. 
The rush to buy real estate shares encouraged other semi-government 
companies to create an IPO and get listed on the stock exchange. Bank managers 
and company CEOs commented to me about these new IPOs, stating that some 
of the companies barely made profits, or that their profits never grew, but that 
their shares were rising in the triple digits because people were buying with no 
due diligence regarding the real value of the shares.  
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Buying and selling were not fully automated. Transactions had to be processed 
by the exchange’s employees on their own in-house computers. An investor in 
the stock market, with more than three hundred thousand dollars to use from 
banks, recounted his story: “I used to receive tips from a high-ranking UAE 
national on when to buy or when to sell; one night I received a call advising me to 
sell all my shares the next morning.” However, because of the backlog of people 
selling on that day, he lost 70 percent of the value of his shares, as his 
transactions were only executed by mid-day, which was too late, as the market 
had tumbled by then.  
For a few, the current hypermodernity represents challenges and opportunities. 
For many, in particular the generation of UAE nationals, who remember their 
Independence Day, hypermodernity is perceived as a threat to traditions. 
However, the younger generation seems engaged and entertained by the 
extravaganza that hypermodernity brings.  
Context: The Researcher 
The impetus for this research comes from my experience working in the Middle 
East. My experience prompted an initial research question: Why are people 
(actants) in the Middle East ‘stuck’ and not progressing professionally or socially 
in their organizations? This leads to the more skeptical question: Do people have 
a purpose that leads to transformation and change? In the often-contested 
situations of business, are there good reasons to change, to choose continuity, to 
care about sustainability or to be loyal? I started my research wanting, via 
participative inquiry, to explore, describe and comprehend ‘stuckness and   
(non-)change’ as it happens in the ‘living present’ in organizations in the Middle 
East. Over the years, I have watched capitalism in the oil rich Persian Gulf states 
develop, more often than not illicitly and corruptly. I have also seen the impact 
of hyper-capitalism on the lives of managers, executives and local national 
owners. Wealth often is immediately transformed into some form of social or 
symbolic prestige. Everyone shows constantly how much they have. Wealth is 
now; the future seems to have little relevance. 
These questions have caused me to reflect on and reconsider my own consulting 
experiences and practices. This, in turn, encouraged me to adopt an 
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introspective perspective, trying to better comprehend the meaning of my 
behavior. Could the ‘differences’ that appeared during interactions and 
conversations lead to (needed) transformations? Should I adopt an 
autoethnographic or a more traditional research stance? As I researched, I 
discovered increasingly that my own assumptions needed examination and 
revision. While I will write about this in Chapter 4, I was forced to realize that, at 
a certain point, the danger of an excessively narcissistic book existed. I had to 
choose: Would the book be about me or about the case (ITCO)? I decided that 
the ethnography should come first.  
However, to start, I’ll provide a few words about myself. 
 
I was born in Venezuela and lived most of my childhood and early teenage years 
in the city of Maracaibo. Venezuelans live a simple life and try to enjoy every 
moment of it. Almost every week there were parties where people would dance 
the merengue until very late in the night. When I was thirteen, my family 
relocated to Lebanon. I continued my studies in Lebanon in English, though 
Arabic is the first language of the country. I learned to speak Arabic, but cannot 
write it at all well.  
 
My mother had only a secondary education. My father grew up in a working-
class environment and did not finish secondary school. Both played an 
important role in encouraging me to complete secondary school. They were 
determined that their children would fulfill ambitions that they had been unable 
to fulfill. My secondary education occurred in a small town in the hills of Beirut. 
The curriculum focused mainly on the sciences and mathematics. Because I did 
well in mathematics and science, I was encouraged to continue my education in 
engineering. Engineering was a professional career known to bring higher social, 
symbolic and economic capital. In 1976, I graduated with an International 
Baccalaureate degree and went on to study electrical engineering at the 
American University of Beirut (AUB). I graduated in 1980. 
 
What brought me to the UAE in the first place? After finishing my engineering 
studies, I found that the job opportunities in Lebanon were slim. I decided to 
leave for the Persian Gulf states, where large projects funded by oil revenues 
were common. I first chose Saudi Arabia, as I had trained at an international 
company during my summer internships. The job at Bechtel was mainly 
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electrical engineering, related to building one of the world’s largest airports. The 
hardship environment in Saudi Arabia, as well as the limited freedom to travel 
that existed due to one’s passport being confiscated and the requirement of 
obtaining entry and exit visas every time one travelled, was uncomfortable to say 
the least. I moved back to Lebanon and continued my studies in business 
administration while, at the same time, learning computer programming. 
During my last year in university, I assembled one of the very first personal 
computers, using an Intel 8080 chip (the very first PC chip on the market). 
Computers and programming continued to intrigue me. After leaving Bechtel I 
spent several months teaching myself programming and various computer 
languages so as to re-start my career as a programmer. I was lucky to be offered a 
job in programming at a small company that developed banking computer 
systems. I really had very limited programming knowledge. After two years of 
work in designing and developing banking systems, I stumbled on the idea of 
designing an on-line transactional banking system. It still took several years 
until the first on-line banking system was implemented in Lebanon. 
The war in Lebanon in 1982 and 1983 forced me to travel outside the country 
again to find work. I went to the UAE, where I started as a programmer 
designing and developing supply chain systems. I soon realized that my work 
was constraining. I liked having the freedom to innovate and create new 
systems, but I was working for a large company and was expected to follow rules 
and procedures. I moved about, only to find that I could not be myself unless I 
had the freedom to find solutions without lots of constraints. I landed a 
consulting job in 1984 with a new start-up firm. I was extremely happy, as I had 
the freedom to grow the business and work hands-on with executives. I felt that 
my life had changed. I excelled at bringing in new clients. The world of business 
systems intrigued me, as I learned about supply chain systems and financial 
accounting systems.  
I started working for Oracle in 1994 and stayed there until 2003. While working 
for Oracle, I developed good relationships with several companies in the Persian 
Gulf region, one of them being ITCO. I had been a high achiever at Oracle, 
exceeding my sales targets year after year. I grew Oracle’s business in the region 
from a mere 1 million dollars in 1994 to over fifty million in 2003. But by the 
end of 2003, I had immigrated to Canada and needed consulting work involving 
travel back and forth from Canada to the UAE. And that is where ITCO came in.  
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During my Oracle period, the Y2K (year 2000) change-over was a major issue. 
Many IT multinational companies flocked to the region to pre-empt their Y2K 
problems; IT sales and consulting revenues boomed. Since then, I had lived in 
the Persian Gulf for over fifteen years and worked in numerous companies, all 
within IT. Most of these companies employed foreigners. ‘Expats’ come from all 
over the world, many from India and Pakistan, and still others came from 
Lebanon, Syria, Britain (UK), the USA, Africa, The Netherlands and France. 
Moving into Canada was a major endeavor. I had not attempted to get a job 
while waiting for the immigration papers. I had thought that finding jobs in 
North America was an easy process. The North American economy was growing 
and I thought that finding a job was just a matter of time. Having some 
contracting work in the UAE seemed like a good fall-back option, just in case. I 
managed to get two contracts, one with Oracle to develop an online partner 
network and another with ITCO to study their project practices. ITCO had 
problems with lower profitability from its operations and projects. These 
contracts set me up to start an independent consulting business from Canada. 
I assumed that organizations needed to keep on improving. I was fascinated with 
America and how technologically advanced it was. I used to get annoyed seeing 
people entrenched in attitudes purely based on tradition, such as in social class 
and community segregation. My work encompassed recognizing the symptoms 
and problems of organizational failure, and conducting cause and effect analysis 
to identify solutions. Root-cause analysis entails continuously asking ‘Why’ 
questions. The technique is called ‘fishbone’ or ‘Ishikawa’ method5. The end 
results are that various alternative solutions are discussed with stakeholders to 
help them reach decisions. 
By 2004, I had spent several weeks working with ITCO’s executives and 
managers trying to identify potential solutions. A turnaround was needed in a 
matter of weeks. I remember that some of my recommendations stipulated 
dismissing a small number of employees and in many cases, demoting others. In 
a matter of eight weeks, the decision to re-structure ITCO was taken and a new 
director for service operations was recruited. I helped in hiring the new director 
                                                            
5 Cause and effect aanalysis was devised by professor Kaoru Ishikawa, a pioneer of quality 
management, in the 1960s. The technique was then published in his 1990 book, Introduction to Quality Control 
(Ishikawa, 1990). 
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and two new division heads. There was an environment of fear within the 
company and many felt threatened by the decisions. There were a lot of rumors 
concerning the unfairness of the decisions. Many employees resigned. 
Nevertheless, in my judgment, the decisions made were right and justified, and I 
stood by them.  
Discussions that took place were meant to help ITCO executives understand that 
the strategic objectives should be changed from just gaining market share, to 
gaining and focusing on profitability. After all, ITCO was a services company 
and gaining market share with no profit was unwise. Sales and consultancy 
achievements have to be measured on profitability and not just on revenue. To 
meet such goals, several change initiatives were discussed to help reduce project 
risk, enhance governance, and improve implementation methodology.  
I managed to remain an external consultant to ITCO, and was contracted to 
follow up on the implementation of the changes and decisions. I was embedded 
in the everyday operations, and would communicate mainly by email. I was 
copied on most internal email, and when that was not possible, the president 
would send me emails for my comments. I would travel and visit ITCO every 
three months.  
My preference was to find full-time work in Canada. But without a personal 
network and a successful track-record in Canada that was very difficult. In 
addition, I could earn more money for the same amount of time with ITCO. I 
did get a few change management assignments in different industries in Canada: 
retail, health and real estate. To my surprise, I found very similar management 
and operations mentality as in the UAE. I had thought that Canadians would be 
more open to new ideas and paradigms. In fact all my assignments had to follow 
a model dictated by the customer. I had to deliver what a senior vice president or 
CEO wanted, even if that defeated all chances of successful implementation. In 
one case, the client asked me to engage and implement a plan before even 
studying or conducting an analysis of what the impact of the change might be. It 
was clear that the required plan would make matters worse. Ultimately, I refused 
to comply and abandoned the assignment. 
Thus, I had lived in the Gulf for twenty years and worked for numerous IT 
companies there. Most of these companies, mainly employed expats coming 
from Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Syria, Britain (UK), the US and 
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Europe. I had started my career as a programmer, and then moved up to 
becoming a director of sales and consulting, and ultimately worked as a 
freelance consultant.   
It had struck me that people from the Middle East will constantly argue. They 
always blame others for mistakes, never admitting that they could be the cause. 
There was a distance between people of the same village, the same religion, and 
in the same company. I always wondered why it was that people stuck to their 
argument or truth, until there was a winner. In Venezuela, people got on with 
their lives as if they knew that there was little value in arguing for the sake of 
arguing. I see (and saw) that ‘stuckness’ leads to a lack of progress in 
organizations in the Middle East. Although there is rich literature that describes 
change in general, there is very little written about business in the Middle East. 
Below an anecdote follows which provides some evidence that ‘stuckness’ in 
normal daily conversations and meetings in organizations obscured reflection 
and progress. The description contains the first person narrative account of an 
event which influenced the course of my research. Described below is an event 
that prompted me to want to better understand why Middle Eastern  managers 
and employees (actors) in organizations throughout the Middle East are ‘stuck’ 
and how they justify the lack of movement. ‘Someone today is to be blamed’ 
orients the reader to some fundamental aspects of interaction in this context. It 
illustrates ways that mature and senior managers utilize rhetoric to suppress 
possibilities for change and to ignore the ideas of others.  Managers with years of 
experience are ‘stuck’ with beliefs that their management methods are always 
right and will not accept change or being questioned about their assumptions.  
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It is usually at the end of the month that all the managers of the Orcle 
Middle East divisions meet in a luxurious hotel to discuss the end-of-
month results.  I always liked the hotels; they gave me a feeling of ‘freedom’.  
There would be more than 14 managers attending from different 
nationalities and countries.  The vice president was Palestinian; there would 
be 4-5 Lebanese, 2-3 Egyptians, 2-3 Indians, 1-2 Europeans and 1 Saudi.  It 
was a fairly diverse group.   
The vice president would start the meeting summarising the past month’s 
results and would list issues for discussion.  He would then invite people to 
comment and explain; most of the time the biggest question was why we 
had not met the target numbers for that month.  
After attending similar meetings in the past, I could always tell that the vice 
president would have someone in mind to blame for missing the end-of-
month results. When the results were positive, I felt that he considered 
himself the reason for the success. In many instances, I would step in to 
defend the ‘victim’ the vice president had chosen. I believed that it was 
never the fault of only one person, or one department, for our results. The 
products and solutions that were sold depended on the whole organization 
and not on one single division, and this is often the case in similar 
organizations. My stepping in to defend the ‘victim’ was based on this 
belief, and the fact that I was also responsible for the overall divisional 
revenue in the region. Nonetheless, the vice president would still blame that 
initial person for the shortcomings of that month.   
I always had my free voice and I could raise my concerns and pinpoint what 
I saw as right and wrong. However when I did so, the meeting would turn 
more tormenting and the debates more acrimonious. 
“Someone today is to be blamed” 
In similar to these and other interactions, people talk but seem to reify matters, 
as if what is under discussion existed all by itself. People in the Middle East, I 
think, see themselves as if inside their reifications.  Conceptually, we place bad 
results and our responsibility outside of ourselves, in the world, as if we could 
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not do anything about it. Our ‘stuckness’ manifests itself at the level of 
relationships. We protect our own selves at all costs and refuse to address and 
solve problems together. We do not share responsibility – problems are never 
‘ours’, certainly not ‘mine’, but always ‘theirs’. 
But there is a positive, even lavish, side to it all. In Abu Dhabi, it is not 
uncommon to continue business meetings during dinner-time at a restaurant. I 
was invited to attend such meetings, from time to time, during my consulting 
visits. Abu Dhabi’s myriad of restaurants is a reflection of the luxury of the new 
construction era. Every hotel in Abu Dhabi hosts a series of restaurants with 
extravagant finishing and decoration. A Brazilian restaurant, serving kebabs, 
displays all sorts of artefacts made from trees of the Amazon and a ceiling 
covered with carved wooden faces. A Polynesian restaurant features a 
Polynesian boat hanging on its wall and serves exquisite cuisine. In any one 
night, all of these restaurants are crowded, and alcoholic beverages are served 
until just after midnight.  
My consulting was with the IT giant ITCO, for whose expat president there were 
only two restaurants: – the Italian/Mediterranean TELGOS or the French fish 
restaurant ZINF. Arriving at TELGOS, you cannot help but notice all of the 
luxury cars parked in front of the hotel: – a Maserati, two Porches, and a few 
BMWs. ITCO’s president arrived just as I approached the entrance to the hotel. 
He was greeted by the parking valet staff, all dressed in brown and gold colored 
jackets, and he handed them his car keys. ITCO’s president approached me and 
pointed to a Lamborghini parked right in front of the hotel entrance belonging 
to one of ITCO’s UAE owners. He mentioned that he had picked out the car for 
the owner himself. The hotel had a rounded central area with flute-carved pillars 
surrounding it. The floor was made of dark brown marble, curved to perfection 
around the pillars. The reflection of the lighting on the floor gives you a unique 
feeling of comfort. The busy entrance elicits a business-like, entertaining 
environment.  
We headed to the TELGOS restaurant where well-dressed hostesses wearing chic 
black dresses and high heels greeted us at the entrance. The president, Viken6, 
                                                            
6 Because UAE residents are embedded in structures of power that are often beyond their immediate 
control, I have been careful to mask names of individuals and company names. 
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asked a hostess whether he was getting his usual table, and we were escorted to 
the centre of the restaurant. Personally, I did not like the table’s location, but I 
soon realized that it was a table where everyone in the restaurant could see you, 
and where you could engage in short conversations with other surrounding 
tables. Fadi, the vice president, joined us after ten minutes, and discussion 
started regarding the identity of those seated at the other tables. Fadi told stories 
about some of the people sitting around us and the kind of projects they were 
involved in.  He mentioned that, for the past month or so, ITCO had won every 
project instead of Michelle, the CEO of one of ITCO’s competitors.  
Fadi ordered an entrée and a pasta dish. I wanted to get the same pasta dish as 
Fadi’s, but then Viken interrupted my ordering and insisted that I choose a 
special dish that had been named after him: – the ‘Viken dish’. Not having much 
of an option, and not wanting to upset Viken, I ordered ‘Viken’s dish’. A few 
minutes later, the restaurant’s chef came to greet Viken at our table. It was clear 
that we received better treatment from the restaurant staff when in Viken’s 
company. Having been there a number other times, I knew that one usually 
received ‘normal’ treatment at TELGOS, like in any other restaurant. It seemed 
obvious that the waiters understood and delivered what their best customers 
expected: –exclusive service and chef’s visits to the select tables.  
To my surprise, discussions of ITCO’s projects only took a few minutes. Fadi 
commented on what issues he was facing with the other vice presidents. Viken 
did not comment, but took notes. The conversation turned immediately to a 
large prospect, and Viken asserted that the focus needed to be on the decision 
makers of that project. Viken did not pay much attention to the discussions 
between Fadi and me concerning the projects and the issues faced.  
Fadi noticed a senior UAE official entering the restaurant, and Viken turned his 
head to view this individual. He stood up and headed towards him, greeting him 
and exchanging a few smiles. Back at the table, he told us that this person was 
the advisor of the Minister of Education with whom he had a very close 
relationship. 
The food was served. ‘Viken’s Dish’ consisted of a small portion of sirloin meat 
and a side salad. Fadi’s dish looked much more inviting, served in a large plate 
with grilled duck pieces on the side, and with sauce and herbs. Viken explained 
that he had asked the chef for a very tender cut of meat, medium-well done with 
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special herbs and the spices of his choice. The meat dish also came with a potato 
puree and some salad with grated cheese. The meat was very good, – tender and 
tasty. People entering the restaurant approached the table, stopped and greeted 
either Viken or Fadi. We ended the dinner with pastries and coffee. The chef 
returned to ask Viken about the dinner, and there was a cordial exchange of 
thank-you(s) and discussion of how to improve on Viken’s dish. Viken looked 
around to see who was still at the restaurant and decided to leave.  
Doing business in Abu Dhabi seemed much more personal than in Europe or 
America. I met with my client’s (ITCO) vice president of sales and the president 
much more often than with others. Viken and Fadi were considered the main 
decision makers, setting the strategy, giving leadership, and having the necessary 
relationships with a vast number of influential UAE nationals needed to win 
contracts.  
On several occasions, while discussing ITCO’s current situation, Fadi insisted on 
Viken speaking directly to key decision makers on some sales proposal that he or 
his team were working on. These sales proposals would usually be more than 
$30M USD in value, and only one or two key decision makers at the customer’s 
organization would be entitled to decide on which company would be awarded 
the contract. Viken maintained high-level contacts with UAE nationals in key 
government positions. During one of these meetings, he received a phone call 
from what seemed to be a key influential person related to a major project or 
contract. Viken left his room and headed down to meet that individual in his 
car. Fadi mentioned that the person Viken was meeting in his car was a close 
relative of the key decision maker in one of the largest deals or contracts ITCO 
was working on. Fadi commented that “The customer wanted to award the 
contract to ITCO and, hence, wanted to make sure we followed a specific process 
and pricing so that it would be easier for the key decision maker to get it done.” 
After thirty minutes, Viken returned to his office. He mentioned to Fadi that the 
deal was done. “ITCO will be called to negotiate and we should stick to $50M 
price to win the deal.” Fadi mentioned that this contract was of utmost 
importance, as ITCO needed new projects and this project could last for over 
three years, and had the potential to bring in a lot of money. Viken gave some 
instructions to Fadi. Fadi left the room for some time, and I continued the 
discussions on existing projects. Viken explained how important this contract 
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was for ITCO and its future. Viken’s body language was different; he seemed 
happy and content. He started writing emails on his laptop. He ignored our 
project discussion. He received a few telephone calls and waited until Fadi was 
back. Fadi returned and insisted on Viken making sure that this $50M USD sales 
proposal did not slip away, and that he would reaffirm with the key decision 
maker, again, as part of the final process for winning the deal.   
This incident reminded me of a similar case I had been involved in a few years 
before, when I was asked by the president of ITCO to meet the UAE owner and 
explain the importance of a sales proposal that Oracle was working on. I was 
called on my mobile phone to meet the UAE owner in his car, which was parked 
in front of ITCO’s offices. I entered the car. It was my first meeting with the 
UAE owner. The car was a white Mercedes Benz. Its interior had tinted 
windows. It had leather seats; glossy wood covered the front dashboard. There 
were three telephones between the front seats.  After greetings, the president 
immediately asked me to shut-off my phone and remove its battery. He stated 
that doing so was the only way to maintain privacy and to keep people from 
being able to tap into the phones. We discussed the sales project in question, and 
I identified the stakeholders and decision makers that we needed to convince in 
order to win the sales proposal. The UAE owner spoke very little. He explained 
that he knew a few people that could help, and that later in the week he would 
send me a note. In fact, in less than twenty-four hours, he sent a message to the 
president for me, instructing me to go and meet a person that was identified as 
someone that could help with this sales contract. I still remember the smell of 
the Mercedes’s car seats and a very strong spiced-perfume in the air. I spoke 
rapidly, and the whole meeting took less than five minutes. 
Several years later, I met the same UAE owner again in Viken’s office. Viken 
explained that they were working on several consulting initiatives but did not 
explain anything more. Once again, I noticed that the UAE owner did not speak 
much. He listened to what Viken said, and looked at me as if afraid of 
something. I asked Viken why the UAE owner looked so surprised, and Viken 
answered, “He is always like that; he is not friendly with people until he gets to 
know them very, very well.” I chimed in: “But he seems to like you?” and Viken 
explained that it had taken him many years to get the UAE owner to trust him. 
Viken explained that he only meets with Joe in Finance and himself when he 
comes to ITCO, and he usually sends a message early in the morning on those 
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days that he is coming in the afternoon, at no specific time. Viken mentioned 
that the UAE owner was a key government statesman, very close to ruling family 
members. 
As a consultant I am not really into such high politics. I may get a glimpse of it 
once and a while, but my world is much closer to that of operations. I believe 
that ultimately I am paid to render the invisible aspects of organizations more 
malleable. I try to see organizations as wholes, as living systems. When I ‘meet’ 
an organization, I encounter its people, themes, and the patterns that are formed 
and being formed from daily interactions. When I describe this in a report 
(often using metaphors and analogies), I am trying to deal with the tacit. But this 
is an almost impossible task, as the tacit can only be partially experienced. When 
you present the organization with what you have seen and experienced, and you 
are told you are missing the point, you are often confronting the shadow part of 
the organization that resists change and denies awareness. 
Of course change is not always positive. No-one can really control change 
processes and, hence, negative outcomes are always a possibility. The notion of 
change, and how could people could adapt faster to realities, and move on in 
their lives, remains a goal in my interactions. I have spent relentless hours 
searching for books in this domain. But have had to conclude through often 
bitter disappointment that the ‘how to’ books really do belong to ‘Heathrow 
management theory’ (Burrell, 1989) and may be a ‘good read’ on an airplane but 
are far too simple, prescriptive and linear to capture the workings of systems and 
change, motivation and resistance, or indeterminacy and the human will.  
I have been delivering consulting services, now, for the past eight years. My 
main focus has been to re-structure organizations, set up new companies, and 
devise performance management systems. In most cases, if not all, my work had 
to do with people from all parts of an organization. The activities I undertook 
cover: developing strategy, addressing financial issues, creating policies and 
procedures, monitoring performance, re-structuring and even managing a 
company until someone is recruited to take over.   
During my early working years at Oracle, I became intrigued by the concepts of 
change and entrepreneurship. I had spent over ten years studying change 
management in the so-called context of the knowledge economy. My focal 
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interest was in complexity sciences and complex adaptive systems (CAS) theory. 
In the last five years, I have lived and worked in Canada as well as in the Middle 
East. I have worked with large Canadian organizations in change management 
programmes related to IT systems.  
The dominant approach to change management and innovation is very top-
down and focused on implementing and enforcing performance measurements.  
It really denies the lessons of systems thinking. While I want to take a whole 
systems or living systems approach to organizational change and development, 
the thinking is all around a ‘designer’ outside of the system, who is in control 
and fixes things. I felt a kind of stagnation and felt that I needed new inspiration. 
And that was the starting point for this research. My objectives at the start were:  
 To engage in and experience a complexity approach in response to 
‘stuckness’ in an organization in Abu Dhabi. To understand how actors 
justify their roles in such contested situations, while gaining the ability 
to account for my own practices and contributions. 
 To make a contribution to ways of thinking and talking about 
transformation in organizations in the Middle East. 
Context: Social Studies 
This book did not become an autoethnography. In autoethnography the 
researcher considers him or herself to be an experiential expert about the subject 
under study (Ellis & Bochner, 2000). Thus, the woman who has lost her partner 
studies mourning, the man with a history of psychosis studies mental health, the 
woman who has had breast cancer studies the effects of that condition; etc. The 
assumption is that prior experience helps the researcher to know what questions 
to ask and to relate empathetically to the theme. Traditional positivist social 
science supposedly lacks relatedness and reproduces alienation. Interviewees are 
reduced to objects by the researcher, whereby phenomena are falsified and 
denied. But what was I an expert in? Taking ‘stuckness’ as an autoethnographic 
starting point would have lead to tautology. If I assume that ‘stuckness’ is crucial 
to Abu Dhabi organizations (or even more extreme, to organizations in the 
Middle East) then I have narrowly thematized my research and can rightly be 
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charged with putting words into my interviewees’ mouths and having pre-
judged the meanings of my observations. Thus I had to back off and give more 
room to observation and description. 
My access to one organization had been exemplary. I had implemented 
interventions, written reports and invited others to do training where I had 
observed and evaluated the results. I had participant observation data, interviews 
and email records of events. I had the trainer’s observations and self-evaluations. 
Thus I had the material needed to write an ethnography of the one organization, 
which I have called ‘ITCO’. And ITCO provided a story: from boom to bust. 
Tremendous growth was halted when the economic crisis struck it in 2010, and 
ITCO shrunk back down to almost nothing. Thus there was drama, but had the 
major players changed, adapted or reanalyzed? I could try to find out.  
So I decided to write an ethnographic case history. I call the effort ethnography 
because my goal is to understand the subject’s beliefs and social order. How did 
the players see themselves and others? How did they experience and understand 
their situation and actions? I seek the outsider’s position. I want to understand 
their beliefs and actions and/or non-action.  And I want to reserve the dialogue 
between my beliefs and ethics and what happened at ITCO for Chapter 4.  
Thus, I have not formulated a working hypothesis or a research plan setting out 
interventions or methods of gathering data. On the contrary, I have used the 
opportunities I had in my daily work and in ordinary meetings with colleagues 
and clients, to partake in many differing conversations. During these 
conversations or just after, I have taken note of what was said and what I 
experienced as striking moments.  Since I am studying processes of living 
relationships, I have tried to write from what John Shotter(1993) calls writing 
from within the ‘living moments’ or ‘witness-writing’, rather than ‘aboutness-
writing’. 
I have adopted a non-linear approach as I write. As I engage in conversations, 
conduct my consulting activities, read and discuss with others, I reflect on many 
issues by asking myself questions such as: ‘What is assumed here?’ or ‘What was 
intended by the actors to happen?’ Ultimately, this is a study in social ontology. 
What do the players in ITCO assume about social existence; about the being of 
the one person to the other?  In Chapter 2 the ordering principle is historical 
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and not conceptual. An attempt will be made tell the story of the growth and fall 
of ITCO. 
Whether a researcher or anthropologist is conducting a study of New Guinea 
Highlanders or managers in an organizational setting, the cornerstone of such 
research is ethnography or the descriptions of a culture through its own emic 
gaze or experience. A detailed ethnography of ITCO aims to understand the 
practices of ITCO’s executives, managers and owners. To change and develop, 
an organization has to be self-aware, which calls for investigation that very much 
resembles ethnography, though more for pragmatic than critical or intellectual 
ends. ITCO’s crises in growing revenue and profitability demanded analysis. 
Given the complexities of both the context and object, I needed to be embedded 
within the organization to closely observe managers and executives.  
The study of a culture like ITCO requires a certain level of intimacy with group 
members that develops overtime by working as an active participant with them. 
The main motivation for adopting the ethnographic approach was the 
conviction that only through living, interacting with, and experiencing ITCO’s 
actors, in their own environment could I really understand their way of life. I 
needed to explore details of the phenomena that are often difficult to convey 
using quantitative methods. I was inspired by Bourdieu’s approach to 
ethnography through open-minded participant observation7. He argues that the 
researcher needs to be part of the research, and close to all the participants, to be 
able to understand the ‘logic of practice’. Knowledge is a product of lived 
experiences within a set of social conditions (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). 
Understanding the habitus of the participants refers to the meanings and 
practices (re)produced and altered through their interactions. Practices are 
shaped by the tacit nature of the habitus (Bourdieu, 1990a) embodied by the 
actors during their performance; we cannot realistically expect to uncover these 
practices through interviews alone (Bourdieu, 1998). Ethnographic study 
extends over long periods of time, allowing the researcher to note the smallest 
and seemingly insignificant goings-on.  
My fieldwork, as a consultant, focused on the managers and executives at ITCO. 
Through attending management meetings, conducting workshops, meeting 
                                                            
7 Participant observation usually means for researchers to get to know the emic characteristics of 
participants and grasp a better understanding of the social milieu (Bernard, 2006). 
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customers, interacting via emails, and visiting the UAE, I built up a picture of 
the socialization of ITCO’s managers and executives. My consulting 
engagements and workshops at ITCO focused on their internal and external 
interactions. The materials of the research were drawn from several sources: 
daily participation in ITCO’s operations and meetings, historical documents, 
and several attempted change initiatives over a four-year period.  
I have tried to examine the patterns in the dynamics of interaction, looking at 
the participants’ social identity, their habitus, and the development of their 
social capital. I have tried to attend to both the actions people took and the 
structural constraints upon their action. Bourdieu (1988a) and Llewellyn (1993) 
both argue that stories, narratives and accounts can be usefully incorporated 
into the ethnographic search for meaning, in order to provide not just “an 
analysis of the experience of social agents, but also an analysis of the objective 
structures that make this experience possible’’ (Bourdieu, 1988a, p. 780). Taking 
into consideration the complexity of hypermodernity in the UAE’s social setting, 
context here is crucial.  
When I began this research, I wasn’t an ethnographer. I was a consultant. As I 
worked with ITCO, I became an ethnographer-consultant by doing the things 
that ethnographers do. I learned how to listen, to ask questions, to observe, to 
watch, and to document the moments of everyday practice, in order to 
understand what underpinned the social construction of the organizational 
reality. My research is centered on the conviction that accounts of social life 
should incorporate the actors’ frame of reference, where reality is not seen as an 
objective entity but is socially constructed to be explored and interpreted (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1967). As a consultant, I was allowed access ITCO I thought on 
the assumption that my involvement would add value to the organization. I was 
asked to provide recommendations for actions based on my findings.  
In the ethnography, I am part of the events as they unfold. I use the first person 
‘I’ because I was there. I was contracted as a consultant I believed to help re-
structure ITCO and incorporate new practices and knowledge to make it more 
effective. I was also a researcher. I was not only observing the environment, I 
was participating in it, and thus I present myself actively in the research. I try to 
capture the multiple voices of the field and I pay attention to what people say 
and to what they actually do (Bourdieu, 1977). I do not just observe the front-
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stage surface performances, but I try to uncover some of the tacit and taken for 
granted assumptions that are behind the scenes.  
In autoethnography, one’s own experience becomes the topic of investigation. It 
requires self-questioning and confronting things that are less than flattering 
about oneself (Ellis & Bochner, 2000). Autoenthography communicates a 
subjective knowing from within experience (Shotter, 1993). Bochner and Ellis 
point to the risks of unconsciously becoming self-centered, tending to occupy an 
overly important place in the discourse. Bochner and Ellis’s concern is relevant 
to my writing, as I must not let it appear that I am the subject of this research. I 
need to stay centered on the goal of observing and describing ITCO. 
I have tried to shape the discourse within ITCO and its discourse has shaped me. 
This positions my experiences; I am linked to the collective enterprise of the 
social agents within the field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). But I failed to 
change ITCO and (as will become clear) I could never really accept ITCO’s 
dominant discourse. I started the research thinking that as a consultant I could 
‘help’ ITCO. It was as if I assumed that business studies (considering, I have an 
MBA) had provided me with some secret guide to success. It was not until I 
engaged with the field and context that I recognized the ‘false transcendence’ 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) of those assumptions.  
During the course of the research, I had to ask myself, in several instances, 
questions such as: ‘Who am I?’ and ‘Who do I want to be?’ This has led me to a 
dynamic negotiation in creating a sense of ‘Self’ in relation to the research 
framework, analysis and representation. More specifically, it has been through 
my own reconfiguration of my self-identity that I have come to understand the 
tensions encountered through my experience with ITCO. I view these tensions 
as positive, creating a bridge that informed the theoretical perspective, research 
strategy and interpretation of my research. As the research continued, I 
experienced several transformational or ‘ah-ha’ moments, which have changed 
the way I look at things. Confrontation with hyper-capitalism is (and was) 
shocking. 
Did I do action research? I wanted, via researching ITCO, to achieve change. But 
there was no common coherent sharing of a diagnosis or joint change agenda. I 
was not able to work in cycles of ‘diagnosis: dialogue: implementation: 
evaluation.’ Ethnography does not normally consider joint action for change 
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between researchers and practitioners as a source of knowledge. The 
ethnographer usually does not participate in efforts for change. Action research 
demands co-research and active researcher-researched cooperation. This did not 
happen. Consultants normally do not do action research because it deconstructs 
their leverage. Consulting operates in a model of a consultant who ‘knows that 
he (she) knows’ and a client that ‘knows that he (she) should learn from the 
consultant’. Action research aims for equality, which ends consultancy.  
“Action research is a form of collective self-reflective enquiry undertaken by 
participants in social situations in order to improve the rationality and justice 
of their own social or educational practices, as well as their understanding of 
these practices and the situations in which these practices are carried out” 
(Carr & Kemmis, 1986, p. 162).  
My initial interest in action research was based on the possibility of engagement 
by all participants in the research and the commitment it requires. Thus I might 
have found action research attractive, but it was never a realistic option in ITCO 
or I believe within hyper-capitalism. 
Ultimately, as Cooper and Burrell (1988, p. 106) phrase it, “to understand 
organizations it is necessary to analyze them from the outside, as it were, and 
not from what is already organized. It becomes a question of analyzing, let us 
say, the production of organization rather than the organization of production.” 
Similarly, Chia (1996) claims that, organizations are consequences from the 
effects of a particular discursive production process at that moment in time.  
Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) argues for a ‘reflexive 
sociology’. I accept that Bourdieu’s notion of reflexivity is important while 
developing an understanding of the problems studied. Reflexivity for me 
requires vigilance throughout the processes of analysis, thinking, and writing. 
Bourdieu’s reflexivity involved a turning back upon the position of the knowing 
subject, a looking back at one’s own knowing practices; for me, that means I 
must look back at how I was embedded in my social position, as well as my 
method of analysis. Reflexivity involves a looking back at one’s own biases, 
practices, and taken-for-granted points of view, to “question the suppositions 
inherent in the position of an outside observer who, in his preoccupation with 
interpreting practices, is inclined to introduce into the object the principles of 
his relations to the object” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 2)(see Figure 5). For me, this 
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means sharing practical experiences with the researched subjects and 
practitioners, and living through the spatiality and temporality of their 
embodied conditions. Through these means, I have hoped to come to 
understand ITCO’s mechanisms of social reproduction, including the structures, 
habitus, field of play, and actions. 
 
 
Figure 5. Bourdieu’s Reflexivity (Maton, 2003). 
 
Thus, I have chosen qua epistemology for a fairly traditional concept of social 
studies. I do emphasize reflexivity, but as a critical tool to better controlling the 
rigor of observation. My ethnography needs to be acceptable to the reader as 
documentation of what happened ‘then and there’. The researcher will try to stay 
as neutral as he can to let the story emerge as far as possible on its own terms. I 
will try to let ITCO talk to you. Of course I know that this is a ventriloquist’s 
trick and that ITCO cannot, as such, talk. But I can try to achieve the traditional 
sign of ethnographic success; i.e. the reader believes that I have really been there 
and that the reader feels that he/she knows on some crucial points what it was 
like. I will try to keep my theorizing, reflections and questioning in reserve 
thereby making Chapter 2 as descriptive as possible. 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
The Case: ITCO 
 
This is a case history. I have announced that this is a book about scarcity and 
excess. Business is all about scarcity – i.e. fulfilling the needs and demands of 
populations and customers. Success in business is all about excess or the value-
added above raw material and labor costs that accrues to managers and owners. 
What has shocked, troubled and fascinated me is that in ITCO there seemed to 
be excess without scarcity. ITCO seemed to flourish without really producing 
products and services to meet market demand. There was demand all right, 
ITCO signed contracts and promised to deliver IT solutions, but did not seem to 
deliver what it promised either to its customers or investor(s). This should spell 
disaster and it did not. ITCO was a mystery to me. How could it exist as it did? 
At first I thought it should definitely be remade into a ‘normal’ successful firm. 
But I discovered slowly that no such thing was going to happen. Thus in this 
chapter I describe as best I can how ITCO was, how ITCO did (not) change 
(despite my attempted introduction of change agents) and how the economy of 
excess lead to excesses I more abhor than I can praise. 
ITCO 2004: Where, When, What 
ITCO is not a real name, but it is a very real place. A few details of its existence 
have been disguised to protect confidentiality, but the overall image of the 
people and the life of the organization are true. 
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I frequently travelled across the Atlantic to reach my consulting destination in 
ITCO, in Abu Dhabi. Usually I would meet the vice presidents and president at 
the start of every visit. I was usually booked in at a nearby hotel; jet lag keeping 
me awake until early morning. Nonetheless, early morning meetings would get 
me going, as I tried to understand ITCO’s problems. When I began working 
with ITCO, the vice president’s main concern was with the projects. 
Management felt that it could not successfully control what was happening with 
project implementation at their customer sites. This made it near impossible to 
find ways to make the projects profitable. The meetings with the vice president 
of sales started with highly optimistic stories about hundred-million dollar 
projects, won in the last months, and how ITCO would keep on growing. The 
vice president would talk about his recent visits to Europe and elsewhere in the 
Gulf region. He would speak of the vast potential in other countries like Iraq and 
Iran. I would caution him that the risks in such volatile places are very high, and 
that ITCO knows little about how things get done in those countries. The vice 
president would laugh and re-assure me (and himself) that there was nothing 
that could not be cracked by ITCO’s collective knowhow in IT. During these 
meetings, there would always be interruptions from sales managers or project 
managers, popping into the vice president’s office to report a problem such as 
issues with products and project delivery.  
ITCO’s main offices are in Abu Dhabi, and it has partner offices in Lebanon and 
Saudi Arabia. ITCO depends on loans and credit facilities from local and 
international banks to operate. In presentations by the president of ITCO to 
foreign companies he has stated:  
“ITCO was founded in 1979 and operates as a single firm with branches in 
different cities in the UAE and the Persian Gulf region. It has grown to become 
a major IT provider of hardware products from global players like HP, IBM, 
Erikson, and others. The company has several divisions, Oracle 
implementation services, retail outlets, and maintenance and support services. 
ITCO had a turnover of approximately US$1 billion in 2007, and over 600 
employees operating throughout its offices.”  
ITCO (in 2004) was a self-contained IT services company that sold and 
implemented solutions and products. It was partly a retail company and at the 
same time, a project implementer, delivering people and hardware-based 
‘solutions’ to customers. Customers either bought directly from ITCO or chose 
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to publish a Request for Proposal (RFP) for needed products and services that 
ITCO could bid for. Once a deal is made, customers are supposed to get the 
solution that meets their needs. Selling and implementing projects is what 
ITCO’s president and vice presidents spend most of their time doing. Most 
customers base their purchasing decisions on price. Competition is mainly 
determined by price but purchases are also determined by relationships. This is 
an almost all-male world – of ITCO’s consultants, 95 percent are male. Few 
female consultants are allowed to enter the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or 
Kuwait. Often, they have to be accompanied by their husbands and have a very 
unique specialization or field of expertise to get in.  
ITCO’s primary assets, as an IT products and services organization, are the 
educated professionals under contract to it, whose outputs are intangible 
services grounded in complex knowledge. ITCO’s reputation is related to its size 
and power, and much less to the quality of its services and personnel. Many 
managers I talked to said that they were attracted to ITCO, as opposed to other 
major firms, because of ITCO’s high brand recognition in major UAE markets. 
Employees see value in belonging to a powerful company as it facilitates meeting 
revenue targets faster. Employees see a good brand name as a means to better 
compensation and/or a better job. Both employees and clients view ITCO as a 
leading provider of products and services, with a core business of selling a varied 
range of brand products from major Western IT vendors.  
Most of ITCO’s consultants work at customer sites all over the Persian Gulf 
region: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain. For the majority of 
employees, working for ITCO means emigrating from their country of origin to 
the UAE. Working in ITCO entails entering a small but intense world of 
interaction. ITCO has a ‘thick’ organizational culture. ITCO’s early growth was 
characterized by a culture of ‘winning’, with strong continuity in the executive 
group. Both employees and customers view ITCO as an IT solution and service 
provider with an outstanding after-sales support organization. The core business 
included the selling of branded products. Selling hardware was the firm’s core 
business since its founding; early projects were based on selling the hardware 
first and making them operational as part of a solution later. The success jargon 
centered on: ‘winning a large deal’, ‘selling thousands laptops’, ‘acquiring a new 
product license’ and having a ‘competitive lead due to a new product launch’. 
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ITCO’s larger customers come from the government and semi-government 
sectors, such as telecommunications, and the oil and gas companies. Most of 
these companies are managed by expatriates just like in ITCO. The government 
and semi-government organizations are managed by locals or UAE nationals. 
ITCO has several offices in Abu Dhabi. There is the corporate office consisting 
of six floors, with a large retail store featuring the latest IT gadgets and phones 
from Erikson and other well-known brands on the ground floor. Executives, 
sales managers, and administration staff operate from the corporate office. The 
services and project offices are at a different location and are less modern. As 
you enter the services and projects offices, you see posters hanging on the walls 
(see Figure 6).  
Figure 6. An office picture at ITCO, 2006. 
(“When a collection of brilliant minds, hearts, and 
talent come together, expect a masterpiece”) 
 
The pictures have proverbs written under them, such as: “C H A N G E; If you’re 
not riding the wave of change you’ll find yourself beneath it.” ITCO’s mission 
statement was: “Rely on our solutions to achieve sustainability and growth; our 
success depends on the success of the clients and communities we serve in creating 
and sharing wealth.” This is mirrored in the vice president of sales, statements: 
“ITCO is one of a few firms that grew enormously during the period of 2003 to 
2009 by expanding into every possible IT product in the UAE and the Persian Gulf 
region. It dominates the IT market in the UAE by winning major projects and 
rapidly expanding with new products.” And by selling Erikson smart phones it 
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had enhanced its image among the local UAE officials and members of the 
ruling family. As he saw it, ITCO’s business model centered on selling IT 
products and services at low margins. Since contracts depended on price, this 
was the way to insure that the revenue levels would grow.  
I insisted to Fadi that usually, when solutions are embedded into products, 
margins should be much higher. He claimed that competition was fierce and 
that ITCO’s strategy was to maintain and gain market share, and hence margins 
were lower than the standards. Whether this was the best strategy to follow, Fadi 
was unsure, but since ITCO was growing, he assumed that it must be doing the 
right things. He explained that revenues originated mainly from large projects, 
and amounted to hundreds of millions yearly. Its telecommunications products 
division was a cash-type of business that brought in millions of dollars daily. 
This counter balanced the late collections from larger projects, whose 
implementation and cash collection usually extended to months and years.  
Every manager and executive I met agreed that the main factor contributing to 
ITCO’s capability to sell and win projects was its senior managers’8 strong 
relationships with local UAE managers in large governmental institutions. 
Projects mostly started at 30M USD each, and could even amount to over 100M 
USD per quarter. Risks on these projects were high, and if payments were 
delayed, the company could suffer losses. The amount of risk tended to be in a 
linear relationship to the size of the customer. It is highly predictable, for 
example, that in economic downturns, companies with larger projects will suffer 
most, therefore the larger a company’s revenues from large projects the greater 
the exposure, and hence the higher the risks. 
Fadi was normally my first ‘port of call’ when I arrived in Abu Dhabi. He 
provided me with the current lowdown on the business. But then, I had to go to 
HR. Jan is ITCO’s Human Resources and Administration (HRA) manager. 
Contacting the HRA manager is a must in any organization in the UAE. They 
hold your passport, take care of your visa, and arrange for your stay and 
transportation. The HRA in my case was also the project manager handling all 
change management initiatives. So she was a key contact for me and my work. 
                                                            
8 ‘Senior managers’ or ‘executives’ refer to the vice presidents and president of ITCO. ‘Managers’ 
refer to directors, sales managers, administration managers and project managers. 
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Jan had been five years in ITCO and was one of the most efficient employees I 
have ever worked with. She knew all the loopholes and ways to get things done. 
She was highly respected by both managers and consultants. Everyone felt 
comfortable communicating rumors and what happened informally inside 
ITCO to her, as well. She supported me in my desire to bring change to ITCO. 
Her explanation of who is who in ITCO: 
“Early in 2004, the demand for implementation consulting staff grew at a very 
high rate, starting a trend of freelance consulting. Consultants and project 
mangers came from all over the world to the UAE. Consultants started to 
demand higher salaries and began to be represented by agents. Agents 
negotiated on behalf of the consultants and had many vacancy positions and 
alternatives; consultants could be easily deployed in any part of the world. 
Agents sought to place consultants for shorter periods of time to maximize their 
possibility of raising their fees. In some cases, consultants demanded more than 
$3,000 USD per day for their services. Having mainly been involved in delivery, 
integration of systems, and consulting, the management team was 
inexperienced in solutions delivery and more experienced in selling products. 
ITCO experienced many issues as a result of these factors and changes in the 
economic context: projects got delayed as it was difficult to recruit the right 
consultants on time; profitability plummeted on many projects; long-term 
consultants started leaving as they sought higher compensation and employees 
felt that the management team was biased towards some employees; and in 
many instances, management refused to be accountable for failures. By the end 
of 2005, ITCO started experiencing losses in projects; however, senior 
management was too busy selling and failed to find solutions to the company’s 
problems.”  
ITCO’s executives portray the company as the largest IT supplier in the UAE 
and make efforts on every occasion and through marketing initiatives to 
maintain this image. The belief of the executives was that local government 
entities buy from the largest supplier, and that winning projects is easier if you 
are bigger. Competition comes from other IT companies. Rival sales managers 
often met each other when requests for proposals (RFPs) were opened at the 
purchasing departments of the procuring institution. The rivalry was not 
personal. Visits to larger customers were made by senior management. 
Participation in sponsoring government and expense-account entertainment 
were also part of the effort to strengthen ITCO’s relationships with large 
businesses.  
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From an organizational perspective, ITCO operated at three different levels. On 
the first level: the consultants and staff took care of customers and the functional 
aspects of projects. In a project, the consultants took the role of implementation 
experts. In this role, the consultant’s task was to manage a project at a customer 
site. The sales person had a primary role before the project was agreed upon with 
the customer. On the second level: ITCO’s managers oversaw many projects 
simultaneously and provided on-line project management. Here, the manager’s 
role was akin to an orchestra conductor or executive chef – that is, to provide 
on-line leadership and direction to the consulting team and to prioritize what 
needed to be done next, and by whom. ITCO’s offices were relatively small, but 
every manager had a separate office. Managers did not like to sit in open space 
cubicles. Earning a manager’s title meant getting an office with a separate door. 
This work seemed to be somewhat conflictual – as you passed by the offices, you 
heard arguments going on, either on the phone or with more people in the 
office. On the third level: the executives provided off-line leadership and 
management. The task here was to manage the organization and design the sales 
and project processes. 
The structure consisted of: (1) a president and four vice presidents, (2) a few 
directors of operations, who managed sales and delivery; sales managers 
responsible for revenue generation; operations and project managers responsible 
for the delivery and implementation of solutions and systems including ERP 
(Enterprise Resource Planning) such as financial, distribution, and HRMS (see 
Figure 7). ITCO also had a few staff functions such as the HR and 
administration manager, a chief accountant. And, of course, (3) there were the 
consultants and the support staff for delivering the after-sales services. 
EXECUTIVES president, vice presidents 
  
MANAGERS 
directors, project managers, sales managers, 
administration manager, service delivery manager, 
finance manager, human resources manager 
  
STAFF consultants, others 
Figure 7.  ITCO’s organizational structure. 
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Sixty percent of the six hundred plus employees were engineers who were the 
consultants providing and implementing solutions at customer sites. ITCO’s 
primary asset, as an IT services organization, was the educated professionals 
whose outputs were intangible services, encoded with complex knowledge. At 
the organizational level, ITCO was steered by normatively sanctioned 
expectations. These included expectations of professional independence, client 
confidentiality, and operating with integrity. ITCO had invested in 
organizational controls to secure compliant behavior. These operated through 
incentives and investment in personnel, via training, workshops, and developing 
the firm’s knowledge infrastructure. During the past decade, many service 
organizations have found themselves at the centre of scandals, specifically in 
accountancy, law, and IT consultancy. IT consultancy firms, much like ITCO, 
have violated the expectations of operating with integrity by exploiting every 
sales opportunity to increase revenues, disregarding accountability and losses as 
long as targets were met. ITCO has not been hit by a major scandal, but 
sometimes you wonder if that was not more good luck or the uncritical attitude 
of the business environment than thanks to its own merits. ITCO’s reputation is 
related to its size and power, and much less the quality of its services and 
personnel. Employees see value in belonging to a powerful company as it 
facilitates meeting revenue targets faster and more efficiently.  
ITCO buys its products from several multinational vendors, such as Oracle, 
Lenovo, Erikson, and many others. These vendors employ almost the same 
organizational structures as ITCO. Managers have the responsibility of 
overseeing project profitability, arranging for resources, long-term business 
planning, and collection. At ITCO managers mainly engage with customers and 
spend much of their day at project sites, meeting consultants and customer 
representatives. They were directly responsible for project plans and project 
profitability. All executives and managers at ITCO came from outside of the 
UAE. For several years, the majority came from Lebanon, Egypt, and India. The 
key administrative and senior management positions were held by Lebanese. 
The majority of the consultants and managers came from Egypt, Jordan and 
Lebanon, and the technical and solution managers came from India.  
From Jan I knew that ITCO’s projects were late and profitability had always 
been a problem, it seemed almost impossible to grow profits. Jan’s perspective:  
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“It seems to me that consultants and managers nowadays are travelling in a 
train, collecting higher salaries at every stop. Nobody cares; all they really care 
about is the money, their salary.  If we are late in paying one day they 
complain.  All have high salaries.  And from time to time they threaten to leave 
the company if we do not comply with their demands... 
If a project loses money, they do not care to find solutions to the problems, they 
blame the customer or senior management, and keep on draining the project 
resources until they leave, and someone else comes in, and re-does the whole 
project.  People do not care. The current management thinks that if we enhance 
our effectiveness in governing the projects, the project manager can reduce the 
risks and we can resolve these issues.” 
Jan thought that change needed to be brought very fast to ITCO. She had never 
attained a senior position during her career, but she claimed to be happy in her 
staff role and wanted to prove that she could help to bring change. I learned 
from her, to my surprise, that ITCO did not have an employee assessment 
method in place, so recruitment and promotions were decided by managers on a 
‘wasta’ or favoritism basis. ‘Wasta’ is a colloquial word that is used to indicate a 
close and reciprocal relationship between individuals, hence providing 
preferential treatment or service.  
Jan claimed that to work in ITCO was to interact with people whose talk about 
their daily practices only conveyed a sense of wanting to finish today, and wait 
for tomorrow: 
“Managers tackle their work with their future in mind, trying to get through 
the day’s work with as little anxiety as possible. Managers’ daily work is 
concerned with the subtleties of customers demanding new technology as the 
UAE sees hyper growth in every industry. ITCO had grown very fast over the 
past 10 years. Before the boom of 2000 to 2002, the company had a small-
company atmosphere. People tended to feel as though they knew one another; 
they communicated on a personal level and with much fewer formal 
procedures. With its fast growth, all this started to change. Attitudes changed. 
One salesman told me few months back, that he gets a feeling of insignificance 
nowadays when he closes a relatively large deal. In the past any deal would be 
celebrated and you could feel everyone was happy. Nowadays only very large 
deals get attention and even then there is no celebrating.” 
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Managers at ITCO have professional experience in systems design, 
programming and systems implementation. They have moved around from one 
company to another in the UAE. They knew their way about. Managers, through 
their social interactions, knew ITCO’s specific routines and practices, which 
were not all that different, anyway, from what they would experience elsewhere. 
Managers mostly comply with company rules; they have learned to stay away 
from executives when margins are low or profits do not look promising. This 
tacit knowledge had been learned previously and was easily adapted to ITCO.  
ITCO’s projects consist of multimillion dollar projects in IT implementation. 
The majority of managers made their money through sales commissions. 
Executives, on the other hand, were entitled to a percentage on the company’s 
end-of-year profits. The national owner or UAE local owned 100% of ITCO. Not 
being involved in the day-to-day operations of ITCO, its UAE owner was 
legitimately able to engage in a wide range of activities, sometimes in direct 
competition with ITCO. The owner was not interested in managing the assets he 
owns or setting any strategic direction for his investments. He expected yearly 
profits from ITCO, but was barely involved. The owner was worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars and usually felt happy that ITCO made profits. While profits 
were only in tens of millions, compared to the hundreds of millions in sales, 
such difference was never questioned by anyone, including the local owner, 
international auditors or the banks. In fact, he probably earned a lot more 
through his direct links to the ruling family than from his businesses. ITCO was 
but one not all too important venture in a portfolio. For rich UAE nationals, 
entering into any venture that is extravagant and unique, which distinguishes 
them socially from the rest, is nearly irresistible. A bank director in one of the 
largest UAE banks, reiterated to me in conversation that the fortunes, especially 
of those close to the ruling families, are in billions of dollars and that the money 
was held in local and foreign bank accounts. Socially, the companies are 
important; even the ruling sheikhs own companies and ventures that are usually 
registered in the names of other nationals close to them. 
For me ITCO was a difficult puzzle. From the perspective of 2004-2005, what 
most urgently needed changing? Was ITCO adapting or was there too much 
inertia? What disrupted or influenced change at ITCO? Could change be 
managed at ITCO? Would increased effectiveness bring what executives at 
ITCO expected? While executives emphasized increasing effectiveness, it was 
The Case: ITCO  51 
 
not clear how and what efforts were really in place to reach higher profits. 
Evidently ITCO had grown its revenues from a few million dollars per year in 
1998 to almost one billion dollars in a period of less than ten years, and everyone 
felt quite happy about it.  
After all they were getting what they wanted; making money quickly. Managers 
saw how fast someone else had accumulated wealth. Many experienced 
corruption as part of their daily transactions in trying to complete documents or 
in sales transactions. As a result, many felt that deviance and corruption were 
sanctioned. For these managers, it was considered a very shameful event when 
someone was caught and brought to justice. And, in such circumstances any 
justice is mostly politically driven by the UAE nationals, trying to hide the mere 
fact of the existence of corrupt practices. Accused individuals faced jail for their 
actions, but are mostly released in a few months, and deported to their country 
of origin. So, while in the eyes of many, justice was done, the reality of early 
release and deportation is low profile. Society, friends, and family, generally 
paint a shameful story of anyone implemented in kickbacks, bribes and theft. 
Rumors travel to the town or village of the perpetrator’s country of origin very 
fast. Everyone would come to know about the stories and would guess how 
much the person had gained. But no one would dare to bring these stories into 
open public discussion.  
In 2004-2005 I was filled with optimism about the possibilities of helping ITCO 
to resolve its problems. I believed that people and organizations should adapt to 
more effectively deliver value to their stakeholders. And I thought thanks to 25 
years of experience that I had what was required to help ITCO change and be 
more effective. My approach, back then, to change management was drawn from 
the management literature, and concepts such as Total Quality Management 
(TQM), sustainability and innovation, Business Process Re-engineering (BPR), 
and organizational development and learning in organizations. Implementing 
such change initiatives is very common in most organizations. Organizations 
assume that these initiatives add new routines and knowledge to their 
companies, leading to better practices and higher profits.  
Discussions with executives from ITCO, Oracle, and local UAE banks revealed 
that organizational change meant for them ‘something’ driven through 
facilitation agents either from within the organization or by outside consultants. 
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Change required the design of planned managerial actions with support from 
organizational members. For example, they talked about the ‘corporate culture 
as a system’ – that is, someone can design and integrate it within the firm. 
Change occurs simply by ‘telling and listening’. Managers, consciously or 
unconsciously, talk about achieving a ‘vision’ or even achieving ‘innovation’, by 
launching a program using a framework with directions and tips. Most of the 
people I met in ITCO held the belief that the effective manager is one who is ‘in 
control’ and can predict the distant future, or at least the near future. The UAE 
national owners and banks expected management to be in control, as it gave 
them confidence in the leadership of the organization.  
But could some sort of planned change initiative help ITCO, and if so, which? 
Could some sort of change program bring enhanced practices and effective 
results? After all such change programs really only amount to training. At the 
end of the day I have to tell ITCO managers something that is going to make 
them act differently. Can I really be sure they will even listen? Of course they 
would pretend to, but that wouldn’t get me very far. Of course there are 
guidelines and books, but they all refer to America and Europe. There’s really 
nothing known about change management in the UAE. Reengineering, TQM, 
and numerous other improvement approaches supposedly have worked with 
great success in some instances, but they can also fail miserably. So how certain 
could I be with my confidence? 
The reality was that executives at ITCO claimed to believe that they had control 
of ITCO and its operations. The executives believed that change involved 
processes that would anticipate future difficulties, threats and opportunities. 
They assumed that change involved a ‘change agent’ who was either internal or 
external to the organization, was committed to increased organizational 
effectiveness, and was aware of cultural constraints. 
ITCO had never implemented any change management framework or process. 
Throughout the years, ITCO had carried out small or incremental 
reorganizations on an annual basis. Year after year, these changes had become 
institutionalized as part of its culture. My interviews with vice presidents 
indicated that they saw these changes as a way to match ITCO’s internal 
structure to that of its vendors or partnered customers. 
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Change within ITCO had always followed a top-down approach. There would be 
presentations and email communications for a long period of time. Employees 
would complain about the changes, mostly informally. The changes were usually 
decided by the president in direct consultation with the vice presidents. These 
discussions were mostly done one-on-one and communicated to others in 
general meetings. No consensus was required. The changes mainly were directed 
to the operating structure of ITCO, sometimes affecting the senior managers’ 
and executives’ positions or authority. The current president had joined ITCO in 
1995 and all the vice presidents had been senior managers prior to being 
promoted to vice presidents, so ‘change’ really was business-as-usual.  
ITCO, beginning 2004, was reorganized into product divisions:  ERP (enterprise 
resource planning), CRM (customer relations management), BI (business 
intelligence and analytics), DMS (document management systems), 
Smartphones; and for each product category is subdivided into functional areas 
and profit centers. The small company atmosphere was gone. The divisions used 
to be independent and small enough that employees inside them felt as if they 
were working for a small company. Employees knew one another and could rely 
on personal contacts to get things done. Formal procedures had begun to 
dominate. Groups developed within the divisions their subdivisions based on 
ethnic backgrounds and countries of origin.  
At the end of 2004, it was agreed that I would implement change initiatives at 
ITCO to tackle issues surrounding the projects. I was to focus on: (1) revenue 
and profits, (2) enhancing effectiveness, and (3) managing finances. Improved 
effectiveness in practices and profitability was the goal. With the need 
acknowledged to increase revenues and achieve higher profits, new practices and 
structures were needed to provide faster project completion to realize higher 
margins. Multinational companies were entering the market, implementing 
projects with new tools and practices, reaping huge revenues and profits in short 
periods of time. ITCO had to catch up. 
Not only were there personnel problems caused by the loss of intimacy and the 
scale of the divisionalized set-up, hyper-capitalism was becoming more 
pronounced. High growth led managers and consultants to focus on their own 
benefit without regard for the company. Many were indifferent to relationship-
building with executives or managers above them. What relationships there 
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were, were built with similar others of the same country of origin and/or 
profession. Executives could not leverage relationships to enact innovation or 
compliance. And increased competition had created higher employee attrition 
leading to higher risks, especially in larger projects. ITCO needed solutions to 
limit attrition and to weld more unity. 
At Work in ITCO (2005-2008) 
In January 2005, I travelled back to the UAE to start the change initiatives at 
ITCO. My job as a change manager was to implement change and interact with 
different stakeholders—ranging from members of the executive team to project 
managers and employees, regional sales people and ITCO’s vendors—and to 
provide answers. The change program depended upon the collaborative 
interaction among informed and committed participants from each of the 
stakeholders. 
The change initiatives included a review of the structure, processes, project 
methodology, skill sets, practices and social relationships in the organization. 
My first question was: what does a person have to know to be in ITCO? The 
answers appeared initially rather simple. You have to know how to get the 
products, sell the products, implement IT solutions, and collect receivables to 
secure one’s profit.  
I constantly faced the temptation to jump to conclusions, a tendency produced 
by my familiarity with IT project implementations. I needed to balance 
observations of behavior with listening to managers and executives talk about 
their work and issues. I needed to tap into the executives, managers and 
consultants’ own interpretation of actions, events and situations. I needed to 
understand ITCO’s practices, and its political, economic and social dynamics, if 
I was to be effective. How did the key players in ITCO act and create meaning in 
their daily lives? 
I had weekly meetings with the vice presidents of ITCO, and I usually spent an 
hour or so per week meeting with the president. ITCO’s president is the main 
producer, innovator and strategist. The president has led ITCO’s growth, pushed 
the expansion into innovative products, and added offices and retail outlets all 
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over the UAE. However, he is rarely involved in day-to-day operations. He was 
keen to follow best-practice operational models and frameworks, and was 
focused on the designing of the processes that should take place. Strangely 
enough, more than once, our meetings were interrupted by the vice president of 
finance wanting to have him sign some papers and complaining about the lack 
of cash and collections. Another time, the director of administration interrupted 
to report that some fraudulent activity had happened in one of the retail shops. 
The president usually got angry at these interruptions. It was common for him 
to shout and argue. It seemed this was the way things got reported and resolved. 
My meetings with the president usually left me puzzled. He insisted that he 
rarely visits project sites, as that is the vice presidents’ responsibility, and that his 
presence could merely complicate matters. He was perfectly aware of the 
problems at projects, and I used to wonder and ask myself whether he believed a 
solution to increase profits was even possible. 
After meeting with the vice presidents I would turn my attention to meeting the 
managers and get more details on what was happening at the projects and in 
sales. Very early on, I decided that sales and project practices were the key 
components of ITCO’s daily work. The sales and projects practices in ITCO 
displayed stable patterns of behavior, but it was not clear how well they were 
adapted to their business environment. 
In any ordinary day at ITCO, people would either be closing sales deals or 
reacting to problems faced in project implementation. Selling products and 
increasing sales revenues is normal enough. At ITCO, high revenue figures 
supposedly differentiated them from all the others in the market. Being number 
one and the largest was an important image, and the story that the UAE national 
wanted to hear. Elias the director of sales: 
“Our objectives are very clear, and the first of these is selling to increase 
revenues; everything else is of secondary importance. The vice presidents and 
shareholders think they know it all; they are the leaders in the IT market in the 
UAE, and since they have grown to become a billion dollar company, they 
think everything they say is correct.”  
ITCO’s president: 
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“ITCO exists because of its relationships in the marketplace and its historical 
positioning. What is keeping ITCO alive are: (a) the brand-image capital it has 
gained throughout its many years of operations, (b) the sales objectives of 
getting deals at any cost, and (c) social relationships, through its political 
influence and that of the owner. This makes ITCO unique.” 
ITCO was focused on sales with little thought about how revenue targets would 
influence project profitability and whether customer receivables could become a 
danger to its finances. Managers at ITCO would always defend increasing sales 
as their growth objective and mission. This applied in particular to the Lebanese 
executives, who had the highest positions in the company. Historically, they 
were well known for their astute and innovative managerial skills. Sales growth 
empowered managers in their roles and practices while shaping corporate ITCO. 
As the president put it, “Everybody is a salesman.”  
But significantly enough, most of the managers involved along the chain of 
command, mentioned that they were not responsible for losses. They claimed 
that projects are complex and there were too many departments involved, and 
hence it was difficult to account for who was responsible. While sales revenue 
grew, ITCO’s accounting problems also increased, even though it engaged 
world-renowned auditors such as YNE Inc9., who in essence were responsible for 
the accuracy of ITCO’s accounts and financial reporting. In fact, shareholders, 
sales teams, auditors, and the national local owner were all benefiting from the 
growth in revenues. It created for everyone a sense of success. Growth in 
revenues meant, as explained by the Finance Manager, “New customers, larger 
projects and beating the competition.” Profits were reported yearly, and balance 
sheets and income statements were audited at the end of every fiscal year. The 
UAE owner, executives and managers collected bonus-pay and their share in 
profits, at the end of every fiscal year, if the targets were met. With increased 
sales revenues came increased receivables. How to account for receivables was 
problematic. Neither auditors nor the management team had proper guidelines 
on how to account for delays or bad debt. In fact, there was an ‘artificial 
receivables’ narrative that kept on being displayed in every conversation and 
discussion, while everyone avoided a decision on what and how to account for 
those late receivables. To reach the agreed to profits, ITCO had to meet its 
                                                            
9 The real name has been changed. 
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revenue targets, as margins were based on total revenues. Every effort was made 
to meet revenue targets.  
Sales were the responsibility of the sales managers, who performed a diverse set 
of roles. They called and visited customers, they answer RFPs, they followed up 
on orders, they interacted with the solution managers, they kept up-to date on 
their commissions, and they prepared yearly sales presentations detailing how 
they planned to meet their targets for the fiscal year. The processes of sales can 
be tracked and measured, and the quality of the outcomes can be judged. Many 
different quantitative metrics are used to assess how well ITCO, as a sales 
organization, was performing. One could see ITCO as a system that should be 
optimized to provide profits for its owners. The goal was to score profits every 
year. Employee and customer satisfaction was rarely measured or reported. 
Those factors were more qualitatively assessed through word of mouth. ITCO’s 
sales volume, revenue, and numbers of new customers were measured yearly. 
These measures were relatively precise; most of the data was easily obtained, and 
the majority of these measures were considered to be standard metrics. 
Prospecting for potential customers and visiting customers are key activities 
performed by sales managers. Customers are registered in a database and a series 
of analyses are performed to determine what best products and services to try to 
sell to them. Once a solution is sold, project managers are allocated to 
implement the solution with a team of professional consultants. The 
implementation could last for several months and in some cases a couple of 
years. Project management is an essential process to monitoring projects and 
their profitability. Projects are delivered and managed by a services department 
that uses what has been agreed in the solution proposal to deliver the agreed to 
products and services within a stipulated period of time.  
Personal wins are considered as all important in ITCO, almost always taking 
priority over any internal commitment or regard for the rules. When managers 
are asked to explain their actions or inactions, their rationalizations mainly rest 
on the premise of having to be an achiever who meets his or her targets. Being 
seen otherwise, opens one to rumor and back-stabbing. When I met with 
managers in there mini-offices, they would talk in low voices. Even when 
answering the telephone, there was a sense of secrecy, and I could not normally 
tell what the phone discussion was about. But it always related to some sales 
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effort or problems on closing on time. There was a strong sense of 
individualism. This was exemplified by the employees’ daily behaviors as well as 
by the organizational sales mythology. Many managers said they were attracted 
to ITCO, as opposed to other major firms, because ITCO paid higher bonuses, 
provided they met their targets. One manager claimed/joked that, “If a salesman 
meets and often exceeds his targets, he gets an open door to see or meet any 
executive, even the president, any time of day.” ‘The sales are everything’ myth 
was clearly crucial to ITCO’s culture. Management indicated that the only way 
to succeed was via sales.  
Customers often wanted things in areas that require expertise. Because of the 
high pressure to meet targets, and the fact that maintaining close customer 
relationships was the only way to make sales, sales managers were reluctant to 
relinquish control of customers to technical experts. ITCO thereby was 
perceived by customers as a generalist as opposed to an organization with deep 
expertise. Due to the individualistic behavior of the sales managers and the lack 
of executive intervention, a perception developed over time that there were few 
real decisions being taken by the executives. On several occasions, I observed 
that new procedures or rules were designed but never followed. In one example, 
sales managers were requested to validate their solutions in every bid with a 
project manager. But this was ignored by the sales managers, who said that it 
was too time-consuming and that the project managers always demanded more 
products or man-days, making the sale almost impossible. As one sales manager 
told me, “If the vice president of sales does not make the decision to impose this 
process, no one will be blamed in the end for getting it wrong.”  
The vice president of sales, Fadi, was a very energetic manager with a vast 
number of connections. Fadi had dozens of sales people and sales managers 
reporting to him. Up to ITCO’s crisis in 2009, Fadi had the full trust of the 
president. In fact, ITCO grew (at least in numbers) as a result of Fadi’s 
aggressive sales strategies. During the financial crisis of 2009, however, the trust 
level between the vice presidents and president diminished, as it emerged that an 
increasing percentage of sales revenues were associated with higher risks. It 
turned out that product/service mixes that had been promised caused confusion 
in the accounting for revenue. Fadi had always insisted that his team did the 
selling and that the problems arose from other departments, either the projects 
or services department, or accounting department. But in the end, everyone was 
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rewarded for selling and doing what they were supposed to do. As long as ITCO 
recorded profits, managers, auditors, and banks accepted the status quo of 
inflated profits. 
 
In 2006, because of the exponential growth in sales, a new system for sales 
reporting was designed and deployed. The system, called FLOW (named by the 
president, as a system that propagated data and informed all departments), 
allowed salespeople to enter and access information about their opportunities by 
registering customer contacts, keeping track of sales closed and profitability. In 
addition, sales people got compensated only when they entered their 
opportunities into the system; failing to do so would mean no commission for 
closing the sale. But, in fact, this was never a policy that was implemented. The 
system was also meant as a management tool to control, manage, and measure 
sales revenues and targets throughout the company. The vice presidents and 
president were to use the system to forecast sales, to reward and discipline sales 
people, and to assess progress towards meeting sales targets. The vice president 
of sales used FLOW to prepare performance reports for the president and other 
vice presidents, who in turn used them to assess the organization’s performance 
and justify and create company policies and strategies. In fact, salespeople’s and 
managers’ everyday office experience revolved from then on around FLOW.  
Ahmed, at the time was a key informant for me. He was a successful sales 
manager who managed to sell effectively year after year and exceeded his sales 
revenue quotas. While I was chatting with Ahmed about FLOW, he mentioned: 
 .... [laughing] “FLOW is full of garbage; we just register opportunities to make 
sure we get rewarded at the end. Most of the data is not correct, and it is over 
inflated; this keeps the vice president and president off your back. It is good to 
report many opportunities. It is only a problem when you do not win enough 
sales at the end of the fiscal year and you need to justify the data you have 
entered. ITCO’s fiscal year is normally a full calendar year and hence no 
quarterly reporting is required. You also need to make sure that you have 
opportunities equally large as other sales people, because the ‘tapping on 
shoulders’ depends on how many opportunities you have in FLOW.”  
Fadi voluntarily took on demanding sales targets. He aimed hereby to legitimize 
his success, position, and status within ITCO and the IT field in the UAE. 
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ITCO’s incentive scheme was complex, but ensured that sales people made vast 
amounts of commission if they met their targets. As described by Ahmed, each 
sales manager had to present a sales plan at the beginning of every year, when 
the vice presidents and president decided on the sales manager’s targets. Every 
sales manager had to have a minimum opportunity pipeline in FLOW and had 
to enter the probability of closing that pipeline. ‘Opportunity pipeline’ is a sales 
term used to reflect the amount of potential customers a sales manager has, with 
details on products, solutions and time required to close the opportunity.  
Fadi had been successful every year for the last four consecutive years in meeting 
and exceeding his targets. Ramez, another sales manager, had mentioned that 
large deals were usually closed directly by Fadi. Fadi knew that only a few of the 
dozen sales managers were good in sales. In many cases, Fadi would step in to 
help sales managers win deals. He wanted to make sure the sales report would 
not show bad results and lost opportunities. Fadi had gained a legitimate status 
for his sales operations and meeting sales targets.  
Fadi’s successes helped everyone from vice presidents to the president to cash-in 
on large bonuses. Sales managers, such as Ahmed and Ramez, knew that they 
usually over committed to customers and that a sale’s win might have less risk 
and returns than what the FLOW system portrayed. When confronting Fadi 
with such cases, he would aggressively justify the failure or low margins as due to 
the incompetence of the project and service department, which overspent 
resources, surpassing what was actually budgeted in the FLOW system. No one 
really engaged in a thorough due diligence of every sales win. The real value of 
projects and the potential profit was always unclear. While there were project 
managers responsible for the delivery of the projects, many problems were 
encountered during the delivery that caused people to act irresponsibly. Even 
when project managers announced failures in delivery, no one was held 
accountable for the failure. By the time the customers received their products 
and ITCO was paid for the project, many variables would have been involved in 
the process, which made it difficult for finance to prove that the sales 
department or the salesman was at fault, even when the sale ended in a loss. 
Reaching the demanding sales targets sometimes proved difficult for Fadi and 
his sales managers. They resolved these difficulties through practices of 
guilefulness, coaxing, and somewhat coercively committing deviance, which 
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enabled them to create a representation of sales successes that were scarcely, if at 
all, grounded on actual sales. Nearing the end of every fiscal year, sales revenues 
would be way off their targets. It was usual for the vice president of sales to close 
a few large deals during the last month of every fiscal year. The accounting 
standard used to report such deals, at the end of a fiscal year, required the 
delivery of products and services, which physically could not happen, as the 
suppliers’ supply chain needed several weeks to ship and deliver. In many cases, 
the accounting vice president would allow revenue to be recognized by printing 
invoices and storing them until the goods were physically delivered. Using such 
practices, it would then be possible to recognize revenue and profits that actually 
did not happen in terms of the GAAP10 accounting rules. The above practices 
projected artificial sales revenues, as sales managers were claiming sales revenues 
and margins on sales that the sales operations had not actually (yet) made.  
Were sales people and managers aware of their deviance? When I asked Fadi 
about the irregularities in his sales operations, he replied; “It is not my 
department’s fault; it is the customer’s, who implicitly asks for certain terms that 
sometimes are difficult to accommodate in a deal and hence we resort to finding 
ways to get revenue recognized before the end of the fiscal year. And since this is 
done almost every year, it does not really impact the overall figures. It is as if next 
year’s revenue is recognized this year, so subsequent years will have the same 
effect.” But if projects were cancelled after the end of the fiscal year, the status of 
having met the sales target would stay the same. 
Change is only possible if managers and consultants accept the need for change. 
Otherwise you will get lip-service and the status quo. In ITCO, the owner has 
complete authority over financial decisions. However, the local owner did not 
get involved in the daily operations of his companies. His inquiries were more 
related to profits and the amount of cash in the bank. Government, a very 
important client, likes to see a strong person who is in control of all labor and 
visa-related issues. Other forms of power are less visible and more implicit. For 
an expatriate, being the president or vice president of a company is the highest 
rank that any expatriate can attain in the UAE. The president and vice 
presidents of ITCO had made the grade. The commanding tone and language 
used in operational daily practices reflected this.  
                                                            
10 GAAP is standard accounting set of rules that are usually mandated by international auditing 
firms. GAAP details how revenue is recognized in trading and project completion. 
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At the end of the fiscal year of 2005, I attended a quarterly sales meeting, to try 
to understand how targets are set and how sales managers go about meeting 
those targets. In one of the sales meetings, the tone and voice of the president 
clearly demonstrated his power:  
“The fiscal year ends in three months and you are behind targets. We all need 
to roll up our sleeves and make a difference before the end of May. As 
experienced sales people, you need to start taking more ownership and getting 
closer to meeting your targets and know what is going on within your accounts. 
You need to be focused and serious, I am confident that you can achieve it. 
What I do not want to hear are excuses on why you cannot close deals. I will be 
calling on each of you to check on every opportunity. I am not going to be 
happy if we do not meet our targets.” 
The sales people gathered for a coffee or cigarette after the sales meeting. 
Ahmed, one of the sales managers, commented on the meeting: 
“They do not know that it is mostly the customer who is delaying the deals. We 
cannot accelerate such events. They should be more on the ground and listen to 
what customers have to say. They cannot just threaten us like this!”  
The president of ITCO did frequently reiterate the importance of the change 
initiatives to the vice presidents, and I was often invited to attend some of the 
executive meetings. It is typical for the president to call for such a meeting; very 
rarely did a vice president call one. Late in 2005, I attended the meeting related 
to adopting a new business model for operations. The meeting started with the 
president talking us through power points. The slides were designed by the 
graphics department of ITCO, and they were really outstanding. The colors, the 
animation and the graphics, were some of the best I had ever seen. The meeting 
started with the president presenting the slides’ content. Interruptions were not 
allowed. Vice presidents were to sit and listen. The ‘Five Gears’ model (see 
Figure 8) was introduced during the meeting, which depicted five main 
departments owning and managing the five major processes influencing how the 
supply-chain from sales to delivery should work. The president explained and 
told everyone ‘what’ and ‘why’ the model should be implemented. Some 
questions were raised and I noticed that the vice presidents were impressed and 
had no comments. Strangely the meeting ended with the president mentioning 
that more would be explained in later sessions. By December 2005, new rules on 
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sales were implemented and a new system to map the ‘Five Gears’ model started 
to take shape.  
 
 
  Figure 8. Five Gears model. 
 
But the gap between the rhetoric and the actual application of the model was 
apparent to all. This created anxiety, tension, and reciprocal blaming; people 
yelled, were accused, and humiliated. Managers were more than ever cynical and 
pessimistic. In a meeting with the vice president of sales, I suggested that the 
new model was not working at all well. The vice president commented:  
“The problem is not ‘what’ and ‘why’, but leading on the ground and showing 
others ‘how’ to implement the new model. We always fail in implementation. 
We have very good ideas, but people are not motivated to implement them. It is 
a people issue; they do not change, no one wants to lead or to try something 
new.”  
But the managers told a very different story: 
“They (the executives) impose on us this stuff that do[es] not work; they should 
consult us before implementing such systems. Anyhow, we just fill in the 
paperwork and show them what they expect to see and get our work approved. 
We are more afraid of getting blamed and being shouted at than getting 
through the paper work. Everyone runs away and blames the other when 
accountability is the issue.” 
Actually, accounting and finance is manned with over forty employees. The vice 
president of finance had been with ITCO for over 30 years. He came from 
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Lebanon and had moved through the ranks within ITCO over the years. He 
understood how banks and auditors operated and maintained good 
relationships with other vice presidents and employees. There had never been an 
internal audit in ITCO. This only happened in 2010, after the 2008 global 
financial crisis had wrecked havoc. The vice president of finance is well 
respected by the owner who visits him frequently, in most cases to inquire about 
profits. Applying pressure to maintain levels of cash flow and profits is the vice 
president’s main task. He is very aware of the difficulties ITCO faces to 
recuperate cash from projects. In his view the sales department is the main cause 
for project failure, and the problems in collecting receivables.  
I did slowly gain some access to the finance department. Initially, the chief 
accountant, a certified account from India, did not welcome my presence in the 
department. No one would give me the time of day, and my queries were 
redirected to the vice president. It took many months to gain access. My 
relationship with another certified accountant from India in another company 
helped me gain some legitimacy. He explained to ITCO’s chief accountant that 
he had known me for many years and that I could be trusted. Only then, was I 
welcomed. I happen to like Indian food, and have an interest in Indian culture, 
so spending evenings in the accounting department worked out well for me. 
I wanted to better understand ITCO’s finances after having heard so much about 
the problems in projects and receivables collection. The chief accountant told 
stories of how projects were not priced accurately and how ITCO was never able 
to collect the last payments on projects. When I asked him what the role of the 
auditors was in pointing out these problems to management, his reply was as 
follows: 
“The auditors come and spend one to two weeks, they look at few of the 
transactions, they discover minor things, and they leave. In a few instances, 
they have alerted the company to cases such as the vast amount of outstanding 
receivables, but in most of these cases, they just advise the vice president how to 
implement an acceptable solution to get the end-of-year reports signed off. 
ITCO needs to show a substantial balance sheet and profits fully audited; 
otherwise the banks might be reluctant to provide us with much needed credit.”  
The president and a few of the vice presidents showed no embarrassment about 
being unable to report higher profits. Profits had not grown for several years. It 
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seemed what was important was reporting profits on a par with previous years. I 
observed tough discussions during which the vice president of finance revealed 
that no profits would be reported for the financial year of 2008. All the vice 
presidents were asked to revise their revenue recognition11 of projects and report 
back to the finance department, to see if higher revenue recognition could lead 
to reporting profits. 
‘Profit’ was a very vague concept at ITCO. ITCO kept borrowing money from 
the banks, almost monthly, creating a paradox that no one volunteered to 
explain. If you are making money why do you have to constantly borrow 
more? I was only able to uncover the (un-)reality of the ‘profits’ in 2010, 
once the financial crisis had hit ITCO hard, only then was I allowed to 
critically examine the numbers. 
I did take part in some of the end of June discussions where compensation and 
bonuses are reviewed. Overall company targets are discussed with the owner and 
the appropriate bonuses for the executives are agreed upon. Sales commissions 
are paid on margins and meeting sales quota targets. The only control is by the 
auditors who report to the owner and not the executives. Since meeting targets 
translates to commissions, bonuses and profits, revenue is often reported that 
usually would go unrecognized according to accepted accounting principles. 
Revenue recognition in the IT industry is usually recorded based on an 
interpretation of what kinds of products are being sold and if the products entail 
the delivery of a solution or implementation. A sales project passes a scrutiny of 
whether the revenue from the sales of the products and implementations meets 
the criteria of segmentation. Revenues from products sold with no 
implementation can be recognized once shipped and invoiced. Revenues from 
products that are sold with implementation can only be recognized in relation to 
the percentage of implementation completed. So if the project extends for 
months, the recognition might happen monthly, for example, once invoices for 
the work completed, are issued.  
But at ITCO, revenue associated with implementation was recorded when it did 
not meet the revenue-recognition principles. Early recognition of revenue at the 
                                                            
11 Revenue recognition allows a company to report within a fiscal year, amounts of money that 
usually follow accepted accounting principle rules on delivery, shipping and invoicing. While sales revenue 
grew, ITCO’s money and profit issues also increased. ITCO engages world-renowned auditors such as YNE, 
who report to the UAE national owners and certify the accuracy of ITCO’s accounts.  
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end of the fiscal year meant that the subsequent year’s revenue would be less. 
But, in the words of the vice president of sales, “We have 12 months to make it 
happen, and maybe we get lucky with some big deal in the coming fiscal year that 
will then cover the recognized revenue we reported the year before.” In essence, the 
practice continued from year to year. Every year it was as difficult to reach the 
revenue targets as the previous year.  
On a day-to-day basis, the project managers are the backbone to project 
implementation. Profit is made or lost in project delivery. It is anticipated that 
project management should form the core to the company. Typically the project 
managers’ tasks included: scheduling projects and budgeting time required to 
meet deadlines, negotiating revisions, changes and additions to the contractual 
agreements, preparing and submitting budget estimates and progress and cost 
tracking reports, interpreting and explaining plans and contract terms to team 
members and clients, dealing with the sponsors of the project. Actually, project 
management was much more intricate. Usually, after the sales team had 
confirmed a sale involving implementing software and installing systems at a 
customer site, the services department appointed a project manager to the 
project. An initial project scope session would take place. Project managers 
would conduct an analysis of what is required to be delivered. They would 
discuss the project with the solutions designer and the sales people in order to 
better understand the required solution. Thereafter, the project manager sets out 
to define the project work plan and the deliverables. A summary of the costs or a 
project budget is developed. Project managers also note potential problems that 
they foresee, based on previous sales contracts and differences between what the 
request for proposal (RFP) stipulated and what is deliverable. Project managers 
point to problematic areas and send emails to their supervisors and heads of 
departments, making them aware that these differences exist. It is a way for 
project managers to anticipate problems and not to be blamed later for failing to 
implement on time and on budget. 
The contention between sales managers and project managers is evident during 
their meetings. There is a very low level of trust. One project manager pointed 
out to me:  
 “Sales people – all they care about is making a sale; they do not understand the 
problems we get into in every project once they commit ‘stuff’ to the customer 
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that is not written into the contract. In fact, no single project contract was ever 
implemented as per the RFP or final contract; there is always some 
commitment that sales managers have given to customers and they never 
documented. We only come to find out what, when the project is underway 
and we then have to fight to see who is to blame. No vice president or quality 
manager would step in to resolve these differences before the project started.”   
The customers were usually large organizations with several hundred users; they 
required the installation of large IT servers and systems. Customers usually 
appoint someone in their department to act as project manager from their side, 
and in other cases the customer IT managers take on an extra role as customer 
project manager. ITCO’s project managers maintain very good relationships 
with customer project managers. In some of the meetings I attended, customers’ 
project managers would blame ITCO for issues and problems, but would not 
blame ITCO’s project manager. 
Methodologies, tools and frameworks all get their due in the mapping out of the 
task project management. But 'communications' seem to be ignored. Only 
project team members usually labeled as technical or functional consultants are 
to be kept abreast of developments. Seldom was communication with service 
directors or vice presidents planned. Only when something went wrong in the 
project did this seem to occur. Nonetheless, it was common for project managers 
to pop into the vice presidents’ offices to briefly communicate, standing at the 
door, commenting: “Project is running well; everything seems to be going OK. I 
just spoke to the IT manager and he has nothing to complain about.” The HR 
manager had previously mentioned such behavior. She went on to say that in 
more than 90% of the projects, the contrary was actually true; projects were not 
on time and were slipping into loss. However, it was never possible to know the 
final outcome of a project in terms of profit or loss until closure.  
Project team members often arrived late at customer sites. The project manager 
would sometimes complain to the team, if the customer was too strict about 
timing. In some instances, project managers would be less strict, understanding 
that team members usually stay late into the night hours to complete their work. 
The project manager usually meets with all the consultants to get an idea of 
where they are at and whichever deliverables they are putting out this or next 
week. In many instances, a consultant or developer points to issues with client 
implementation. The project manager listens to the challenges, reviews the 
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client’s contract, but almost always finds that the contractual terms are too 
ambiguous. On other occasions, the project manager meets the client to insist on 
services that have been requested that cannot be rendered in the packaged 
solution. Customizing a solution to meet the client’s need could put the 
implementation into jeopardy. A solution consultant is usually involved in 
trying to limit customization. I noticed that project managers, in many of their 
projects, failed to enforce the final decision. In those instances, the customer 
usually made a decision demanding changes to the solution. These changes are 
not communicated to ITCO’s services director or vice presidents. ITCO’s project 
managers tend to conceal such critical information from others in order to avoid 
blame when unable to meet customer demands. Such projects end in losses. 
The vice presidents were aware of reasons why projects might fail or at least they 
thought they were. Failures could be attributed to the scope of the project (or 
lack thereof), and to the lack of commitment from the project managers. The 
losses came about as a result of project managers and consultants exceeding the 
planned time and not meeting the milestones originally proposed for the project. 
Because consultants and project managers were led by the customer in terms of 
how to implement the procured system, costs accumulated were beyond the 
project manager’s control.  Instead, project managers should have been leading 
the implementation based on the original customer requirements and discuss 
with the customers and the vice president new ways to address the increasing 
costs. ITCO’s projected costs were usually based on the initial customer 
requirements, and so a contract would be drawn up and priced based on those 
requirements and the time needed to configure the IT products for the 
prescribed solution. Consultants and project managers were supposed to comply 
with the fundamental baseline on which the project was priced. They were not 
supposed to reconfigure the system, as the cost impact would be unpredictable. 
They were supposed to stick to the contract, as signed. All contracts were fixed 
priced, i.e. ITCO would not be allowed to change the price once the contract was 
signed. Large discrepancies between contracts and reality led to losses in many 
projects.  
ITCO’s vice presidents were convinced that the losses were as a result of 
diverging from contracts. Executives and the leadership were focused on 
performance targets, control procedures and other impersonal mechanisms, but 
failed to acknowledge that they themselves were not engaging in proper 
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governance of the projects in a systematic manner in order to reveal issues, risks 
and delays, which affected project profitability. While there was a formalized 
governance process overseen by the services director, project governance did not 
reflect the reality of what happened at the project sites.  
In ITCO’s project plans, each activity was well detailed, reflecting the starting 
time, ending time and number of resources required. Each project manager 
would spend almost a whole day, before the end of every week, updating their 
project plans. All these plans were consolidated and centralized under a system 
where any manager or vice president could conduct a thorough analysis of any 
project. However, when visiting projects, I discovered that very few of the stated 
plan activities matched what the consultants were actually implementing. It 
seemed as if project managers strongly believed that what they represented on 
their project plans was the reality of the project, but in fact, it was not what the 
consultants were actually doing. After several failed projects, it was apparent that 
several factors were contributing to project failure. Causes and remedies for 
project failure were documented on the company website. 
The project managers were eager to be certified. Seeking PMP (Project 
Management Professional) certification was important. PMP certification is 
granted by a North American organization that creates the curriculum and 
administers the exams. It is usually a costly endeavor, but project managers 
believed that such certification gave them more status and better compensation, 
so almost all project managers at ITCO sought and obtained PMP certification. 
To this degree they were motivated to learn and to improve. They attended 
several implementation methodology sessions and made an effort to use some of 
what they had learned. This meant defining deliverables and better control of 
milestones. More attention to customer requirements could help to deliver and 
test the required system. In most of the cases, they followed the methodology 
and copied the templates for each deliverable, and had the customer sign off on 
the template-based documents. They mentioned that in many cases the 
customer would not read the whole document, but would sign the documents so 
as not to delay the project. Of course, such practices were not recommended, but 
project managers needed to move forward on their projects, and thus they 
allowed such practices to continue.  
70 Chapter 2 
 
New training could, therefore, reinforce ITCO’s commitment to its managers, 
and if it was delivered professionally, it might trigger some change. The decision 
was to target specific training interventions directed to areas of weakness 
needing urgent improvement. A workshop was organized where project 
managers could identify problematic areas that they usually encountered in their 
daily practices. Risk management and governance tools and practices could 
strengthen the implementation methodology. Project managers would be 
enabled to analyze project stakeholders and to identify risks. Before planning the 
workshop, I talked with several of the project managers and their manager. 
Hamed, one of the ITCO project managers had previously worked for IBM and 
had attended many workshops. I asked him about his experience with such 
learning sessions: 
“Workshops and training sessions are always good to have. But it is very 
difficult to get consultants and customers to abide by new practices. 
Consultants do not want to do more than what they are doing and customers, 
in most of the cases, do not read documents or care to implement new 
procedures or policies. Customers feel that it is your responsibility to get the 
system working to their requirements and anything extra is not their problem. 
We have seen in the past and in current projects many issues. I assume that the 
new practices should be able to help us manage these risks and issues.”  
Hamed was working in Kuwait on a project called PEFKU (an oil and gas 
company implementation of an HRMS system). He mentioned that the PEFKU 
project was facing many challenges. He further noted that the company was 
managed by locals (Kuwaitis) and that PEFKU’s employees were trying their 
best to avoid the new system. PEFKU wanted to hire non-nationals to work on 
the application, but no-one had been hired. At the same time, PEFKU’s project 
owners had recently changed and the new ones were blaming the previous 
owners for the lack of progress on the project; they were afraid to take 
ownership of it. In addition, PEFKU’s users had complained several times about 
Hamed. They felt that he was not leading the project. When I made queries 
about Hamed’s performance and work, I was informed that he always came late 
to work and that he did not manage consultants at the project site. Hamed was 
well paid, and being outside his base country (the UAE), he was entitled to many 
fringe benefits. Hamed had been on the PEFKU project almost eight months, 
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and Edmaz, his direct manager, commented, “He just let the situation get to what 
it is without raising red flags to alert others to the problems early in the project.”  
When asked what would help make things better at PEFKU, Hamed mentioned 
that more resources would be needed, and thus the cost of the project would 
have to be at least 50% more. Hamed also mentioned that executives always 
blamed the project manager for mishaps, and that he felt powerless in all these 
cases. Edmaz was frustrated because Hamed’s projects were failing and he was 
unable to do anything to aid matters. Edmaz:  
“Customers are not easy to deal with, but Hamed does not seem to care much, 
and every time I audit and hold him accountable, he promises to make things 
better and not to fail me. But this same behavior and promises [have] been 
going on for many months now.” 
I decided to also call Harb, another project manager at a multimillion dollar 
project, and to get his input. Harb was a graduate of the American University of 
Beirut (AUB). He talks with ease, is always calm and he speaks perfect English. 
My first encounter with Harb had been a few years previous, when he and his 
colleagues started the Linker, an internal newsletter for ITCO. The newsletter 
was a success, and many of the employees and consultants liked it and talked 
about it. Harb: 
“TELCO is definitely one of the most resistant projects I have seen. The client is 
bound by governmental laws and regulations—this makes him/her resistant to 
accept new software and new business processes. In Lebanon, finding a skilled-
job is difficult, and employees fear losing their jobs or positions due to the new 
ERP system being implemented. Managers fear employees who are gaining 
extra knowledge and thus might become unmanageable. The fate of the project 
is all very political. All the above, and many more reasons, make TELCO an 
interesting subject to analyze.” 
Harb sounded positive and motivated. When asked about his experience with 
using new tools and practices, he said that by upgrading his current knowledge 
he should be more effective. I was somehow pleased with his replies. He sounded 
positive and willing. 
My objective was to introduce new tools and practices, to instill a strengthened 
awareness of risk and stakeholder relations which would in turn lead to better 
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governance, higher profits, and improved customer satisfaction. I contracted a 
training specialist to coach ITCO managers in project management practices. I 
thought that the managers would be more inclined to listen to a professional in 
the field than to a generalist. ITCO’s vice president of services approved the 
initiative. I informed the vice president that I was seeking to bring an expert 
from Canada, Bruno Das, who had worked with the Big 5 consulting firms. He 
had over fifteen years of experience in project and change management. Bruno 
used to work for YNE and had worked on IT projects. 
Bruno, on my suggestion, decided to conduct a needs analysis and acquaintance 
session, so he could customize the training sessions based on local needs. The 
workshops were scheduled for November 2008. They were held at ITCO’s main 
offices in Abu Dhabi, (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Bruno’s workshop in Abu Dhabi. 
I video recorded the sessions so I could study and analyze them later. I wanted, 
not just to hear what was said, but also to see body movements and facial 
expressions. Not only were words available for analysis, and inflection, tone, or 
other vocal modalities, but also gestures and body language. I ended up with in 
excess of sixteen hours of recordings. I asked all participants whether they would 
be constrained or annoyed if I filmed the sessions, but nobody said that they 
cared or felt intimidated or concerned. No-one even questioned why I was 
recording or considered it an intrusion.  
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Bruno flew in to conduct the sessions. He had prepared a series of presentations, 
and planned to conduct the sessions to allow as much dialogue and interaction 
as possible. He would throw back questions on the subjects that project 
managers were trying to get answers to or problematize possible solutions. 
Bruno was set to try to uncover the issues around the failures in projects. I 
played the role of a participant, attending the sessions, listening to the 
discussions and not interfering in any manner. On some days, I did not attend, 
but left the camera on for the whole period, even during the coffee breaks. 
Managers attended from the UAE as well as from the other countries like 
Kuwait, Lebanon and Qatar. The managers working in those countries were 
expats, living in those countries during a project’s duration.  
The first session was to start at 9:00 a.m. Most people came later than that; in 
fact, some people only showed up at 10:00. Edmaz, the service delivery director, 
mentioned to Bruno that it was very common for people in the UAE to show up 
late. Muhammed, one of the project managers, said that customers also often 
showed up late. Bruno commented that sometimes individuals use such 
behavior as a power play, and in many cases, individuals are held accountable, 
while other people may feel insecure and intentionally show up late.  
It was really only Muhammed and Edmaz who were concerned about the time 
issue. The other project managers were yawning and did not contribute. The 
theme of being late continued, and Bruno mentioned that one way to change 
this behavior was for the latecomers to have to sing a song once they entered the 
room. In this manner, the participants could be held accountable for being late 
and might feel embarrassed. When asked about whether coming late could be 
changed, all replied that it could not, and it was fine to keep it that way.  
During the discussions on how to conduct a risk analysis, Bruno argued that the 
analysis should not be too widespread but instead should involve a few key 
individuals within the project. He explained that the main objective was to use 
the analysis as a means to identify issues or factors affecting project progress. 
The results of the risk analysis would contain sensitive information. The main 
objective was to use the stakeholder analysis as a means to manage resistance 
and to identify everyone’s benefits and interests in the project. Bruno warned 
that while explaining the analysis’ results, project managers would need to be 
careful and refrain from communicating the findings to a larger community of 
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users, as this might create problems, such as inviting rumors, envy and other 
factors that could, in fact, defeat the success of the project.  
The attendees reacted to Bruno’s comment by arguing that sometimes it is good 
to lie and not speak the truth so as not to upset the other parties. Muhammed 
mentioned that there were always people watching and listening so anything one 
did would be communicated eventually to management. The argument 
continued for some time. Edmaz was quite open-minded, and having worked in 
Canada for some years, replied that executives were not just waiting to hear what 
other people had to say just and punish someone.  
During the coffee breaks, the project managers took the opportunity to talk to 
me and to discuss some of their issues and concerns. Jead took me aside and 
started the conversation stating that I had not come to the UAE lately, and that 
he missed my advice. Jead started to tell me that a previous director had 
promised him a substantial raise before he left: 
Jead: “The previous director promised to look into my pay package sometime 
back. Now that he has left, I am worried whether what was agreed will come 
through. I would like you to know what was agreed.” 
Me: “What are you working on at present? Did you have a suggested 
percentage on what the increase would be?” 
Jead: “I am working in Abu Dhabi. My current package is almost 22,000 AED 
($6,000/mo. USD). Now that you ask me about my expectations about the 
percentage increase, I would expect ITCO to raise me to the normal market 
price for my qualifications which is 35,000 AED ($9,500/mo. USD), which 
requires a 60 % increase to my current package. I know that you are influential 
and they listen to you.” 
Me: “Take it easy, Jead. I can only advise, but you do understand that I do not 
make the decisions around here?!” 
Jead: “Your reaction is the best proof that for a long period my package has 
been way below what it should have been. Please simply tell me why after five 
years of hard work and sacrifice I should be paid less than the market price of 
someone of my caliber? Unless you don’t believe that I have correctly stated the 
market price now for someone of similar qualifications. Yeah ... the percentage 
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looks big but this shows for how long I have been underestimated and 
underpaid.” 
Me: “I will communicate to the vice president what you say. You are definitely 
a person I respect a lot and your work has been commended by the HR 
manager and customers.” 
Jead:  “I was just expecting a faster response on this, really months ago; plus, I 
am going for annual leave and I want to close the issue before I go.” 
Me: “I know that management always studies raises and changes carefully. 
They consider many variables that affect all stakeholders. If you look through 
the past years, they have always been able to satisfy over 95% of the employees. 
But Jead, ITCO needs all the help consultants and project managers can give 
them to improve ITCO. This is why they are investing so much on this OCM 
initiative.”   
Jead: “I would always be happy to help make ITCO a better place for 
everybody. As you opened the subject, one of the things that really frustrate me, 
however, is the very weak response from the company when it comes to things 
that are in the employees’ benefit.” 
Jead complained extensively about the previous and current management. He 
was dissatisfied. However, it was difficult for me to believe everything Jead said, 
though I was definitely not fully aware of all the facts. I thought that some of his 
comments might be true and others might be fabricated to win my support. In 
fact, it took me more meetings and considerable time to understand Jead, and to 
know when his stories were true or fabricated. His constant assertion of his 
needs and demands for salary compensation increases had a negative impact on 
the HR manager and vice president of services. Apparently Jead always needed 
more money, because he was constantly investing into either real estate housing 
ventures or buying new stuff for his family. While he seldom achieved his goals, 
he remained committed to ITCO throughout the years, but asking for more 
salary and compensation seemed a way of life for him.  
I was curious about what was being said during the breaks. I later reviewed the 
video tapes. There were instances of discussions between the managers that 
dwelled on compensation. There was also talk of how some projects were more 
difficult than others.  While Bruno was still in the room, there was limited 
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conversation between the managers. As soon as he left they started talking. In 
one of the sessions, during a short break, I noticed that one of the managers was 
checking whether Bruno had left the conference room before he spoke (had they 
forgotten that there was a video camera sitting on a tripod right in front of 
them?). With Bruno gone, he comments:  
“I am really surprised ... really surprised [a project manager speaking in a 
serious and concerned manner]. I am surprised about how Harb mentioned 
that his project is not delayed, and the customer does not want to take 
ownership  ... the customer is paying for the licenses; the customer is paying for 
the implementation and everything else, and the project is for the benefit of the 
customer ... and it is all for the customer ... and the customer does not want to 
take ownership! From my experience in every plan there are activities, these are 
well defined and have end-dates. So if the activities are not fulfilled, then there 
should be delays. But they tell you that there are no delays. I think that the 
project manager should pin-point this with the customer and make him aware 
of late activities and that he [the customer] is not doing his part. So there must 
be delays somewhere.  I am surprised.” 
Another manager replied, 
“These are usually fixed priced projects. The customer has done his homework 
and found the software to be the best. So they know that their decision was the 
right one as Oracle is the best around. He knows that eventually the system will 
be delivered. He might delay activities now and then, move other activities to 
future dates. It is always like this. Managers at customer sites seem relaxed 
once they have proven to their managers that they have bought the best. They 
do not care thereafter to get the system working in the fastest time.”  
The first manager still not convinced, replied, 
“Project managers should have everything documented, approved and signed 
off by the customer, so that they protect themselves against unpredictable 
changes and they protect the company’s interest.”  
Another project manager replied, 
“I have this customer that was happy with some of the implementation and 
gave me an extension of $10M USD on the project, he saw another part being 
well implemented after a few months, and gave me another $17M USD 
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extension. Now after six months he is thinking of another $30M USD 
extension.”  
A practice manager comments,  
“Yeah, he gives you more and more project and money, but he is increasing 
your risks. Is this or is this not a risk? Documents are not approved or signed-
off? Who bears the responsibility if something goes wrong?  
The first project manager (laughing) replies, 
“The customer IT manager and some finance managers are ‘shabeehah’; they 
want to show something done to their superiors, so they want to show new stuff 
and hide the facts of older projects; there is some kind of knavery. What 
happens at the end no-one knows.” 
Bruno walked back into the room and started to resume the session. The 
practice manager, still confused, commented to Bruno: 
“Stakeholders in projects have a major impact on the project, but it seems that 
it is taken lightly by project managers and customer representatives.”  
No-one commented and Bruno returned to continuing his presentation. The 
carry through did not happen. What was presented was not really discussed. 
During Bruno’s sessions there were a vast number of questions on every subject 
Bruno introduced that were relevant.  
In one of the risk analysis sessions, one of the managers pointed to the difficulty 
in believing what stakeholders said. The manager mentioned that many 
customers say something but practice and decide something else. This behavior 
is confusing; he wondered whether the analysis would really have any value. 
Bruno answered that the analysis had to be conducted regularly and hence 
irregularities and differences could be identified that should then be questioned. 
In response to the presentation of the stakeholder analysis, the managers started 
to argue, relentlessly, seemingly trying to find the cause or even the root cause of 
project politics. The arguments really started to pick up after Bruno had 
presented the stakeholder analysis and its purpose. Ali, a project manager, asked, 
“If we do not know what we need to change from the very beginning, how can we 
start this change?” Others supported Ali, stressing that it is necessary to know 
78 Chapter 2 
 
the change requirements before we can use the stakeholder analysis; only then 
can you know what and how to ask questions. You could feel that there were 
political constraints working in the minds of the managers. Bruno stood 
astonished.  
Everyone around the conference table had a different point of view. Everyone 
insisted that behavior, routines, tradition and ways of working were different in 
every country and that the tools might not work as prescribed. It was clear, after 
a long session that only a few were convinced that the tools explained by Bruno 
could work. Bruno, surprised by the views of the project managers, observed, 
“These are best practice tools used in many parts of the world and the whole of 
North America. They should work here in the UAE as well.” 
The sessions continued with the theme of leadership in projects, mainly talking 
about how to get people to change their behaviors to come up with solutions 
rather than just bringing in problems. Harb and other managers stressed that 
they wanted to be systematic and to follow prescribed processes. But Bruno 
stressed how it is easy to find fault in people and their behavior, but more 
difficult to praise them for good behavior.   
At the end of several days of workshop, most of the managers were exhausted. I 
hoped that something had been accomplished. My expectations were that some 
of the knowledge might be put into practice, hopefully producing better project 
outcomes. Themes that kept coming up during the workshop had centered on 
relationships and expectations, for instance, executives going out and meeting 
customers and the provision of resources on time. But the expectations of the 
executives had all focused on staff assessment and evaluation. So between the 
project managers and the executives there was clearly a gap. I emailed all the 
participants and reiterated the objectives of the workshop as a learning event, 
which should help to enhance the service level at customer sites. I also asked 
Bruno to reflect on the sessions and his stay in the UAE12: 
 
 
 
                                                            
12 This summary has been edited and shortened. 
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 It is a human tendency to focus on differences. But in the interest of a 
balanced perspective and fairness, it is important to look at what the 
similarities are between the North American and Gulf Region contexts. It is 
the similarities that will make implementing Organizational Change 
Management (OCM) either possible or very problematic. If I was to use a 
(very unscientific) gut assessment of what is the ratio of similarities as 
opposed to differences, my interaction with the people in the UAE leads me 
to assign a ratio of 85/15 similar to  different.  
This degree of similarity leads me to believe strongly that introducing OCM 
to the region is not only possible, but is actually a big opportunity, 
particularly in the context of the changes that I currently understand are 
happening in the region (more on that below). The caveat is that the 15% 
that is different, is significant, and needs to be taken seriously. And it needs 
to be taken seriously more in the approach used to introduce OCM into the 
region, as opposed to the content of the methodology and tools that 
comprise a good OCM framework. 
Just a caveat: All of these observations are personal and are based on a brief 
(9 day) visit, intense as it was, and on numerous conversations on this topic. 
It is likely that continued interaction would lead to some changes of my 
opinions. 
Similarities between the North American (North American in this context 
represents Canada and the US) and Gulf Regions 
The main similarity can be summarized by the simple phrase “people are 
people” the world over. We are all motivated in various degrees by financial 
gains, recognition, physical and psychological comfort, and of course, fear. 
The majority of people value feeling respected and value trust in 
relationships, they want to feel like they contribute positively to an 
environment, and that they have an intrinsic value to one another and to an 
organization. 
I found the same thing in the Gulf. During the workshop, the participants 
showed open-mindedness and curiosity at a level above what I expected. 
They seemed open to challenge their own ways of thinking and 
assumptions, although habitual tendencies made it difficult for them to 
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 actually do so on a consistent basis. They showed a high openness to new 
ideas and concepts. They also showed a degree of eagerness above what I 
would expect to find in Canada, and a degree of skepticism and cynicism far 
below what I would expect to see here. I also found the desire to form trust 
as a basis in a relationship to be very high.  
The main motivators seemed to be frustration with the status quo, and 
seeing OCM as a likely and significant solution, at least for a good portion 
of their project management problems. They want to improve their own 
current situation, and to make their own personal work life easier. They are 
attracted to the ‘latest management techniques’ and being the first to use 
these. 
Their ability to ‘break the ice’ and engage in candid and open dialogue was 
on par with what I would expect to find among North American workshop 
participants. They showed an ability to place trust quickly into the 
facilitator and participate in activities that could prove potentially 
embarrassing personally, and showed an ability to engage in interview-type 
dialogue among themselves very quickly (first two hours of the workshop). 
Whatever the reason for these positive differences, as well as similarities 
with North American participants, it leads me to conclude that introducing 
OCM into this part of the world is very feasible. And considering the 
eagerness to know more about OCM and apply the tools, I believe it is a 
concept and solution for which the Gulf region is ‘ripe.’ 
Differences between the North American and Gulf Regions 
One of the major differences is the mental habit of deferring analysis, 
planning and decision-making, to organizational superiors. I observed two 
habits consistently at all levels. The first was that more ‘confident’ 
employees react to crises quickly by immediately escalating problems to 
their superiors. They present problems in a ‘raw’ form, and respond to 
proposed solutions from their superiors by countering these solutions with 
either negatives (“We’ve tried that and it can’t be done”), or new 
information that also reduced the potential impact of the proposed solution 
(“That plan is good, but the customer does not want to even see us as of last 
week”). 
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The second habit was that employees who could be classified as ‘pleasers’ –
do not want to offend by saying ‘No’, and therefore agree to solutions 
knowing that they will not be able to meet their part of the commitment. 
They will agree to meet at a certain time, or would assure a customer that 
they would fix an issue, in order to mollify, only to later either show up late, 
if at all, or to allow the issue to fester without any meaningful intervention. 
They try to come to a solution on their own, and try to implement it. If it 
works, the day would be saved. If not, more silence follows for fear of 
offending superiors and customers, and of course, would this leads to 
further and worse crises. 
In either of these cases the employees do not stop to analyze the root causes 
of the problem, either individually, or with others. In the UAE this seems to 
be the modus operandi. Another related mental habit is the lack of 
planning. When a situation is encountered and solutions are proposed, 
people do not stop to plan how a particular solution should be 
implemented, apart from a few initial tactical action steps. For example, 
thinking through what initial steps should be taken, what the consequences 
could be, and what options should be contemplated or attempted, should 
any of the consequences come to pass, are not part of the problem solving 
approach. This habit is most pronounced in recurring problem situations. 
Since these were Oracle systems implementations mostly, some of the same 
issues tend to arise with a fair degree of frequency (e.g., a key stakeholder 
not responding to e-mails over a two month period, or a customer asking 
for additional functionality and pushing back on the price). There is no 
attempt to anticipate a plan of action should these high probability events 
occur, and each time it happens it is treated as an almost unexpected crisis 
situation. 
Rather than sending the individual ‘back to the drawing board’ to come up 
with the root causes and options, managers engage in solutioning, usually 
without trying to understand the root causes themselves. Their personal 
effectiveness is judged on how well they deal with crises, rather than on how 
well they manage the processes so that these crises do not occur. 
Other habits observed were: deference to authority as demonstrated in the 
reluctance to propose decisions to superiors and equating leadership  
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 completely with organizational authority; the degree of importance placed 
on relationships to manage business projects as opposed to process or merit.  
 
Changes and Developments in the Gulf Region 
I think companies in the region are ‘growing up.’ They are becoming, and 
actually are already, large, complex, organizational entities, with all of the 
challenges that this presents. In many cases, these companies or business 
units are still managed like small- to mid-sized enterprises through personal 
relationships. The reality is though that the increased order of complexity 
requires managing processes, rather than people directly. A merit-based 
world-view does not allow for favoritism based on personal relationships. 
Where should the line be drawn between the region’s perspective of giving a 
monetary gift for a special favor, and the Western perspective of what 
constitutes corruption? For how long will very competent Syrian, Pakistani, 
Shia, or female managers be denied access to executive managerial positions? 
In terms of metaphor, the current mindset is the ‘Dessert Tribe’ metaphor: 
Several tightly knit, but separate and individualistic, family units of dessert 
tribes both sharing and fighting for scarce resources and reacting to 
adversity. The current situation, however, is pointing to an evolution toward 
a completely different metaphor, best described as a ‘Global Brand’: United 
global organizations managing abundance with best-in-class human 
resources based on merit and collective team collaboration planning for 
sustainable prosperity. 
How change will manifest itself, is open to speculation. What is certain, 
however, is that change will lead to a re-evaluation of what motivates 
individuals to do things. For example, if the power of personal relationships 
erodes, the ability to use top-down organizational power or personal 
influence to get individuals to ‘follow orders’ will also erode. What will 
replace it? Leaders will need, and will seek, new tools. OCM offers them a 
solution.  
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 OCM Implications 
In summary, the observation that ‘people are people’ makes introducing 
OCM to companies in the Gulf region at the very least feasible. The current 
openness, curiosity and eagerness shown by individuals toward tools and 
techniques to improve current management situations makes the region 
‘ripe’ for introducing OCM, and presents a very good opportunity. However, 
there are challenges. Not only is OCM is a new concept in the Gulf, but it 
also demands introducing a new way of thinking. It will take time for people 
to become ‘unstuck’ and start to analyze root causes, discuss potential 
solutions, propose feasible options, and limit the habit of ‘excessive 
politeness’ to overcome their desire to please and their inhibition on making 
decisions.  
This is not something to be done quickly. Instead, it requires: awareness of 
new techniques, tools and concepts; understanding of their appropriate use 
and their benefits; incremental shifts in habit. 
 
As you will see below, the workshops failed more than they succeeded. Few new 
skills or attitudes resulted. Thus how could Bruno send me such an unrealistic 
assessment? For one thing he was selling OCM and himself. I had brought him 
in to change the myopic sales mania of ITCO and instead of changing it, he 
caught it. He wanted what everyone else wants in the UAE, more consulting, 
more billings, and more revenue. When during the workshops he lost contact 
with the group he asserted his cultural capital and ethnocentrism. These 
methods are state-of-the-art, seen from America, so they are ‘true’. Thus the 
long passages in his evaluation about cultural equality can either be seen as a 
conscious effort to repair the damage or as an unconscious effort to assuage the 
cultural violence inflicted. ITCO managers were not willing to engage with 
OCM. On a very superficial and rational level they might be willing to ape some 
of the phrases, but they reject Bruno’s rationality first approach. They live in 
communities of relatedness and have no desire to become rational monads. 
‘Wasta’ may be repugnant to a North American, but the assumption of mutual 
obligation and relational logic seems natural to people in the Middle East. And 
in this Bruno is on thin ice. After all, I had brought him as a favor to ITCO and 
probably (implicitly) expected him to help me further to find my way in Canada.  
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As for ITCO’s managers, their taken-for-granted assumptions weren’t going to 
change merely thanks to a few days of training.  The consultants and managers 
were trained by Oracle. Oracle methodology was the only way they knew how to 
deliver their projects. In fact, it sounded as if all the consultants, no matter 
where they came from, had constructed an identity that reflects the Oracle 
methodology. Consultants and project managers were proud of this identity. 
Knowing what Oracle had taught them, allowed them to move from company to 
company seeking better compensation.  
Some of the difficulties encountered during the sessions, I think resulted from 
the project managers and consultants having codified their practices into a set of 
rules that they followed blindly. The rules were adopted ‘unthinkingly’. Their 
methods are rational behavior but fundamentally rule-driven, lacking in novelty, 
or any intention to change. The project managers are ‘robotized’ and have never 
asked questions about the rules. And these rules are what they have to offer the 
labor market. Indeed they automatically try to find solutions. As mentioned by 
Ali, what we need to change is what precedes the need to change. When I asked 
some of the attendees, they explained that their methods are an automatic 
practice for them. Ironically Bruno repeated the same fallacies, just differently. 
OCM according to Bruno was inherently correct. Anticipating, planning, 
rationalizing was true. His defense of rational individuality was just as blind as 
the project managers’ assumptions of ‘how to act’. Bruno sees a rational linear 
world leading to North American attitudes and practices. In so far as ITCO and 
her managers did not share the same assumptions as he did, they were (in effect) 
backward.  
I wish to draw attention to the core themes. I was struck by how little we had 
ever in ITCO really discussed project management practice. The conversations 
were more focused on emergencies and meeting targets. And I discovered 
‘stuckness’, or the idea that we hold each other in some sort of pattern, which 
seems difficult to discuss. Indeed, the absence of practice-directed discussion has 
led me to believe that we actively constrain each other from reflecting because it 
would be threatening in some way. 
My overall impression of the workshop experience is that by becoming 
repetitive, the taken-for-granted nature of what we do leaves us stuck in our 
practices, unable to transform, and destined to repeat. What we call best-
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practices or Oracle methodology locks us into repetition. Most of the work was 
understood as repetition. The task was not to innovate and experiment, but to 
make the projects more efficient. ITCO was not a technology driven wild start-
up, it was a big firm looking for continuity, predictability and resilience. While 
no one really wanted a new culture, there were attitudes that could (and did) 
become self-destructive.  
My legitimacy within ITCO was as a change management agent. So I almost had 
to look at matters from that perspective. I was convinced that ITCO was 
insufficiently profitable and that projects were sub-optimally managed. While 
the relationship based culture was fundamental, better reckonship of results was 
needed. I tried to examine the conversations during and around the workshops 
to assess what was possible. To better understand ITCO project management I 
visited project managers at their customer sites, and I visited one project in 
Lebanon (TELCO) and one project in Abu Dhabi (ADF). The intentions were to 
gain insight into the project managers’ thinking (or their dispositions). 
As the weeks passed by, I followed up with Edmaz, a senior project manager. He 
stated that he wanted to get all the project managers to start using the risk 
analysis tool that Bruno had provided. Some other project managers were filling 
in the analysis matrix but others were not. Edmaz commented: “It has always 
been the case that you need to follow up with them.” 
The risk analysis matrix is an important tool used in projects. Through the use 
of risk analysis, project managers can create a traffic indicator (red, amber, and 
green) map, through which risk elements are identified in regards to how they 
might affect the project and that can mitigate ways to resolve the issues before 
there is an impact on the profitability of a project. Edmaz communicated, with 
an email to the project managers requesting them all to fill in the risk analysis 
template for each of the projects. He explained that the information would help 
everyone to better understand the risks involved. Harb had mentioned that the 
risk analysis tool was superb, that it worked ‘like magic.’ 
I wanted to meet with and hear more from the project managers in the field 
about their adoption of the new knowledge delivered through the workshop 
sessions and how those sessions might have changed their behavior. I scheduled 
meetings in Lebanon and Abu Dhabi, with Harb and Jead. 
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Harb was one of the many project managers at ITCO. Since ITCO conducts 
implementations throughout the Gulf Region, project managers could stay for 
several months in different countries, until the final acceptance of the system 
they were working on was achieved. Harb was managing the TELCO project.  
TELCO is a telecommunications company in Lebanon, which had acquired the 
Oracle ERP software and in 2008 had started the implementation of the system. 
Harb had worked in the UAE and in many other countries in the Gulf Region. 
He was assigned as the project manager for TELCO. When I asked Harb about 
his view on the workshop and his use of the risk analysis, he replied: 
“I had something similar that was more or less ready, ever since our training 
last summer. It is indeed an interesting sheet. I think is part of PMP [a project 
managers’ certification], and hence it is a must for every project manager to 
include it as part of the project charter. I will send a copy via email to all on the 
TELCO project.”  
Unlike conversations I had with Jead, Harb had not recounted any discomfort 
before the training. When I asked Harb whether his reflection on the workshops 
had allowed him to change his attitude or behavior, he responded: 
“The workshop was great. I think something was missing when dealing with 
customers in my projects. It seemed to me as if I know more and that gives me 
more confidence to do my job.” 
Then several months passed, and the TELCO project was reported to be losing 
money. I asked Edmaz to arrange a visit to the customer in Beirut. I wanted to 
see and explore the real facts on the ground by meeting with all the project 
stakeholders. I flew to Lebanon and met Harb, with Edmaz, at a Donuts café 
near the customer site. I asked Harb why the project had gone so sour, and if the 
tools and resources had helped him in any manner to make this project a 
success. The following conversation took place: 
Harb: “I have reported all the issues to Edmaz.” 
Edmaz: (surprised) “You never mentioned that it was so critical and that the 
customer was thinking of cancelling the project.”  
Me: “Did you manage to use the risk analysis template? It is usually meant to 
map such risks, identify the relationship and politics of the customer, and to 
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help to work through the project complexities in order to reach an acceptable 
project sign-off. Don’t you think so?” 
Harb: “I filled in two reports so far and I indicted the risks. The customer was 
refusing to sign off the deliverables. The IT manager signed them on behalf of 
the project and told us to move on, and that there was no need to get the 
finance manager (the customer project lead) to sign them off. The issue is that 
the customer is not committing enough resources to test the system and hence 
was delaying the sign-offs and acceptance of the project.” 
Edmaz: “Why didn’t you ask for a meeting with executives so that I could help 
you resolve these issues?” 
The meeting went for another hour. Harb was implying somehow that everyone 
knew the status of the project, and hence there was no reason to blame him for 
its current status. Harb stayed angry and did not speak much after that, and we 
each left for home. As I sat in my car, I pondered every conversation and 
discussion I had had with Harb. I reflected on those moments when Harb had 
been so positive, indicating that the risk analysis tool was superb, that it would 
work ‘like magic’.  
I realized that Harb had kept doing what he always did in projects. The new 
knowledge was incorporated as a practice. He did implement the risk 
assessment, but Edmaz had informed me that Harb twisted the reality of the 
risks in the project, making it look as if everything was going fine. Harb assumed 
that since the project deliverables were signed off by a department head, that the 
project was going as per plan. However, Edmaz and Harb knew from contractual 
agreements, that since the main project lead and sponsor had not signed off on 
the deliverables, the risks were much higher, and he should have confronted this 
issue and gotten it resolved before continuing onto other activities.  
My second meeting was with Jead. He had attended the workshops. He was the 
one who always came late. He had started his career at ITCO as a programmer 
but always wanted to get ahead. He was very meticulous in his work and 
managed to build a reputation of ‘being perfect’ after working two years with 
ITCO, he was promoted to interim project manager; his job was to assist a 
project manager at some implementation sites. I had a good relationship with 
Jead. He would always pass by the ITCO main offices and showcase his work to 
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others. He had been with ITCO for six years now. At the time he ran many 
projects at ITCO, and his success rate was extremely high. In fact, Jead was, for a 
few months, also the project manager at TELCO and had insisted on leaving the 
site and moving to another project. He never mentioned the real reasons, as we 
knew them now. While attending the workshop, I noticed, on several occasions, 
how Jead automatically started to try to find immediate solutions to the 
examples that Bruno used. According to Jead, he had never had a project failure. 
He describes below the difficulties he experienced in maintaining and enacting 
new behavior and practices:  
Jead: “We’ve made a lot of progress. I work very closely with my consultants. 
We cannot function well except by being close to the consultants and the 
customer. Sometimes the customer is very difficult, but we need to absorb him. 
I usually get very emotional about my projects, and I cannot accept failure. I 
have always been this way, and I say it as it is. I am not afraid to say the truth. 
One of my aims is to make money and lots of it.” 
Me: “But you ran away from the TELCO project and did not raise a red flag 
that the project was going sour.” 
Jead: “You know, Samir, the TELCO project started wrong. The users were 
complacent, the consultants found Lebanon a nice place to entertain 
themselves, and hence it was difficult to be accurate. You should also know by 
now that when a consultant or project manager leaves or requests to leave a 
project site that there is something going wrong. ITCO’s management should 
then investigate and do a proper due diligence before appointing a new project 
manager to the project.” 
Me: “But would it not be easier to tell the facts and let ITCO’s management 
work on solutions to resolve the issues than running away? Isn’t this what the 
workshop taught us?” 
Jead: “True, but in many cases, this does not work, and it might not work at 
all. The users in this part of the world are like me and you, expatriates, and 
hence they are in no hurry to end projects. Even if they finish on time, being an 
expatriate you do not get promoted easily. So they work calmly with no 
incentives to finish projects.” 
Me: “How come your projects have been mostly successful?” 
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Jead: “I maintain very good relationships with everyone. I go sometimes to the 
extreme of giving some freebies in projects to gain a user, because I know that I 
will need him or her later in the project. My incentive is to finish the project 
before the target date, as this translates into more profits and hence a higher 
bonus for me.”  
Me: “But isn’t this what all project managers should do?” 
Jead: “Frankly, whenever I feel that a project could be problematic after 
meeting the users at customer sites, I draw my own risk assessment. If I am able 
to manage it, I go about it silently and spend relentless hours to make it 
happen. If I feel that the project risks are much more than what is usually the 
case compared to other projects, I immediately tell the Services Director, the 
HR manager and the vice presidents. If the customer does not comply with my 
practices, I will keep on nagging everyone in ITCO. What happens, in my view, 
is that the vice presidents listen to the Services Director and ignore my 
complaints. The Services Director puts pressure on project managers until they 
stop complaining and somehow the accountability, as to who decided to 
continue with the project, gets lost. Vice presidents assume that the Services 
Director is on top of the projects and thereafter the reports do not show the real 
risks that projects are in.” 
Jead claimed to support the program, but he believed that his own practices and 
methods had proven more successful.  
I also tried to talk project management through with Edmaz, ITCO’s services 
director. Edmaz had been recruited as a senior project manager joining ITCO in 
June 2008. He had worked in Canada for the past five years. He returned to the 
UAE with a focus on making money; his debts in Canada were over a hundred 
thousand dollars. Many of the vice presidents were happy with Edmaz’s 
performance. He was therefore promoted to services director. After noticing that 
the workshops did not generate the expected results, and that the project 
managers had gone back to using their old methods, I asked Edmaz to reflect on 
the past few months. Here is what he had to say: 
“People in general in this region like to take personal credit and do not care 
about their company’s well-being. Why? Because employment relations are not 
stable in general; people move from one organization to another in a split 
second if only the package offer is better. They also know that they can get fired 
at any time; therefore, loyalty does not exist or is minimal. The workshops, for 
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them, are valuable for adding new skills to their resumes, and frankly they 
never care about using them, even when you ask and try to emphasize their 
importance. I get the feeling that people did not see any personal gain by 
implementing any of it, and personal gain here means more money. In Canada 
people also have the ‘I know this better’ and ‘This is the way it should be done’ 
kind of attitude, but people fear being fired. Maintaining a job in Canada 
means paying the mortgage and jobs are not that plenty, so people implement 
on orders from above. Things get done, but of course they may take more time 
and not always meet set objectives.” 
I reflect and ponder: how could the field of management have come to this? I ask 
myself, how and what could drive people to deliver actual and real results? How 
can a manager measure the intentions and actions of the collective? Even if 
managers could lead with strong gestures in few moments of interaction, how 
could we capture the subtle processes of daily interaction that happen with 
words, body language, eye contact and the feelings throughout the whole year? 
Can managers really manage the collective in a command and control manner 
without understanding the ideologies, beliefs and engaging in constant dialogue 
with employees? 
 
After the Five Gear model meeting in late 2005, Fadi, had asked me to meet him 
in his office to discuss the progress on projects. During our conversation few 
interesting events happened that opened up my mind to consider a new 
initiative at ITCO.  
Fadi asks me about Viken’s presentation, and I say, “It was impressive and 
colorful.” 
Fadi nods, "An impressive show." 
I ponder for a moment then ask:"Do you believe in that kind of management?"  
(This was an important question for me, as I am always portrayed as a 
pessimist, so I wanted to know whether others felt the same skepticism as I 
did.) 
Fadi replied, "Unless someone cares to implement on the ground, and engages 
with others, these frameworks or models cannot deliver.”  
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Fadi receives a call from his assistant that his guests are waiting in the 
reception area. Fadi asks me to stay. He welcomes the guests and we move to 
sit around the conference table in the room.  Fadi whispers to me that these 
executives have come from Europe offering SECURAL representation to 
ITCO (several security-based products).  
"Meet Samir,” says Fadi. "We were talking just now about frameworks and 
management models." 
Fadi asks Ricard, the vice president of SECURAL, his opinion on frameworks 
and models, and Ricard answers, "Most of today’s frameworks in use are based 
on a model where individuals are considered to be a system and the 
organization is considered to be a separate system, and where the CEO or 
senior managers are to use some kind of cause-and-effect analysis or a 
command and control framework to get results. It all follows a form of 
modernism from the books of management gurus we are taught at universities, 
but in Europe we seem to have moved away from these models and we are 
embracing some kind of a postmodern view. I think models can blind managers 
as they fail to consider people's true meanings during interactions. I have 
stopped thinking in terms of cause and effect, unless a situation really requires 
it. However, I do engage in dialogue and interaction, questioning every possible 
aspect.” 
Someone else says, "Mostly I think we know what to do as managers. The 
systems management thinking just makes us unnecessarily insecure. I listen 
carefully, respond thoughtfully, and question assumptions. I truly believe I 
have had as much experience and read as much as any other manager. We 
read and get ideas from other people, but we put them together in our own 
way, tailoring them to the situation …. And if we can't decide what to do, we 
confer with each other… It is fun.” 
"What do you mean when you say you do not use the conventional tools?" Fadi 
asks.  
"Well, we don't entertain the myth that systems management entails trying to 
find solutions through prescribed frameworks or models. I have stopped 
pretending to myself that I am following any grand narrative or theory on how 
to manage.”   
A few people nod.  I find myself nodding.  
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Fadi finds himself defending the use of frameworks: "Well, I still use some 
frameworks, but I do it just occasionally."  
One of the guests interrupts Fadi, "We don't mean to say that you shouldn't 
use frameworks. I think we all use some models some of the time. We recognize 
that this is a great field we are in; we have learned a lot, and we believe in what 
we do, but no theory, all by itself, seems to hold water, so we join hands to try 
to cope, and try to figure out our way forward.” 
Ricard comments, "If you try to apply any framework to every person and 
every situation, it becomes just too simplifying. We maintain a little looseness 
in the way we work.” 
 
Maybe I can help ITCO to achieve more ‘looseness’ in their thinking by 
asking management to look at situations from many angles and not to be 
stuck in just one paradigm. Another, much more modest, intervention took 
place. Professor Hugo from Holland met with the management team. If 
Bruno could not order them to communicate more openly, could Hugo 
seduce them? Hugo retold the story of the fall of the Dutch bank ABN 
AMRO based on Jeroen Smit’s (2008) book De prooi (The Perfect Prey, 
(Smit, 2009)), annotated by his own experiences with bad management that 
was unable to connect with people and circumstances. Hugo tried to cajole 
management to talk about itself and its actions. In effect, his question was: 
“How do we relate to each other and to our circumstances when we are 
challenged?” Storytelling was meant to evoke and provoke the managers.  
Hugo began telling the story of how egocentrism – being over-concerned with 
one’s own power and self-interest – had driven ABN AMRO into bankruptcy. As 
a result, the Dutch government had nationalized the Dutch parts of the bank to 
prevent its complete failure. The managers were asked to reflect on the failure of 
operations and what that can lead to. The story was meant as a provocation. 
Hugo: “So what do you think of the story?” 
Edmaz: “I do not know ABN AMRO so well; I know that they have a branch or 
used to have a branch here in the UAE. Many banks fail these days and no one 
knows really why.” 
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Elias: “The context is different in the UAE. No bank ever failed, they (the 
government) will not allow a bank to fail. It will cause chaos, lack of confidence 
and embarrassment to the rulers.” 
Sesh: “I have noticed that many people in the UAE do not pay much attention 
to what happens in other places.”  
When Hugo tried to push the managers to think about business disasters, 
change and managing in a crisis, the conversation took a different direction:  
Edmaz: “I live in Canada and we do not see the same stories over there. I have 
worked in many consulting firms and I bring knowledge to ITCO. I came here 
because I cannot make the same money in Canada. I have two kids who have 
started very early using the Web to show their work (designing games) and 
make money.”  
Sesh sat silently with not much to say. Elias, preoccupied with his phone, 
commented: 
“In the past similar cases happened here in the UAE, I’m not sure if there is 
much an individual can do.” 
Hugo tried to get them relate their stories to ITCO and its future, but it was 
almost impossible to get a conversation going. Hugo was frustrated; as he 
describes it:  “It was like a dance, I wanted to Tango and they were willing to 
Waltz, but only half-time.” The managers did not relate to each other, or perhaps 
better said, ‘they related to each other as not relating to each other’. The 
collective ‘We’ (Mead, 1934) just wasn’t there – or was in denial.  
Hugo had confronted ITCO’s managers with the challenges the global financial 
crisis brought with it, expecting them to oppose or agree with potential actions. 
But the managers did not form a group of discussion or respond with a common 
view. ITCO’s managers do not work together as a ‘we’, as a team, or as a group. 
They remain individuals. One or another may be willing to speak, but only as a 
monad with his personal history. There seemed to be no: ‘We planned this 
project’, ‘We will implement these new ideas’, and ‘We are responsible.’ The 
‘we’, or working as a collective, did not seem to get them what they wanted, and 
hence they reverted to the ‘I’ to fulfill their expectations.  
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Hugo came away from the session pessimistic about ITCO’s chances of 
responding to crisis. Dialogue enables individuals with conflicting views to 
reflect on the views of others; it opens us to questioning established 
assumptions, doubting the validity of simple claims to ‘truth’, and highlights the 
multiplicity of action. Or as Bakhtin writes: “Truth is not born nor is it to be 
found inside the head of an individual; it is born between people collectively 
searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984, 
p. 61). In their hyper-capitalist context, ITCO’s managers seemed each, to only 
be interested in his own views. 
Improving project delivery in such a hyper-individualist setting is nearly 
impossible. Since ITCO’s profits are recognized only when a project is 
successfully completed, projects and their implementation really ought to be 
central to everyone. In order to deliver projects, team effort is needed. Groups 
need to be formed where each group, including those at customer sites and those 
in the back office, come together to help to deliver on-time to recognize the 
desired profits. But blinded by their past successes at selling, the managers and 
consultants seemed to be blind to their limitations and to the destructive 
consequences of their attitudes. Success had made the people all the more prone 
to protect their self-interests.  
But the context changed – the economic crisis hit and then things seemed 
different. The situation started to get worse; banks were cutting on their facilities 
to companies and ITCO and its sister companies had almost with no cash. 
Salaries were late, employees were resigning. I spent hours every day on the 
phone and in every occasion my advice was to do whatever was possible; from 
cutting costs, to closing down some offices and firing redundant employees, just 
to reach a stable cash position. I had conducted a financial diagnosis and knew 
that their financial ratios were way off from any standard, and I knew that it 
would be very difficult to fix such discrepancies in a short period. 
But to my surprise, few of my proposals were implemented and ITCO continued 
on its same course. Chris, the director of operations, seemed convinced that my 
advice made sense and did start to implement. Was this a different Chris? He 
barely used to consider my proposals. Had Chris changed? Chris in my opinion 
was an opportunistic person. He wanted to reach a high position as quickly as 
possible. As the crisis arrived, he adopted the slogan ‘If there is no pain, then 
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there is no change.’ To my surprise ITCO was becoming more attentive to my 
advice. But still there was no action on the ground. Chris seemed to be the only 
person that was acting and implementing. He seemed very convinced. I had 
helped to recruit Chris when I was still at Oracle. He was, then, the sales support 
for Oracle’s e-Business suite of products. Chris comes over as astute and 
humorous. He has good critical thinking skills and is liked by most customers. 
Chris moved to ITCO in 2002. In 2008 he was appointed Director for operations 
after Remas, ITCO’s then Director resigned. At that time, there were few options 
to find a replacement, and Chris seemed a reasonable choice. I always felt that 
Chris wanted to prove himself. During his Oracle tenure he did not achieve his 
targets and while at ITCO he only met his targets once, in 2007. I always thought 
that he lacked skills and knowledge in business management. But he did try very 
hard to read books and to understand the management literature. But Chris had 
always tried at ITCO to ignore my advice and he would not engage in substantial 
discussion with me. So our relationship had become rather cold. But Chris 
rather suddenly was engaging in conversation and interaction, which gave me a 
feeling of satisfaction. Now that he was better informed about the company’s 
business, its finances and how the operations worked, he sounded more 
confident. I also was more open to ask Chris questions that had always 
concerned me. I wanted to know how good a consultant I was. What were my 
strengths and weaknesses? How could I improve myself and my practices? 
Chris: “There is no doubt that if I had listened to you a long time back, and 
understood your vision more, both I and ITCO would have been in a better 
position today. What does this also mean? It means that regardless of the 
integrity of the advice, the WAY it is communicated and the WAY it is 
presented, and WAY you try to convince people with your advice, remains an 
issue. So you should ask yourself, ‘Why aren’t they listening to me?’ ‘Why aren’t 
they acting upon my recommendations?’ It’s true that humans by nature and 
especially us here in the region don’t like to take advice, we probably move too 
slowly and are sluggish implementers, yet I believe your means of delivering 
your message needs to be much more aggressive and convincing (not because 
they actually aren’t, but because this is how people are here) this is something I 
even say to myself.” 
Me: “Have you changed in any of your beliefs or values at ITCO? Did I have a 
role?” 
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Chris: “There have been changes across various aspects of my work from Sales 
to Marketing to People Skills to Communication and recently and most 
importantly Finance and Administration processes and best practices. In terms 
of changing my views, since you have been part of my professional journey for 
the past 10 years, I really don’t know if it was you or life and its experiences 
that have surely changed so many of my views in life. However there a few 
things that definitely came from you; building the ability to understand people 
and work with them according to their potential without any excessive higher 
expectations, and reading and learning by experimenting. Now that you ask, I 
suddenly regret that I didn’t take more notes during these past 10 years!” 
Me: “Is it that people tend to take advice but do not want to admit or give 
credit for it?” 
Chris: “Personally you have had a big impact on the way I think, implement, 
govern and strategize for the future. To elaborate, a bit, I can remember being 
admonished to always be professional and respect the conduct of business, it 
will always play in your favor, always base any judgment or decision on solid 
facts, a story is the best way to teach anything, it will never be forgotten. Indeed 
I remember so many stories.” 
Chris’s points on how to convey the message are probably correct. The people 
around me at ITCO are not pragmatic; they are emotional and expect the 
message to be immediate, direct and personal. You do not ‘tell it as it is’ but 
leave the listener to articulate it. As for the rest of the vice presidents, they were 
still ‘stuck’ and there was no action. They shied away from questioning their 
assumptions or ITCO’s business model; they just wanted to preserve the status 
quo. Chris met with the vice presidents almost daily. I wanted to know what was 
happening, so I asked him about how he would explain the inaction:  
“To be honest, and I hope you can keep this confidential, the vice presidents 
seem very lost. We are very vaguely updated about the true status of the 
company and its future. One of the vice presidents is in a panic-y and depressed 
mode, to an extent that all employees, including me, are getting scare. It is a 
very unproductive mode. Rather than being the leader, when needed the most, 
he’s just not there. Employees are actually mocking his reactions to the 
situation; even the market has realized that he is far gone.  ITCO’s future is 
very unclear, one day they want to close it, another day they want to minimize 
it, another they want to merge it, and last but not least, they want to sell it. 
None of which is happening, all we do is talk, meet and discuss with no action 
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proposals, no owners present, and not one single action or even plan has been 
agreed upon. The guys’ future is here, and ITCO’s future, personally speaking, 
is threatened, they don’t want to change the model and everyone knows it must 
be changed.” 
I expected that the ‘pain’ ITCO was experiencing would at least make the 
managers and vice presidents more open to engage in new ideas. It seemed as if 
past success was overshadowing any new gesture or dialogue. Was this nostalgia 
at its most destructive? 
ITCO and the Global Financial Crisis 
On December 13th of 2009, as I sat in the business lounge at Schiphol Airport, I 
reflected on my experience with my previous assignments in Abu Dhabi with 
ITCO. After suffering losses from ailing projects in the UAE and the Persian 
Gulf region in the past years, ITCO’s executives undertook a detailed review of 
its business strategy in 2004 and concluded that its current organization 
structure and project implementation processes required change. I was the 
consultant hired to assess the situation and to make recommendations. 
My initial assessment had been that ITCO was succeeding in growing yearly 
revenues, and that executives and managers acted professionally at conducting 
their daily operations, but that profits, and margins on projects, were low. A 
simple comparison with a nominal bank rate of return on investment showed 
that ITCO’s shareholders were not maximizing their opportunity costs. In fact, if 
ITCO accounted for the risks factors associated with the delivery of IT projects 
in the UAE and the Persian Gulf region, ITCO might not be creating any value 
to its shareholders at all. By using simple valuation models, such as discounted 
cash-flow or asset-value models, ITCO’s net worth seemed stagnant for the last 
ten years. The problem as I then conceived of it was related to delivering IT 
implementation projects on time and on budget. ITCO’s managers did not focus 
on maintaining project profitability, nor were they focused on managing 
customer sites in terms of their consultants delivering per project plans and 
raising alerts if projects faltered. ITCO had several hundreds of consultants and 
employees. Since most of the projects were delivered at customer sites, there 
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were managers at the customer sites and there were other (more senior) 
managers at the home offices.  
My initial questions were related to economic performance; in particular, in 
terms of ITCO’s profitability and project delivery. Was there a need to re-train 
managers to gain new practices? Should the managers adopt best-practices in 
managing the service delivery process? At the time, I had learned to use 
frameworks on change management and strategy from authors like Senge 
(2003), Kotter (1996), Lewin (1951), Bridges (2003) and Collins (2002). And I 
was convinced that implementing some of the normative ideas and frameworks 
in these books could improve the situation at ITCO.  
As I was getting ready to board my next flight, I felt puzzled and enraged about 
the lack of progress that the company had achieved during the last years. From 
2004 to 2010 several change initiatives were implemented with the objective of 
improving project delivery. By early 2010, ITCO was running out of cash, 
struggling to pay its suppliers and employees. I lived and re-lived the activities 
and behaviors of ITCO’s owners, managers and executives in my head, trying to 
understand how the largest IT company in the UAE could find itself in such a 
difficult situation, after having grown from a mere forty million dollars of 
revenue to over eight hundred million dollars in less than twenty years. As I 
watched other planes take off at the airport, I wondered why there was such a 
gap between what the managers and executives said they ought to be doing, and 
what I knew they actually were doing.  
The constant pattern of managers and executives repeating previous practices, 
despite investment in new management initiatives and new training, had led me 
to question my interpretations of ITCO and its stakeholders. Some questions 
centered on whether ITCO, to start with, was created to make a profit. In the 
UAE money has (perhaps) no real value to people who possess an unlimited 
amount of it. Was ITCO owned for power, prestige or spectacle? What in effect 
is the nature of ITCO as an organization? Were my assumptions about what 
counted as rational and ethical in business really possible or relevant in ITCO? 
My plane landed that day in Abu Dhabi. A taxi took me straight to ITCO’s 
offices. As I walked through the corridors to meet ITCO’s president, I noticed 
that the offices were mostly empty. I met few managers in the corridor; I noticed 
wondering faces. As the financial economic crisis had unfolded in 2009, the 
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chaos had created difficult and complex conditions for ITCO. It was difficult to 
predict what the next weeks or months would bring. The president informed me 
that the banks had stopped lines of credit and that they were only sure of 
covering salaries for a few months. Vendors and suppliers had stopped 
supplying IT products as payment had been delayed. Sales patterns had become 
unpredictable. The vice president of sales, always optimistic, said: “No matter 
how chaotic the situation is, and no matter how much staff attrition happens, new 
sales and projects are always there.” The president commented, “His proverbial 
faucet cannot be turned off” pointing to Fadi the vice president of sales. But 
ITCO had never had enough cash on hand to last more than few months, but it 
had managed to achieve revenues around a billion dollars, every year for the last 
three years.  
That day I met Jan, the Human Resources and Administration head (HRA), who 
had made every effort possible to implement change programs during the past 
few years. During the organizational change management (OCM) program, I 
had worked with all levels of managers, championing the implementation of new 
practices and processes to enhance the delivery of projects. Jan was happy to see 
me again, but felt sad that no one, executives in particular, had really taken the 
OCM program seriously. Jan thought that the crisis in was affecting everyone 
and was not sure of any progress.  
ITCO managers were awarded bonuses for achieving their revenue and 
performance targets. I thought they would feel like shareholders and hence want 
to increase shareholder value. In fact, ITCO did post yearly, internal pro forma 
profits, but the total net profit remained the same year after year. Up to the last 
minute, people in ITCO were confident that the crisis would not hit the UAE. 
Business was growing and projects were still coming in. I remember speaking to 
several vice presidents at ITCO, to consider potential scenarios in case the 
financial situation changed. But they insisted that nothing would happen in the 
UAE. I sent emails again and again to the vice president of sales, asking him to 
consider alternatives and options, just in case the economic crisis got bigger. But 
I kept on getting the same response: ‘Everything is fine here.’ I started to believe 
them, as nothing much was being said about the UAE or the Persian Gulf region 
on the news.  
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I had thought that normative management principles and best-practice concepts 
and frameworks would succeed in ITCO. But the outcomes left me puzzled. 
Behavior in practice did not seem to be governed by what people said they ought 
to do. While the vice president and president of ITCO continually emphasized 
their desire to increase effectiveness by stimulating responsibility, governance 
and profit growth, not much seemed to get done. The outcomes of ITCO 
appeared puzzling. Profit making in business literature is considered a natural 
activity of individual action driven by rational considerations. But in Abu Dhabi 
one was faced by fiction-like stories of multimillion-dollar deals closed in days, 
and management practices such as kickbacks and other forms of corruption. In 
UAE hypermodernity, networking, marketing, and display dominate. The 
appearance of performativity is sought as the end purpose; but does 
performance still count?  
I worked to improve project profitability and to change the ‘I do not care’ 
attitude of many. My strategic objective was for ITCO’s managers to assume 
responsibility and accountability for their actions and to make ITCO profitable.  
Having lived in the UAE for several years, I understood that the social structure 
of an expat society formally in the service of the local nationals is very divisive. 
From 1998 to 2008, IT companies made fortunes for their founders and 
shareholders and at an ever increasingly speed. Organizations’ and employees’ 
behavior displayed a self-interested attitude of ‘I don’t care’ linked to a lack of 
reflexivity and unwillingness to experiment. Such behavior invites you to 
question the rationality and irrationality of practice.  
Between the beginning of 2004 and late 2010 I spent in total about two years and 
a half in the UAE. That time was spent in ITCO and that is where the 
information in this chapter comes from. In the beginning ITCO was 
implementing several change management initiatives, using standard Western 
change management methods. These methods followed a common American 
framework, the so-called ADKHAR method, which based on Kotter (1996). 
Using the method, strategies were developed with ITCO, stakeholder analyses 
were conducted, and communication plans were implemented. The change 
initiatives targeted the organizational structure to improve project delivery. 
They included re-structuring the services division to achieve better 
accountability and implementing new project management practices. Being 
The Case: ITCO  101 
 
engaged in the OCM program allowed me to document, investigate, analyze and 
understand ITCO, its owners, executives and managers, and how they reacted to 
change management interventions.  
I thought that sticking to a normative paradigm of achieving better performance 
would result in augmenting and maximizing my income as well. But in 2010 I 
realized that I was the only loser. From the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis, 
until my last visit to ITCO in 2010, I was surprised and puzzled to find out that 
the executives and managers had benefited enormously and had hoarded 
millions of dollars, while ITCO as an organization was insolvent. I had assumed 
that downsizing ITCO, by letting go of three hundred employees, would save 
ITCO millions of dollars, helping to cover its bank debts and to regain its 
position in the marketplace. Leading ITCO out of its mess would leave me, I 
thought, with some lucrative consulting fees.  
But the banks never foreclosed on ITCO or any of its stakeholders, nor did the 
UAE national owner regain his losses, nor did executives got lower 
compensation. The banks were told by a member of the ruling family to back off; 
where upon lines of credits were restored. I was willing to be a ‘bad guy’ by firing 
three hundred or more employees. The three hundred or more employees left 
ITCO voluntarily in 2011 to find better salaries and bonuses elsewhere. ITCO’s 
executives were seen to be good managers, paying their dues to their employees. 
During my visit to Abu Dhabi in 2009 I stayed at ITCO’s guesthouse. The 
guesthouse is a three-story villa used to accommodate managers and consultants 
visiting from outside Abu Dhabi. I wanted to spend more time with the 
managers in an informal setting to be able to understand the ‘shadow side of the 
organization’ and to meet the managers’ when they were not at a customer site 
or inside the company. Most of the managers seemed happy enough with my 
presence as it allowed them to get to know me better and to speak their minds 
on issues that were important to them. During my six-week stay at the 
guesthouse, we talked about: the UAE and its progress, their performance in 
projects, their overall (dis-)satisfaction with ITCO, and issues that troubled 
them. The residents would meet in the main sitting area and start conversation 
with jokes about each other and their customers. The discussions would then 
begin to take a more serious tone.  
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There was agreement that in Abu Dhabi everything was very artificial and that 
there was no foundation for the rampant housing speculation. They had all 
received calls from real estate agents and banks urging them to invest in 
apartments under construction with promises of enormous profits once the 
buildings were completed. But they felt that it was worth taking chances to cash 
in as others had. They were wanted to take advantage of what the UAE had to 
offer. Living in a boom economy supposedly could be satisfying. Almost 
everyone was obsessed with making (more) money and aspired to live it up. 
They all complained about their standard of living. Several felt detached from 
ITCO and expressed interest in trying to find a new job that paid better. One of 
them was one of the best project managers at ITCO who I found had always 
showed commitment and loyalty by working after hours and completing his 
projects on time. But he also wanted out if he could earn more elsewhere. There 
were some who were less enthusiastic about taking risks and experimenting; they 
reported that they saw the UAE as an entertainment-like experience.  
It did not take long for them to open up and share their stories of what they had 
done in the past and where they would like to be in five years’ time. Some of the 
discussion even lasted until four o’clock in the morning. Sometimes there was 
conflict and sometimes there was shouting. It was during those moments, that 
especially valuable information came out.  
Everyone talked about their grievances with their countries of origin. They all 
mentioned how their countries’ governments were corrupt and that they could 
not trust anyone. They recounted many stories of how ‘wasta’ is constantly used 
to get what one wants and that only those in power enjoyed the riches of their 
country, while they had to travel abroad to make a living. They would perceive 
any new project or initiative in their home country with skepticism, and would 
be cynical about it. They had an attitude of mistrust and distrust. They seemed 
to understand ITCO and everything around them in terms of their experiences 
in their homelands.  Their observations of the behavior of others with more 
money than themselves were entirely cynical.  
They repeatedly told how many times ITCO’s executives had broken promises 
or had not delivered on commitments. Most were either resentful or indifferent 
about accepting new work practices or management initiatives. They were not 
committed to making ITCO operate more successfully. But they were serious 
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about their careers and titles. They continuously talked about how the UAE 
provided fertile ground for anyone seeking higher positions and compensation. 
A few mentioned that their resumes were posted with several agencies, and that 
it was just a matter of how much they were offered for them to jump ship. When 
I claimed that ITCO executives really wanted to enhance work practices and 
effectiveness, they all laughed. No one was really interested in firm strategy or 
planning, but they kept on asking whether I knew if salary raises would be 
coming that year or not.  
Everyone claimed that ITCO was a business in a dynamic industry where 
profitability was an important goal. The concept of profit meant different things 
to different stakeholders. For the expats, managing profit generating companies, 
at least as per the audited income statements, was a means to earn higher 
bonuses. In the cynical words of a chief accountant at ITCO: “On paper there is a 
number, but can this number be reality? [It] is almost impossible.” For the 
national owner, profits meant that he could draw money from the company’s 
bank account, comparable to his share of the profits. For the banks it meant that 
they could extend additional credit to the company and in many cases increase 
the rate of return as the credit ceiling and acceptable risk level is raised.  
I knew of receivables and collection delays and about the difficult cash situation. 
Despite my requests to study ITCO’s accounts, I was never given direct access to 
them, except for summaries and supporting documents to the balance sheet. 
Numbers in company accounts are only numbers, and unless you can link them 
to the actual processes, you cannot make sense of what is really going on. I 
wanted to understand the intricacies of why cash and receivables were 
problematic and to advise ITCO on steps they could take to improve on their 
position. 
I did discover that sales revenue as a percentage of total revenue had been 
increasing, while sales and margins from services had been decreasing. ITCO 
was acquiring new products to sell through new vendors as a means to maintain 
and increase revenues. To deliver the required services that usually accompany 
the sales of IT products, the president remarked, “We have given considerable 
thought to the company’s underlying concept of having a diverse, multilingual 
consulting team from different countries to cater for a similar diversity at 
customer projects.” The services ITCO sold were described as being delivered 
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efficiently and effectively, in order to maintain profits and satisfy customers, but 
in fact there were no profits from services. 
By the end of 2009, the global financial crisis had still not hit the UAE, or at least 
it was not publicly admitted or spoken about. I tried to advise ITCO’s executives 
on the need to prepare for what the crisis could lead to. They were not 
concerned, as sales revenues were still growing. However, easy credit facilities 
were drying up. Customers and the UAE government started being late in their 
payments. However, government officials were still encouraging people to invest 
in the real estate market, as if nothing was wrong. 
I was frustrated that ITCO’s executives were not taking my advice seriously 
about how the Global crisis would affect ITCO. I was not sure how solid ITCO’s 
financing was. But I had a feeling that ITCO’s cash position was not really that 
good, as many employees complained of salaries being paid late. 
In August 2009, I had discussed with Fadi, vice president of sales, about the 
current situation in North America, and the fact that the financial crisis seemed 
to be hitting hard in other countries. I urged Fadi to think of establishing some 
contingency plans, in case the crisis hit the UAE and Persian Gulf region. His 
reply was: 
“You worry always so much; you should be in the UAE (and not in Canada); 
you are not in touch with senior executives specially locals [meaning UAE 
nationals]; they tell me that all is well and that a similar crisis happened 
before, and the UAE remained immune to it.”  
My email warnings were replied to, thus: “ITCO is doing well; we are selling even 
more than before.” When I explained to the president that the income statement 
did not show real growth in profits, he replied:  
“You always come to us with ‘theorie’s and you ignore the situation we are in. 
The market is moving very fast and we need to outgrow the market to stay 
number the number one company. We do not have much time to spare for 
theories.”  
While conducting a ratio-analysis on ITCO’s financials, I had discovered that 
the TIE ratio (times interest earned) was 1.9, a ratio above the 1.0 normal. This 
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meant that ITCO was paying interest equal to its net income. Best practice on 
this ratio is less than 1.0.  
Late October 2009, I got a call from the ITCO’s president who was concerned 
because some customers were not able to meet their obligations to ITCO and 
that the cash situation was deteriorating very fast. I mentioned the need to look 
into cutting un-needed staff and to look at expenses with a focus on cutting 
costs. On November 2nd 2009, I flew back to the UAE and spent four weeks 
conducting a financial analysis of ITCO, trying to locate potential savings and 
cost reductions. 
As I sat in my hotel, late at night, I read the Toronto Star on-line13: 
“Just a year after the global downturn derailed Dubai’s explosive growth, the 
city is now so swamped in debt that it’s asking for a six-month reprieve on 
paying its bills—causing a drop on world markets Thursday and raising 
questions about Dubai’s reputation as a magnet for international investment. 
The fallout came swiftly after Wednesday’s statement that Dubai’s main 
development engine, Dubai World, would ask creditors for a ‘standstill’ on 
paying back its $60 billion (U.S.) debt until at least May. . . . Dubai became the 
Gulf’s biggest casualty of the global credit crunch a year ago. But its key leader 
had continually dismissed concerns over the city-state’s liquidity and claims it 
overreached during the good times. When asked about the debt, he confidently 
assured reporters in a rare meeting two months ago that ‘we are all right’ and 
‘we are not worried’, leaving details of a recovery plan—if such a plan exists 
[emphasis added]—to everyone’s guess. . . . After months of denial that the 
economic downturn even touched the glitzy city-state, the Dubai government 
earlier this year showed signs of trying to deal with the financial fallout that 
has halted dozens of projects and touched off an exodus of expatriate workers.” 
It seemed as if the unbounded expansion had created the conditions of its own 
destruction. I attempted to prepare a financial analysis of ITCO to better 
understand its financial situation. But I needed more detailed data than ITCO’s 
financial department would provide. I made a few recommendations, which 
included: the creation of a task force from all departments to monitor project 
progress on a daily basis making it possible to invoice customers as fast as 
                                                            
13 “Dubai debt 'standstill' raises alarms about image”. The Associated Press, Published Nov 26 
2009. http://www.thestar.com/[30.11.2009]. 
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possible, and to start discussions with the local owner to explore selling ITCO’s 
assets for cash.  
For several months, thereafter, I kept sending alerts to the vice president of 
Finance and the president. To make my points clearer I set-up a website where 
management could log in, and study ITCO’s results for the past five years. To 
my surprise, ITCO declared profits and earnings for the year with a growth of 
revenues exceeding 30%. But considering its lack of cash, I realized that 
collections could be an issue. After a thorough analysis with the chief accountant 
(a CPA – certified public accountant) from India, it became apparent that 
provisions for potential bad debt had never really been taken. When I 
confronted the president and vice president of finance with these results, they 
re-iterated that the external auditor was comfortable with the level of provision, 
and thus it was not an issue to be re-considered. The vice president of finance 
sent me a series of reports claiming that ITCO had assets that could cover its 
debts.   
My next visit was in January 2010. By then there was no doubt that the financial 
crisis had ‘arrived’. The panic of executives, as the crisis unfolded, raised 
questions about their past leadership. It was obvious that ITCO’s executives and 
managers had failed to engage with the relevant issues and challenges.  
The government stopped payments on its debts. International banks operating 
in the UAE closed down credit facilities and started pressuring ITCO for re-
payment. ITCO began to lose employees to competitors. The outlook started to 
look uncertain and performance lagged behind the budget. By the middle of 
2010, the company was in an even worse situation. But still not a single 
contingency plan was in evidence to decrease costs and/or to raise cash. When I 
asked why, executives responded: “Rumors that our financial situation is bad 
could travel fast, causing banks to limit their credit facilities even more, and 
customers might cancel orders or stop buying from us.” But in fact many already 
knew of ITCO’s problems but ITCO’s executives were in full denial. The pace of 
change in ITCO did not reflect the urgency of the crisis. 
Many companies, including government-owned ones, started to default; a few 
private companies actually closed their doors. Those owned by nationals, like 
ITCO, were left to find any solution they could for their financial situation. 
ITCO’s executives started blaming each other: whose fault was it that ITCO had 
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no cash or reserves? Meanwhile, the banks increased their pressure on ITCO to 
repay their loans.  
The vice president of Sales at ITCO wrote me: 
“Your suggestions are not possible. We cannot just cut budgets and fire people 
to reduce costs. The suggested financial and business model you propose is 
complex. There is no time or anyone to implement any such thing. Every 
executive seems to blame the others. The major problem is that I am too busy 
to work on this alone. I am drowned with the daily operations and with trying 
to keep the big projects afloat. Please help me.” 
I became convinced that ITCO needed one of the big five consulting firms to 
help them out of their mess. It took me several weeks before the president of 
ITCO agreed to get a third party to look into a turnaround for ITCO. In October 
2010, I was given the mandate to seek turnaround consultants to help ITCO 
negotiate its way out of its (near) insolvency and to restructure its accumulated 
debt, as the banks in the UAE froze the credit facilities, leaving hundreds of 
companies in a crunch situation. 
DT, a leading big five consulting firm, was selected by ITCO’s national owner 
and the majority of ITCO’s executives. DT was also the main advisor to the 
Dubai government in regards to its one hundred and twenty billion dollars of 
debt. DT brought with them an expertise in turnaround management, but most 
importantly they understood the reality of the UAE, its relationship model, its 
banking system, the political environment and how decision-making took place 
in the local corporate culture. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
From  ‘ME’  to  Habitus  
 
In this chapter, social studies theory is applied to understand the case study. A 
‘modernist’ theory is used. It is critical theory, but still ‘modernist’. By that I 
mean that it is theory that implicitly assumes that social reality makes sense and 
that by analytically examining it, one can make sense of events. Firstly, I 
examine the social construction of identity. The social self of ITCO, formed via 
the collective identity of excess, has been my subject matter throughout. What 
sort of identity does the economy of excess produce? What happens in business 
if scarcity recedes into insignificance? Social self is a matter of accountability, of 
giving account of oneself to self and others. If there is no account and no story, 
there is no (or little) self. Accountability can be caste as repressive, as enforced 
self-justification; but no accountability may be equally perverse. What sort of 
identity remains without responsibility? Thus, using Mead things that happened 
to identity in ITCO are examined. 
Ultimately this investigation is not psychological, though it is somewhat social 
psychological. This book is more ‘economic anthropology’ researched in an 
organizational studies context than social psychological. Self and identity are 
important because my actants, their setting and the organization studied, are all 
unimaginable without it. However, ultimately, the research object is the 
organization without scarcity, or the organization of excess, as it occurred in 
ITCO.  
Thus I move on from Mead to Bourdieu, from identity to habitus. The 
organization of excess is a habitus; it is a shared social way of existing and thus 
110 Chapter 3 
 
Bourdieu’s key concept brings me very close to my object of study. However, an 
analysis based on types of capital takes the persons out of the context. With 
Bourdieu I gain insight into the structure of the force-field wherein ITCO exists, 
but the insight is bought at the price of losing sight of the people, identities and 
experience.  
My attempted analysis within analytical modernism reveals aspects of how 
identity operated in ITCO as well as how it was grounded in the social force-
field, but these analyses bring me to a very static form of insight. ITCO can be 
understood as put together from social constructed identities, which are 
grounded in forms of capital, but this insight is bought at the cost of reifying 
ITCO. ITCO is cast as an object with certain mechanical workings. I gain a sort 
of understanding, but I lose what I experientially found interesting, namely the 
living relatedness of the story. Thus, I present my modernist analysis below, but 
I signal that I will want to try to go further (in Chapter 4) to attempt to paint a 
more dynamic picture. 
What ITCO Does to ‘ME’ 
I will now explore what G.H. Mead’s concepts and theory of the self and action 
reveal about ITCO or in other words what ITCO does to me or to you?  In the 
case of Bruno, detailed in the previous chapter, ITCO confronted him with an 
identity crisis as he tried to defend his ‘generalized other’ of ‘I am valuable,’ ‘I am 
professional,’ ‘I know what I am doing,’ and ‘this is truth’, while his practices 
and tools were not really valuable in ITCO. ITCO refuted his professionalism 
and confronted him with a different truth: ‘I am not effective,’ and ‘It is out of 
my control.’ Even when his control could have been good for ITCO, Bruno was 
unable get a grip on the object (i.e. ITCO). In the case of Hugo, his use of 
provocative storytelling to incite dialogue also failed. He was confronted with an 
ITCO whose managers refuse to engage in social relatedness. 
 
I wish to extend Mead’s notion of the self, to show how the dynamics in a hyper-
capitalist context, lead managers to individualistic practice. In my case, I had 
several encounters with ITCO that confronted me with my own identity. ITCO 
did not really want you to get a grasp on it or to control it; its people did not 
want anyone to control them; rather they wanted to continue practicing and 
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doing what they had always done to satisfy their own individual interests. In the 
section that follows, I make use of symbolic interaction and the views of George 
Herbert Mead to the study of myself, ITCO and the two other interventionists. 
Mead touches on meaning, social action and the construction of the self. These 
concepts help us better understand the micro interactions and reactions of 
individuals when faced with ITCO’s paradoxes and conflicts.  
George H. Mead’s Account of the Self  
Symbolic Interactionism (SI) is a sociological perspective that examines how 
individuals interact in a group setting, focusing on identity creation through 
interaction with others (Blumer, 1969). Mead (1934) developed a theory of 
sociality that encompassed dynamic processes, change and emergence. For Mead 
the ‘social act’ is the basis of meaning-construction. Through action, we not only 
reinforce the taken-for-granted social structure that we share, but we also test, 
reflect, and creatively reconstruct meaning. Mead (1938) suggests that, with the 
‘becoming-of-self,’ individual growth occurs via the seeking of new experiences. 
The person tries to understand what it feels like to live a life by constructing 
meaning as lived and experienced interactions. Understanding is strengthened 
by adopting a perspective that questions taken-for-granted assumptions, beliefs 
and ideologies. 
In Mind, Self and Society (1934), published after his death and constructed from 
lecture notes of his students, Mead explores the social nature of the ‘self.’ As 
individuals, we fashion a sense of our own selfhood through interaction with 
other selves, using symbolic symbols. According to Mead, our ‘selves’ and those 
of others, exist through the meanings we construct from social action and 
mutual interactions: “the self is something which has a development; it is not 
initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity, 
that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process 
as a whole and to other individuals within that process…since our own selves 
exist and enter as such into our experience only in so far as the selves of others 
exist and enter as such into our experience also” (Mead, 1934, p. 135). Mead 
stressed ‘significant symbols’ that evoke the same response in the person making 
the gesture as in the respondent. Symbols are significant when they have 
meanings that are mutually accepted. Thus, if we are having a conversation 
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about the nature of organizations, we could draw on notions such as 
‘positivism’, ‘rules’ and ‘control’ as significant symbols, in our effort to co-
construct meaning. These are significant symbols, mediating our transactional 
processes of meaning-making, if we share a common understanding of what 
they mean. In the absence of such significant symbols, our interaction could be 
reduced to chaos and a series of mis-understandings. Interacting with significant 
symbols can, as long as the differences are not too big, offer the opportunity to 
explore distinctions in meanings attached to particular symbols. The ambiguities 
admit the possibility of new insights and learning. 
Significant symbols allow us to stand in someone else’s shoes during interaction, 
and to anticipate likely responses to our own ‘moves’. For example, when I stand 
in front of a flip-chart, managers attending a meeting understand that I am 
about to explain something. But, this does not necessarily mean that all those 
attending will pay attention; although a significant symbol indicates the 
expected conduct in a social situation, individuals to a degree can make their 
own choices about how to react. However, even these choices are socially 
moderated by significant symbols. Mead explained this social regulation of 
conduct in terms of the ‘generalized other’, which is the organized system of 
significant symbols that reflects the generalized attitudes of the social group. 
Social habits of conduct are constituted as the generalized other.  
From the perspective of symbolic interactionism, the self is a social product. 
Mead makes a crucial distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ in conceptualizing 
the self. The ‘me’ is the socialized self, made up of the internalized attitudes of 
others, as already experienced. This embodied ‘me’ equates to habits of conduct 
that have been acquired reflexively through social interaction. The ‘I’, as Mead 
uses the term, is the unsocialized self, a set of personal desires and dispositions. 
The more spontaneous wants and wishes of the ‘I’ serve to distinguish the self 
from others, and can be said to inject something new, creative, and innovative 
into the social process. Self-awareness, Mead states, arises when the self is able to 
distinguish the ‘me’ from the ‘I’, and attain a level of reflective distance from the 
demands of society and culture. Mead stresses the continual social processes in 
which a person acquires a self, and a notion of the generalized. 
The attitudes of the other players, which the participant assumes, organize into a 
sort of unit, and it is that organization which controls the response of the 
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individual. The illustration (is) of a person playing baseball. Each one of his own 
acts is determined by his assumption of the action of the others who are playing 
the game. What he does is controlled by his being everyone else on that team; at 
least insofar as those attitudes affect his own particular response. We then get an 
‘other’ which is an organization of the attitudes of those involved in the same 
process (Mead, 1934, p. 154). 
The generalized other is the “organized social group which gives to the 
individual his [or her] unity” (Mead, 1934, p. 154). For Mead, the generalized 
other is “[a]ny thing – any object or set of objects, whether animate or 
inanimate, human or animal, or merely physical – toward which he [the self] 
acts, or to which he responds” (Mead, 1934, p. 154). The ‘I’ responds to the 
generalized other in that the ‘I’ is the “answer the individual makes to the 
attitude which others take toward him [or her] when he [or she] assumes an 
attitude toward them” (Mead, 1934, p. 177). We embrace some aspects of the 
generalized other and not all that the generalized other represents. Following 
Mead, the self and the generalized other are always in a process of articulating 
new experiences with other selves and other entities, which are more or less 
integrated into the generalized other.  
Mead (1934) believed that meaning comes from experience and in particular 
from the consequences of one’s actions mirrored back to the other. Through 
experience, the individual constructs meaning. The consequences of dealings 
with the world give the world its meaning. I - Me and Self are always changing, 
in a dynamic process in and through transactions with each other, and with 
other selves. Social action is understood in terms of interaction, gesture-
response via significant symbols, and meaning-making, where interactions occur 
in real time, and at all levels of the social system. The ‘I’ is mediated by 
significant symbols; it has an inherently social quality. As such, society emerges 
out of interaction and shapes the self, but the self also shapes interaction. 
Change is a constant in the social process; unpredictable experience necessitates 
creative adaptation. According to Mead, the local situated gesture-response 
produces momentary concrete differences. These differences have the potential 
to develop into new patterns, producing coherence and the possibility of the 
new. The potential for change, in social interaction, depends on participant 
interaction. Hence, the willingness of people to participate in the conversation is 
an essential contributing element to create and articulate something new. These 
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elements of SI combine, providing a way of seeing social action as a dynamic 
process in meaning-making. They suggest how practice and social action shape 
identity and vice versa.  
Turning to Bruno’s role in ITCO, ‘identity’ a concept that has become 
increasingly popular within organizational studies (Alvesson, 2008), is crucial. 
When moving to a new location, individuals are challenged to reflect on who 
they are (Bengtsson, 2007). Attention to how identity is formulated, and the 
presentation of self, can offer insight into identity construction (Ybema, 2009). 
Individuals can compress part of their lives into moments of self-narration, 
stored as ready-made narratives to be drawn on to explain and represent their 
lives. Bruno insisted that someone like him was needed in order to resolve 
ITCO’s problems. Using Mead’s theory of the self and the act, Bruno tried to 
‘find himself’ by positioning himself in the conflicts between competing forces, 
various interests and passions, swirling about him. He attributed a key role to 
himself and his knowledge and status. He believed that he could prevail by 
applying the same concepts and tools in consulting as he used to do so in 
Canada. Linear, pragmatic and rational models would define his identity. These 
qualities, he asserted, were universal and thus his status ought to be the same. 
Bruno believed in solutions that lead to expected and predicted results. He was 
convinced that managers were inevitably motivated to take on new knowledge 
making their work easier by using the ‘latest techniques.’ The problem was to 
penetrate the status quo at ITCO. He blamed ITCO and its leadership (or lack 
thereof) for the failure of his methodology and the tools he offered. The sexist 
pun a couple of sentences back, of course, was intended. The consulting 
assignment was valued at more than $8,000 USD, plus full expenses. This is 
much more than an independent consultant of his caliber normally earns in 
Canada. Bruno wanted to work in the UAE. He pushed hard to convince ITCO’s 
executives that his consulting could generate profits.  
Bruno’s identity is deeply linked to the idea that the tools he brings are 
performative. He asserts that he is a successful consultant who knows his tools 
and methodologies and that ITCO should use his tools in every project as a way 
to resolve its project problems. But when his tools are not accepted, or do not 
deliver what they are to supposed to deliver, he gets frustrated, and instead of 
reflecting and admitting that he could not get the managers to use his tools and 
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methods, he puts the blame on ITCO and its managers. Bruno to a degree knows 
what is expected in his society. His generalized other is based on a highly 
pragmatic way of conducting business, which is in many respects the common 
way of living and working in Canada. He used in ITCO the same terminology of 
Cartesian and positivistic literature: ‘root causes’, ‘planning’, ‘problem solving’, 
‘solutioning’, and ‘managing processes and people’ to mention but a few, as at 
home. His practices are grounded in Taylorism and the assumption of 
prescriptive deliverables, whereby change is planned, individuals can be 
separated from organizations, society and the ‘other’, and thus behavior can be 
rationalized. Bruno has embraced the importance of being successful, the need 
to be opportunistic, and the desire to apply performative tools.  
Bruno had built a fairly narrow identity, which did not serve him very well 
under the changed circumstances of Abu Dhabi. In fact, his professional identity 
in general was insecure; his eagerness to do consulting in Abu Dhabi reflected 
his problems in getting assignments at home. His failure at ITCO could have 
prompted him to make changes in his identity. Here we see an interesting 
relationship between the ‘me’, of the Western generalized other, and the ‘I’. 
When Bruno’s tools failed him, the ‘I’ became defensive as he denies and blames. 
His ‘stuckness’ mirrored the ‘stuckness’ of ITCO, with no movement on either 
side. Bruno’s two weeks in the UAE might have allowed him to question his (and 
other’s) performance(s) (Goffman, 1959). In these terms, Bruno’s performance 
was ‘front stage’ where he did not share a ‘back stage’ really with me, or as far as 
I could see, with anyone else.  
On the intervention by Hugo, he believes that managers should be able to reflect 
on what they are doing, while they are doing it, and be able to articulate their 
experiences as a group. The managers, however, were focused on their own 
interests with no further display of social relatedness. The ‘generalized other’ 
had no truck with communicative openness or mutual social relatedness. Here 
the norms ignore the collective ‘we’ (Mead, 1934). Hugo ended up in a 
monologue for dialogue. But he had agreed to meet with the managers without 
an honorarium and to see the event as an experiment. His failure to achieve 
social relatedness with ITCO’s top-brass did not destabilize his identity; 
principally because he had achieved a clear ‘back-stage’ with me and I shared the 
same failure of relatedness with ITCO’s top management.  
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Behavior is usually governed by practical reason (Bourdieu, 1998). In contrast, 
collectivistic values emphasize harmony, sociability, and a willingness to put 
aside personal needs for the good of the group. The ‘self’ is consequently 
considered to be an aspect of the shared group identity (the generalized other). 
Neither individualistic nor collectivistic values should be considered inherently 
superior, but rather each is best depending on the context and cultural 
circumstances. In ITCO there was a shortage of cooperation, openness and 
shared willingness to correct mistakes. Individualism became selfishness and 
money was the primary measure of well-being. ITCO’s managers and executives 
were blinded by their successes, which masked their limitations and the 
destructive consequences of their actions.  
My objective at ITCO was to help managers and executives enhance their 
practices of governance and risk control, in order to deliver better performance 
at projects and, thereby, gain more assured profitability. I started with a 
modernist and normative organizational perspective, expecting people to work 
professionally, be responsible and accountable for their actions, and to create 
shared accountability among employees. The norm of maintaining accurate and 
true financial reporting, providing sustainable assets to face any volatile crisis, 
was unquestionable for me. I saw my task as providing substantive advice on the 
implementation of needed systems, and not just selling unnecessary solutions 
never to be used. At that time, ITCO’s managers and executives seemed to live in 
a world of their own, where normal business practices and procedures did not 
factor. I believed that business was rational and profitability was socially 
necessary and beneficial. Amongst other things, the economic crisis since 2008 
has changed all that. I am no longer so sure that business ‘makes sense’ and that 
business ethics is more than an oxymoron.  
ITCO and its managers were whirling in a hyper-capitalist dream; they were able 
to make money easily, with no competition, no risk and no checks-and-balances. 
There was a mismatch between my modern perspective and the beliefs of 
ITCO’s executives and managers. Was the UAE’s hyper-
real/hypermodern/hyper-capitalist climate to blame, or ITCO’s managers, for 
promoting a culture of unlimited desire? Or is such a culture of desire really 
fundamentally attractive, though unattainable most of the time. I may have 
accurately represented how business is normally conducted, but were ITCO’s 
executives really wrong to ignore the rules? Unlimited consumption, bigger 
From  ‘ME’  to  Habitus   117 
 
revenues, more assets and bigger organizations – it was marvelous as long as it 
lasted. Or was it? Managers were reporting ‘creative’ profits, and systematically 
mis-representating income and assets. But should we blame them, or conclude 
that it was all a product of a ‘generalized other’ of shared excess?  
Albert Camus’ The Stranger (1989) was a favorite book of my youth. Of course 
his Algeria resembled my Lebanon. But more fundamentally, the book examines 
the individual without others or what happens when the ‘generalized other’ is 
inoperative. Camus speaks through Meursault, “Mother died today. Or maybe 
yesterday, I don’t know. I had a telegram from home: ‘Mother passed away. 
Funeral tomorrow. Yours sincerely.’ That doesn’t mean anything. It may have 
been yesterday.” Meursault feels no need to create grief, as grief does not arise 
naturally. We are thrown into specific circumstances, where meaning exists only 
to the extent that it is created by the individual. Meaning is not a given in life; 
individuals are free to try to create meaning (or experience meaninglessness, as 
in The Stranger). One may not be totally free in one’s daily interactions, but 
there is freedom to respond, confront or face the individual; there is freedom to 
create meaning in the immediate here-and-now of the moment. We are all born 
into a family, culture, nationality, religion (or none), or ethnic group; we are 
‘thrown into’ them. The Stranger is the story of Meursault who lives in Algiers 
and faces unpredictable and uncertain events. At the very start, he is faced with 
the death of his mother, and he does not feel the grief others expect of him. He 
finds himself a stranger in his own social existence. He enters into a relationship 
with an Algerian girl, Marie, and with other characters that represent the society 
around him. Relations are disconnects. He is confused about the conflict 
between a meaningful existence on the one hand, and absurdity on the other. He 
has no standard from which to justify something as ‘good’ or ‘bad’; everything 
depends on the context. As the plot unfolds, he gets into trouble; he commits 
murder and is put on trial. Meursault seems to be the exemplification of the 
unreflective man, who takes life for granted, and who is barely aware of his own 
thoughts and feelings. But during the second part of the novel, he becomes 
progressively aware of his existence, the nature of his freedom and choices, and 
his emotions. The book is about defining ourselves and what we stand for. There 
is no God or external standard of ‘the Good’ to refer to, and no sociological or 
psychological conditioning to blame. But in the end, we want to know whether 
we chose wisely. ITCO was populated by strangers. It was held together by 
money, and by little else. There were precious few beliefs acknowledged, shared 
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or expressed. Not being able to find solutions based on traditional concepts can 
provoke new forms of practice and ideas, the quest for individual meaning and, 
paradoxically, a desire to connect one's separate existence to the existence of 
others. This paradox, that each person is, on the one hand, an independent and 
unique self striving for meaning and purpose in a particular human life, yet on 
the other hand a relational, social self that depends on others to become more 
fully human, reflects in existentialism the universal tension of human 
coexistence. But ITCO was more a farce than a drama. The absurdity of 
meaninglessness was papered over with cash and existential crises were drowned 
in expensive wine and good food. 
Mead’s notion of the social self is helpful in explaining and representing the 
process that I have gone through while struggling to deal with ITCO. The 
formation of the ‘self’ is often bumpy. The struggle is primarily internal. It 
involves coming to terms with conflicts, new knowledge and choosing how 
meaning is integrated into the self. This does not mean ‘self’ formation is easy or 
successful, but it does mean that the individual makes choices and, for the most, 
communication is open between individuals and those who make up the 
generalized other.  
Again, ‘significant symbols’ are those gestures that call out the same response in 
the gesturer as in the responder. They are significant because they embody 
meanings that are mutually accepted. I long assumed that systems’ thinking was 
such a ‘significant symbol’ in business. The business is a web of relations where 
the whole is bigger than the parts and the whole thing falls apart if you start to 
amputate elements. But now companies move all sorts of things off-shore and 
out-source functions leaving themselves partial and dependent. The old rhetoric 
of: ‘vision’, ‘command and control’, ‘strategy’, ‘performance’, ‘pride’, ‘wealth’, 
‘optimization’, ‘re-structuring’ and ‘frameworks’ is passé for many. The 
common understanding of what these symbols meant has come and gone. For 
some they are relevant; for others they are now clichés. I still believe that the 
world and its interactions are all based on systems. The individual is a system. 
Organizations are systems. As systems, we analyze and respond to inputs and 
outputs. But meaning construction is an interactive process of sense-making, 
which for a long time I have insufficiently understood as mutually constituting 
interactions.  
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ITCO’s managers and executives wanted to keep things as they were; I wanted to 
provoke change and experimentation. According to Mead, humans do not 
merely react in an instinctual manner but their reactions are based on past 
experience and their perception of the options that they have. The managers and 
executives wanted to maintain their high status and prestige. Following Mead, in 
their social actions they sought activities and symbols to maintain their standing. 
Their social meanings rotated around reputation and esteem. As one project 
manager commented: 
“Everything in this country seems to revolve around who can make money 
faster and quicker. I have never seen so many luxurious cars such as Porsches 
and Ferraris in one small city. People want to be seen in these new luxury cars. 
They also want to be seen in the best restaurants. They sit and wave their 
hands to others, sitting around them.” 
The generalized other centered on one’s role in a hyper-capitalist game of easy 
money, no competition, few risks and no oversight. Under hyper-capitalism; the 
dynamics of success made people prone to protect their self-interest. My choices 
were ridden with a normative and modernist perspective seeking to maintain 
efficiency and productivity through social relatedness. My ‘significant symbols’ 
were out of step with those of the rest. What Mead would have designated the 
‘social act’ entailed practices, actions and ideas bound to the tactics needed to 
gain acceptance by others in the UAE. Key past and anticipated consequences, 
leading to success, were always in most minds. In order to fulfill their desires 
and impulses, managers and executives had to acquire more and more projects 
and increase the cash flow. ITCO had to remain the largest IT company in the 
UAE. The owner, customers and employees thought that ITCO was growing, 
and would be able to remain solvent as its revenues increased. ITCO defined a 
‘generalized other’ of its own. I could have shouted that the ‘King had no clothes 
on’, but nobody would have listened to me. 
I sometimes struggled to articulate the contradictions and to bring ITCO back in 
line. But more often I rationalized my position by referring to doing ‘the right 
thing’ based on what my consulting clients wanted of me. The positivistic and 
reductionist meanings acquired during my MBA did not prepare me for the 
‘existential stranger’s position’. I was trained to prioritize goals, and to organize 
and plan optimal actions. I tried to convince my listeners that the activities 
proposed would lead to positive results and, hence, were worth the effort. I came 
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across as ‘loud’ and extrovert, rather than introvert, because I preferred to be 
doing things and to find solutions which generated results. Nonetheless, my 
proposals were often unpopular and seen as time consuming and demanding 
hard work. They did not fulfill the managers’ needs for status or prestige. The 
significant symbols of hard work and hard earned success were not received very 
well. ITCO’s managers and executives signed almost every contract that sales 
could win. Growth and the number of projects were all that mattered. 
Mead’s concepts forced me to think reflectively. A new approach of ‘who I am’ 
and ‘how the self is created’ had revealed itself to me. I had been thrown into a 
specific circumstance where meaning existed only to the extent that it was 
created by the individuals around me. I found in myself a stranger believing in 
strict normative responsibility, in an environment of relativism. For most 
professionals in the UAE, ‘If it looks good, it is good’. I found myself in a conflict 
that confused me. My generalized other and that of ITCO were in conflict. In my 
view, every opportunity for human interaction is an invitation towards insight 
and possible change. I believe that when we diminish our possibilities and 
repress our will by conforming we are devaluing ourselves. For ITCO’s actors, 
my normative concepts of self-actualization were irrelevant. In ITCO, the 
individual and generalized other were not linked via ‘mutual growth’, ‘dialogic 
creativity’ or ‘innovation’. In Mead’s terms, ‘neighborliness’ is necessary if the 
self is to develop as a unified whole. But no such holism was on the agenda.  
My intention was to shore up ITCO’s lack of accountability and responsibility 
among its managers which had led to losses in projects and poor profitability. I 
thought that best practices could eventually lead ITCO to resolve its problems. 
The lack of follow-up by managers and the ‘I don’t care’ attitude of the 
consultants shocked me. Such conflict indicates that the world of my ‘self’ 
collided with the generalized world of ITCO. Even though I intended to take on 
the attitude of the dominant other, doing so would have been an essential part of 
my survival; I was out of step. My social existence was precarious. Why was I 
kept on? Probably to sooth managerial guilt, ‘See we are trying to address our 
problems’ and for the status, ‘We have an international consultant’. I was 
operating on the edge, expecting frustration and anger, but simultaneously 
knowing that the ‘edge of chaos’ is ripe with possibility.  
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I was not in command anymore. The actions and commitments of the ITCO 
managers were loose, and the risk of letting go was so high, my whole job was 
potentially at stake. I could no longer sufficiently impose control or authority on 
the conversations with others, so I stopped trying. Simply paying more attention 
to others seemed to generate a more open and transparent discussion, rather 
than just more recalcitrance. Paradoxically, the more I let go, the more 
‘attention’ there seemed to be from others. Thinking about ‘I’, ‘Me’, and ‘others’, 
I was testing letting go and still being in control. The clients were happy with the 
‘attention’, although it was not problem or solution directed. I was going with 
the flow, which they liked. Because I was focusing on relatedness and deep 
listening I was doing something very different from ITCO’s daily culture. I had 
perhaps found a sort of compromise. I honored their values by focusing on the 
now and immediate feelings; but I was loyal to my values by concentrating on 
community, dialogue and belonging. 
For ITCO’s executives and its UAE owners their dreams were realized when they 
were making lots of money. They all owned, and still own, several real estate 
assets and luxury cars; they travel around the world to play their favorite sports, 
and no-one has to pay a single dollar from his own pocket. Most importantly, no-
one went to jail. An observer would probably conclude that this is paradise. Any 
businessman strives to reach such a position. I could not have imagined that 
ITCO would end up in such a comfortable situation. In my case, I lost my 
consulting contract with ITCO. I was not paid for my last engagements and I am 
back in Canada with no permanent job. I have ambivalent feelings about their 
paradise. Have I lost the chance to make millions as well? I was content that 
ITCO post-2010 was making money again, while at the same time I hated the fact 
that the goals of my consulting interventions were not being met. I was content 
that none of ITCO’s executives went to jail, but I hated the fact that I was the one 
who had lost the most. Mead's claim that self and identity emerge in public acts 
is confirmed. 
But why and how did ITCO’s actors manage to maintain such practices, 
attitudes and behavior? Bourdieu’s concept of habitus comes in here. Looking 
back at the ethnographic data, what sort(s) of ‘capital’ did ITCO’s managers and 
executives possess? Bourdieu’s theory of practice offers a conceptual framework 
that helps us understand and analyze these. The habitus under hyper-capitalism 
or is it hyper-capitalism’s habitus, reigns here. For Bourdieu (1990a), the habitus 
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is the durable, transposable, structured (and structuring) dispositions of 
individuals. The habitus is shaped by one’s experiences and determines how we 
act in the world. Habitus thus informs our practices that guide us in managing 
change and uncertainty. While it is both historically and socially situated, 
habitus is second nature, but it is not fully deterministic. Habitus may also be 
novel, adapting to new forms and actions, and responding to changes in social 
relations. 
A Sociology of Habitus  
In ITCO, aspirations, aims, beliefs and motives for accumulating wealth and 
maximizing personal profit also reflected a desire to gain symbolic recognition. 
Within the social context, ITCO executives acted in pursuit of their specific 
goals. The managers and executives embodied a particular performativity, 
imbued with prestige and status. This embodiment illustrates how the processes 
of becoming are bound up with the socio-spatial context within which the lives 
are lived, and within which the social networks and relationships are 
constructed. I, therefore, approached the daily practices and values of ITCO’s 
managers as social attractors.  
Sociological approaches to hyper-capitalism tend to either consider a macro 
view dominated by structural effects or a micro view of identity change. The case 
of ITCO’s hyper-capitalism compels us to move away from both of these 
approaches and to consider practices and the field(s) where the interactions 
occur. Here actors behave according to their context, particularizing meanings; 
social structure depends on forms of capital which actors strive to implement.   
In the description of ITCO, ITCO was described as a complex network of brand 
representations. ITCO was the sole licensee of Erikson, Lenovo, etc.; and a major 
representative of Oracle, SAP, etc. Thus for hardware and software 
implementation, ITCO existed thanks to the Euro-American or Asian firms that 
it represented. Representation was highly political; it was the fruit of one’s 
relationships and depended upon support in the ruling circles of the UAE. ITCO 
represented very desirable brands or products; and it sub-contracted projects 
and work to other firms in IT projects. In such a project-based industry, firms 
organize their structures, strategies and capabilities around the needs of projects, 
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which often extend across conventional firm boundaries. The contexts of 
projects and organizations can be very diverse, ranging from organizational 
units to organizational fields. Some writers have highlighted the extent to which 
projects are embedded in the wider society (Ekstedt & Wirdenius, 1999). Most 
organizational literature also tends to approach the theme of embeddedness, 
seeing it as networks of formal and informal relations. It does, however, remain 
unclear how the wider context, in particular hyper-capitalism, has implications 
for organization.  
Granovetter (1985) points to the ‘social embeddedness’ of any economic activity 
in interpersonal networks. A more general view of social embeddedness 
highlights the dependency of individual and collective action on the structures of 
social systems. Social systems exist in time and space, displaying differing 
degrees of institutionalization. They exhibit structural properties to which 
agents refer, in their organizing practices. While structural theories (Giddens, 
1979) provide traditional contextual views, and tend to emphasize the impact of 
these structures on social interaction, the role of agency in giving life to 
structures and contexts is often ignored.  
In ITCO, the operation of the organization took place in social and political 
fields where the practices of hyper-capitalism correspond to the dispositions of 
the executives and the ruling economic and political order. Actors in ITCO 
inhabit a hyper-capitalist field of production and seek to seize the economic, 
social and cultural resources afforded by that field. ITCO managers acquired a 
hyper-capitalist mentality, conveyed by the practices belonging to the hyper-
capitalist field. These practices included notions of growth strategies through 
sales and expansion, maintaining a successful image at any cost, giving gifts and 
building necessary social relationships.  
The struggles and tensions that accompany hyper-capitalism were crucial to 
ITCO’s development. To examine hyper-capitalism I turn to Bourdieu’s (1984; 
1988b; 1990a; 1993; 1998; 1986; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) theories of 
social action and social fields. Bourdieu’s theory is frequently referred to in 
hyper-capitalism studies (Graham, 2005; Ho, 2009). In the past few years, there 
has been a revitalization of social structural approaches to the theoretical 
analysis of organizational practice. In particular, Bourdieu's conceptions of field, 
practices, habitus and forms of capital, have been used by scholars to make such 
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analyses (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Lounsbury, 2008; Lounsbury & 
Ventresca, 2003). 
Applying Bourdieu’s concepts in studying a private company illustrates that 
‘economic capital’ does not always constitute the only determining factor, even 
in the private sector and even in a company heavily influenced by a performance 
discourse. By focusing on an organization rather than a field, we choose a level 
of analysis particularly close to individual interpretation and action, in order to 
understand how criteria for distinction emerge from individual practices 
(Bourdieu, 1984). 
I did not begin to focus on Bourdieu until I began analyzing my data. My 
observations and interviews were not skewed by a Bourdieu mindset. By 
allowing the data to speak for itself, I was presented with an opportunity to use 
the concepts of ‘field’, ‘habitus’ and ‘capital’ in a management context. I did not 
postulate a priori which field was to be taken into account; I had to determine 
empirically the multiplicity of fields relevant to understanding the practices of 
the different social actors.  
Bourdieu (1977) created a relational theory focused on the dialectic character of 
the relationship between agency and structure. He argued that the social world 
and the subjects within it are co-constituted through dialectical relations 
between objective structures and the structured dispositions that agents hold, 
which in turn actualize, reproduce and transform those very structures. 
Bourdieu’s analytical framework exposes a circular relationship between 
different layers of social reality, in which the notions of field, capital and habitus 
are interlinked. The relevance of his relational theory to organizational studies 
has been identified as Everett (2002) asserts, “certain concepts associated with 
[Bourdieu’s] thought, such as field and capital, are already widely known in the 
organizational literature.” Everett has suggested that it is possible to see the 
organization as a field “in which a game takes place” or “as a field of relations 
between individuals who are competing for personal advantage” (Everett, 2002, 
p. 60). Similarly, Lounsbury and Ventresca (2003), explore the re-emergence of a 
new structuralism in organizational theory, and argue that Bourdieu’s notion of 
field provides a systematic approach for organizational researchers to explore 
structure and agency in a single framework. 
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Bourdieu’s relational approach accords primacy to individual and group 
relations within the social space of various fields. In ITCO’s socio-political-
economic ensemble of hyper-capitalism, the actors believed in maximizing their 
capital accumulation for influence and rewards. Likewise they shared a set of 
values, logics and discourses, and worked within similar socio-economic 
structures. This commitment to logic and values corresponds to what Bourdieu 
calls ‘illusio’, which is “the fact of being caught up in and by the game of 
believing the game is ‘worth the effort’” (Bourdieu, 1988a, p. 77). Any member 
of a field is subject to ‘illusio’. Actors in their everyday lives invest a great deal of 
time, energy, expertise and their very identity, in participating in their field.  
Fields are not fixed. They are conceptual spaces that are realized by actors and 
organizations, who are sharing specific interests and goals. According to 
Bourdieu, each individual brings with them their histories, tastes and 
dispositions, and how they operate within a field will have an effect on how the 
field itself is formed (Bourdieu, 1998). Actors in ITCO’s field will generally be 
disposed by the working of their habitus, to strive for recognition, fast 
accumulation of capital, and will be looking for better positions. This 
organizational field values commitments to maximize revenues, branding, 
acceptance of the rules, impassivity, and an acceptance of common-sense rather 
than the constant testing of knowledge claims or pursuit of transparency of 
findings. 
I stretch, here, the concept of field across the social space of the UAE, taking us 
beyond my empirical investigation of ITCO. Utilizing Bourdieu's concept of 
field to discuss the impact of hyper-capitalism, leads to acknowledging that 
social meaning lies not so much in the products of hyper-capitalism as in the 
practices that routinize their production. It is through such practices that the 
symbolic and social orders are connected. In the example of ITCO, ‘the global’ is 
played out as a cultural strategy by actors endowed with a form of habitus that 
remains to be specified. A habitus is usually formed through negotiated action in 
which actors are identified with their local resources and discourses. In ITCO’s 
hyper-capitalism habitus the actors developed an ethos and set of experiences 
that frame and empower them to seek revenue growth and wealth accumulation 
that led to insolvency. But the actors had a ‘practical sense’ understanding of the 
righteousness of their actions.  
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The forms of interaction and practices of ITCO’s managers and executives were 
repeated each day. The range of individual behaviors stretched from those 
seeking to increase their wealth, to the closing of bids and deals, to arguing 
about projects and criticizing one other, to looking for jobs, and finally to 
lavishly entertaining themselves at the end of day. In Chapter Two I have 
indicated the internal logic of the managers’ field(s) and the dynamic 
interactions of the actors and their external environment; their viewpoints, the 
interpretations attached to their experiences, the ways in which the individuals 
and groups interacted, the power inherent in particular contexts, the 
relationships and interrelationships that existed intra- and extra-
organizationally, and how the process of practice did not change over time. 
Bourdieu’s position explains the relative durability of differing forms of hyper-
capitalist behavior or practices, addressing both structure and agency in the 
process. This, in turn, brings to light the manner in which the very pursuit of 
wealth and the cultivation of lifestyles are themselves caught up in various 
struggles for social recognition or ‘distinction’.  
At first glance, Bourdieu's theory seems entirely unsuitable to the UAE. His 
concepts were meant to address events and the sociology of France in the late 
twentieth century. In contrast to France, the study of ITCO portrays a 
heterogeneous society; the UAE is a young nation, oil and expatriates are the 
main contributors to the economy, and various local traditions and a colonial 
heritage intermingle with globalization and transnational cultures. The model of 
society that Bourdieu develops in his studies views society in terms of a nation 
state containing a homogeneous population with a class structure. But in my 
view, contemporary UAE is not an incoherent case to be dismissed as an 
exception. And, despite remaining within a Eurocentric framework, Bourdieu 
himself started his career as a sociologist and anthropologist in Algeria at the 
end of the colonial period in the 1950s where he developed most of his concepts. 
Social reality, according to Bourdieu, exists in relational realms that include 
schemes of perception, thoughts, actions, and social structures. Hence, in the 
sociological analyses, the individual and society should be constructed as two 
dimensions of the same social reality (Swartz, 1993). Bourdieu constructs this 
connection between the socialized body and the structural logics of the social 
space, through a set of conceptual devices: the habitus, being more related to the 
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socialized body, while other concepts are more focused on the structural logic of 
the ‘field’.  
I want to analyze both executives and managers’ roles in the shaping of ITCO 
pointing to how the UAE’s hyper-capitalism helped to instantiate their 
attitudes and practices. I examine the values and practices of ITCO’s 
stakeholders that led to the financial booms and busts. I seek to demonstrate and 
explain the experiences of the executives, managers and shareholders, as shaped 
by the hyper-capitalist context that empowered them.  
Accessing the values and practices of executives, managers and shareholders, 
allows us to unpack the organizing of hyper-capitalism. Actors in hyper-
capitalism create practices demanding forms of ‘skills’ and ‘strategies’ necessary 
to enter the field. Through an analysis of Bourdieu’s key concepts—habitus, 
capital and field—I explore how organizations such as ITCO may be investigated 
not only through its processes, structure and interactions, but also through (so-
called) objective relations that exist beyond these processes and networks. Pierre 
Bourdieu, in The Logic of Practice (1990a), suggested investigating practices not 
by looking at how people consciously rationalize their actions, but by 
constructing the object of study in terms of how a specific field (context) and a 
specific habitus reciprocally construct each other. This allows the sociologist to 
build an understanding of a world in which individuals rationalize their actions. 
A central argument in Bourdieu’s Logic of Practice is that we can never know 
things in themselves; there are no universal truths because every idea is filtered 
and expressed though discourse, language and other symbolic forms (Bourdieu, 
1990b). Beliefs, thoughts, values and judgments are implicitly and explicitly 
interrelated and shaped in the field(s) of play. But this does not undermine 
network analysis; indeed, as Bourdieu himself explains, a study of organizations 
must necessarily entail an analysis of networks, leading analysts “to construct the 
network of the objective relations among establishments that, like heavenly 
bodies belonging to the same gravitational field, produce effects upon one 
another from afar.” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1998, p. 132) 
Before considering how ITCO can be analyzed through Bourdieu’s ideas, it is 
necessary to define his key concepts and to outline the core of Bourdieu’s 
theoretical framework. Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977) and The Logic of 
Practice (1990a) present a general theory and methodology for the study of 
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dialectic agency and of structures that are embedded in society. Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus and its relationship to the concepts of field and capital form a 
theoretical framework and the basis of a methodology that are supposed to 
enable the rigorous investigation of human actions and interactions.  
My conceptualization of Bourdieu’s concepts: 
My primary engagement with Bourdieu’s work is in relation to his notion of 
social field, which he defines in the following way: 
A field is a structured social space, a field of forces, a force field. It contains people who 
dominate and people who are dominated. Constant, permanent relationships of 
inequality operate inside this space, which at the same time becomes a space in which 
the various actors struggle for the transformation or preservation of the field. All the 
individuals in this universe bring to the competition all the (relative) power at their 
disposal. It is this power that defines their position in the field and, as a result, their 
strategies. (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1998, pp. 40-41). 
The field captures the socially constructed and negotiated positions of actors and 
organizations between which strategic action takes place. Although fields are 
constructed through discourses and practices, it is the individual agents who 
enact these discourses and practices. According to Bourdieu, a field is occupied 
by agents who implicitly acknowledge the rules of the field through the very act 
of ‘playing the game’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). As such, a circular 
relationship exists between the micro and macro levels of social reality, that is, 
between agents and structures. Thus, understanding a field requires 
investigation of the structures of the field, forms of legitimate capital, and of the 
individual agents who enact, reproduce, and subscribe to the structures. In 
Bourdieu’s terms, “the field of play is a field of objective relations between 
individuals and institutions that are competing for the same stake." Maintaining 
one’s position requires gaining capital in all its forms, which leads to the 
reproduction of the field. Bourdieu sees every actor interacting with a 
conglomeration of fields, including organizations, family and others.  
The relations in each field create dominant classes in each, but the process of 
struggle for capital is comparable in each and capital can be exchanged from one 
field to the other. A field offers resources, values, and relations that the actors 
use when they establish their internal perception of self and when they negotiate 
and transform the underlying dispositions that create meaning and practice (in 
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the habitus). A field also provokes expectations about behavior, both in the 
present and in the future (Bourdieu, 1977). The earlier an individual enters a 
field, the less she or he will be aware of the associated learning of the ‘rules of the 
game’ and the greater is her or his “ignorance of all that is tacitly granted 
through his or her investment in the field” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 67). The 
dynamic principles of a field, Bourdieu (in Wacquant, 1989, p. 30), “lie in the 
form of its structures and, in particular, in the distance, the gaps, between the 
various specific forces that confront one another.” These forces are what define 
the specific capital of a field. A field is meant to encompass a structural logic 
according to which specific types of capital compete against each other for a 
stake in the game; every field has its own self-defining stakes and interests, 
which are irreducible in relation to the stakes and interests specific to other 
fields (Bourdieu, 1993). The structural logic that a field imposes on actors 
specifies the forms of struggle, which are internalized through forms of 
embodiment; the actors mobilize their embodied or objectified properties as 
forms of capital to pursue their specific interests.  
Bourdieu sees any social formation as consisting of a hierarchy of multiple, 
relatively autonomous fields, with their own logics of practice, hierarchies, and 
power relations among the agents and their positions within the field, with the 
sum of the parts being greater than the whole. The extent of field autonomy is 
reflected in the strength of its capacity to refract interference from other fields. 
Collectively all fields are overlaid by a field of power. Agents within each field 
compete for control of the interests specific to that field, and utilize their capital 
(economic, cultural, and social) in this competition. The habitus of actors 
affects the extent of their ‘feel for the game’.  
Bourdieu’s ideas have been applied in the broader context of a ‘field’ such as 
universities or media (Ladwig, 1994). But business organizations often straddle 
different social fields, opening questions about hierarchy. How do the logics of 
practice within a field connect with those in other fields? How do social fields 
affect other social fields? Ladwig has suggested that contemporary organizations 
exist as fields with multiple levels, one of which has a global character (Ladwig, 
1994). Under conditions of globalization, the autonomy of organizational fields 
is reduced. This is in line with Bourdieu’s last writings. In his political essays, 
Firing Back (Bourdieu, 2003) and in The Weight of the World (Bourdieu, 1999), 
he critically documented the negative effects across many differing fields of the 
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political field of the neo-liberal global economy. Drawing on Bourdieu (2003), 
the amount of ‘local capital’ possessed by a given organization within different 
fields is a determining factor in the degree of autonomy it can muster. Rawolle 
(2005) suggests that looking at practices, which are embedded in multiple fields, 
and their habitus, allows for a methodological resolution accounting for in 
multiple fields (see Figure 10). 
   
Figure 10. Re-conceptualizing Bourdieu’s concepts in multiple fields. 
For Bourdieu, practical activities provide social meaning to actors, such as gift 
exchange, farming activities, sales activities, or common rituals. Through the use 
of practices, individuals and groups make meaning of the world and individuals 
are able to shape and construct the world around them. To be a part of 
particular practices, individuals need to have a ‘feel for the game’, indicating an 
understanding of the rules, strategies and tactics in the field involved (Bourdieu, 
1998). Actors in organizations interact in multiple fields and their practical 
activities call into action strategies for the accumulation of capital in those fields 
of play. 
The concept of field(s) insists on the necessity to think relationally. The notion 
of field draws on and explores changing relations among the elements within 
any particular field and its relations with other fields. The positions of actors 
within a field are never determined a priori and for all time, but change and shift 
depending on the distribution and kinds of capital. Further, the relationship 
among different fields and within them are mediated through the specific 
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particularities of their present and histories. The possibility for collective 
strategic action occurs when two or more groups engage in joint strategic action. 
Individuals embody the structural logic of the field through their habitus and 
doxa14. These are the modes of reproducing the objective social structures within 
the cognitive schemata of the individuals. Individual actions are not purely 
mechanical responses to external structures, but instead symbolic interests and 
the habitus shape them: “the social world is accumulated history, and if it is not 
to be reduced to a discontinuous series of instantaneous mechanical equilibria 
between agents who are treated as interchangeable particles, one must 
reintroduce into it the notion of capital and with it, accumulation and all its 
effects” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 241). Persons accumulate capital and in their 
individual histories they build a habitus as their particular frame of reference.  
Habitus is constructed via the historical trajectory people go through. Once 
acquired, habitus generates actions, assigns meanings to actions and settings. 
Habitus provides a focus for analyzing the experience of social agents and the 
objective structures underpinning experience (Bourdieu, 1988a). The formula is:  
(Habitus x Capital) + Field = Practice. Habitus is visible as it comes into contact 
with field. During change, a new place in the field is occupied. Habitus is 
exposed through attempts to understand the informal, unspoken rules of the 
new environment. Habitus underpins practices guiding the individual in 
managing change and uncertainty. While it is both historically and socially 
situated, habitus can be novel, adapting to new forms and actions, and 
responding to changes in social relations. For Bourdieu, the habitus is the 
durable, transposable, structured (and structuring) dispositions of individuals 
(Bourdieu, 1990a). “The field, as a structured space, tends to structure the 
habitus, while the habitus, tends to structure the perception of the field” 
(Bourdieu, 1988a, p. 784). Not only beliefs and values affect change, but the field 
where action takes place is equally important. Habitus as a construct cannot be 
measured directly. Bourdieu (1977) indicates that habitus is revealed through a 
person’s perceptions, aspirations, and actions. The habitus that fits the 
                                                            
14 By doxa, Bourdieu means that which is unmentioned, unquestioned, and tacit: the natural and 
social world appears as self-evident  characterized by a harmony between the objective structures and the 
'subjective', internal structures of the habitus where the social world is perceived as natural, taken-for-granted 
and tacit (Bourdieu, 1990a). 
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organizational field can be defined as the habitus that enables owners, executives 
and managers to translate capital into actions relevant for their interests.  
The habitus drives thoughts, perceptions, expressions, and actions. The habitus: 
“embodies history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history –it 
is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product .... [it entails 
dispositions of] spontaneity without consciousness or will” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 
56). These dispositions do not depend solely on the individual but are at work 
within the individual. This is how structure takes on life. A person cannot 
contain a habitus because a habitus must be social, it must be created and 
recreated, produced and reproduced through interaction and social practices.  
Individuals from a particular socio-economic group will usually have many 
aspects of habitus in common. A person’s dispositions will include beliefs about 
their chances of success in any given endeavor. Bourdieu postulates that one’s 
aspirations and subsequent actions are adjusted to the perceived probability of 
success. He refers to this as the ‘causality of the probable’. Dominant relations in 
society are often reproduced via the habitus. Frequently social and cultural 
relations are not reflected upon, they are just ‘lived’ (Creswell, 2003). Global and 
macro social structures and the structural arrangements and distribution of 
capital constitute experiences, which inform the habitus (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992). Class, privilege and bias are embodied social capital and are part of the 
habitus. This embodiment is inherently bound to the context within which 
people’s lives are lived. Bourdieu emphasizes that agents are only partially 
knowledgeable; they are also influenced by subconscious and embodied 
motivations. Therefore, it is not necessary for individuals to be consciously 
aware of the value of their social relationships for these networks to count as 
capital. For Bourdieu, capital exchanges may be subconscious and governed by 
dispositions and choices that defy rational reflection. Socially and culturally 
constituted ways of perceiving, evaluating, and behaving, are often unquestioned 
and taken for granted. Such things may not be necessarily recorded formally but 
they are embodied in actors as the way in which things are done and are for 
them part of the natural order (Bourdieu, 1977). 
Mainstream economic thought treats capital as a sort of ‘thing’ made up of plant 
and equipment, natural resources, and money. For Marx, capital is a ‘social 
relation of production belonging to a definite historical formation of society, 
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which is manifested in a thing and lends this thing a specific social character’ 
(Marx, 1996, p. 1). Bourdieu also emphasizes the need to avoid a ‘substantialist 
reading’ of the term ‘capital’ (Bourdieu, 1991). Bourdieu distinguished three 
fundamental forms of capital. First, there is the classic notion of Economic 
Capital defined in terms of the command over economic resources and 
possession of financial assets. Second, there is Social Capital that consists of 
relationships and the networks of influence, and the support people can tap into 
by virtue of their social position. It can be also defined as membership in formal 
and informal groups that gives privileged access to different types of resources. 
Third, Cultural Capital refers to explicit and implicit, formal and informal, 
cultural competences. These include the skills, attitudes, and knowledge parents 
teach their children, making the educational system a comfortable and familiar 
place in which they can easily succeed. Cultural capital appears in an ‘embodied’ 
state (personal character, life-style, ways of thinking, aesthetic taste, manners), 
an ‘institutionalized’ state (formal educational qualifications, competences 
confirmed by credentials), and an ‘objectified’ state (objects of cultural value, 
mainly works of art).  
Bourdieu also describes a fourth type of capital: Symbolic Capital (Bourdieu, 
1986). Symbolic capital entails the perception, understanding and recognition of 
the value attributed to any of the other forms of capital (social, cultural and 
economic). Symbolic capital is embodied in prestige, reputation and personal 
authority. Bourdieu (1977) has suggested that social and cultural capital can be 
converted into symbolic capital. Symbolic capital is made up of combinations of 
the other forms of capital and is fundamental to their use, in that it facilitates the 
conversion of social or cultural capital to economic capital. Symbolic capital 
resides in individuals; however, the production of symbolic capital is a socially 
constructed process, through which other forms of capital become accepted, 
socially recognized, and considered valuable. 
Recognition of symbolic capital requires shared understanding and meaning by 
other actors of what constitutes value, and therefore what is considered 
legitimate, valid and useful. Symbolic capital refers to the ways in which the one 
person, group, organization is valued by others. Bourdieu (1988a) used the 
example of honor in Mediterranean societies as a typical form of symbolic 
capital. Honor only has currency through the representation that others have of 
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it and to the extent that there are shared beliefs about what is honorable or 
dishonorable.  
Not all versions of capital are equally valuable and each field is characterized by 
a specific combination of capital(s). By defining one form of capital as belonging 
to a field, or as the most valued type of capital there, one group can dominate 
and enforce its own resources as crucial. The resources that constitute social 
capital are thus related to the field within which they are accumulated. 
Individuals use their capital to gain access to a higher position in the field of 
play. The rules of conversion from one capital to another differ in each field, and 
these rules can also be considered a constitutive element of the field. By 
definition, the dominating type of capital, or the most valued and desirable type 
will possess the highest value within that field in relation to other types of 
capital.  
The potential of a group within an organization to acquire social capital may be 
greater than others. For example, those managers or executives closer to UAE 
nationals gain access to officials of value in closing sales. In addition, those at the 
executive level, who control the interactions with suppliers and banks, hold 
greater social capital than others do. Increasing sales, adding new customers, 
contracting for new products and maximizing revenue are socially and 
symbolically powerful. The process of recognition of both social and symbolic 
capital reflects the economic system’s assumptions about usefulness. Such social 
capital is legitimate and leads to symbolic capital only as far as the networks 
involved are recognized within the organizational field(s). Thus, the context in 
which social actions take place has to be legitimized by the dominant capital. 
Interpretation must take the nature of the dominant form of capital into 
account. If social capital is the dominant, then organizational action must be 
understood in terms of characteristics related to social capital. Some of these 
characteristics, in the case of ITCO, could be the network of relationships with 
UAE nationals, suppliers, clients, and financial institutions. This dependence on 
social capital could be the key dimension of interpretation for observer and 
social actor alike.  
Agents are positioned relative to other agents in a field according to the overall 
volume of capital in their possession and the composition of that capital. 
Economic capital can be converted into other forms of capital, just as social 
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capital can be converted into economic capital, but at different exchange rates. 
Economic capital is more liquid and more easily transferable from one actor to 
another. Economic capital can be passed from generation to generation, 
reproducing class legitimacy and domination over time (Bourdieu, 1988b). 
Social capital can be crucial, for example to gain promotion, between actors in 
an organizational field. For instance, an actor who has a limited network of 
relationships might find his opportunities to advance much less than those of 
another actor who has gained access to powerful internal and/or external 
officials. 
As an actor’s portfolio of capitals changes, his/her position in the field alters. But 
no social actor can act in only one single field. In fact, possession of capital 
makes us actors where ever that type of capital is in play. For example, by 
acquiring even a small amount of social capital in the UAE, one becomes an 
actor in the complex social networks of Abu Dhabi.  By acquiring residency, one 
automatically obtains the right to work and becomes an actor in the fields of the 
labor market. It is assumed that the goal of every individual is to maximize profit 
(or, additional capital) from her/his capital exchanges (Bourdieu, 1991). As the 
social capital is exchanged, agents gain status, changing their relations and 
behavior to others. At the same time, the fields adjust to the new conditions of 
individuals. The capital gained shifts (the fields of) one’s habitus.  
In the UAE, economic capital (land, buildings, cars, bank accounts) and social 
capital (recognition and prestige) were crucial. Cultural capital – quality 
education, artistic sensitivity, possession of beautiful things – did not count for 
much. Abu Dhabi is fundamentally a nouveau riche society. Social capital, or 
acceptance by the local elite, was crucial. Through one’s social capital one could 
gain wealth. According to Bourdieu, there is no area of human life, where one 
cannot find self-interested calculation, as well as kindness or altruism. Every 
field of human endeavor is defined by a set of competitive strategies and a field’s 
practical logic. In Bourdieu’s study of the Kabyle society, gift giving was a part of 
these strategies. Gifts were part of the game in the field of play, creating 
obligations, confirming relationships, and strengthening alliances. By way of gift 
giving symbolic capital is accumulated and advantage is gained over the other. 
This is how everyone else will perceive the actions and this will be their real 
meaning. To explain this practice in any other way is to resort to ‘subjectivism’ 
and to try to explain it only from a person’s perspective. Gift giving is a form of 
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relatedness, best understood in terms of the creation, exchange and embedding 
of relationships and in UAE it is a crucial form of relationship creation. 
In ITCO the owner has unmatched economic and symbolic capital. He is a 
senior government official with a broad range of connections and entrusted by 
the ruling family with administrative transactions and decisions. These 
relationships and connections influence ITCO’s possibilities and identity. The 
top expat managers who have contact with the owner are in a privileged 
position. Others without those contacts are clearly in inferior and weaker 
positions. ITCO’s president and the vice president of finance, with well-
established connections to the owner, have built on their social capital to gain 
relationships to other government officials, suppliers, and the banks. On the 
other hand, sales and project managers have networks of connections gained 
through their daily work. These can lead to all sorts of tips, gifts and job offers. 
The expats want to accumulate wealth. They are less out to save money than to 
enlarge their field of play both in the UAE and in their country of origin. The 
most successful have possessions back home – houses, cars, bank accounts; that 
guarantee their future status. An Egyptian project manager said: 
"I studied very hard to earn my degree. I always wanted to stay in Egypt and be 
around my family. But the opportunities were dismal. The fact that I live here 
in the UAE have not let me forget my country at any minute. I work to save 
money to go back and enjoy the money I earned. I have many fellow 
countryman and friends in the UAE so I do not feel really outside my country. I 
am proud of my profession and this is more important to me than anything 
else." 
Cultural capital (a university degree) did not get him wanted he wanted in 
economic capital, so he became an expat. His social capital amongst his fellow 
countrymen in the UAE seems to have been satisfactory, but he still wants to 
transfer his economic capital back to Egypt, because he misses the cultural 
capital of living in the country of his family.  
Ahmed, a sales manager: 
"My motives have included building wealth, sales success, and recognition, and 
any company that would provide these would always become my target. I 
originally chose ITCO from many potential offers because of multiple factors, 
including the products and solutions, the salary and prestige of working in the 
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largest IT company, and ITCO’s good reputation. But after some years, my 
main motive became wealth and career growth opportunities. Moving to a 
multinational could be a better option in the future." 
Ahmed portrays himself in terms of his employer’s capital. He wants to work for 
the company with the strongest economic, social, and cultural capital. 
Supposedly the employer’s resulting symbolic capital will rub off on him 
somehow.  
Applying the conceptualization of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice enables us to 
identify the social fields ITCO inhabits and the social habitus of its hyper-
capitalism. ITCO is characterized by the reproduced social practices and 
relations common in it. I propose to proceed in three steps. The first is to 
identify the field(s) of actions. The second consists in accounting for the 
positions occupied by actors and organizations competing for what is at stake in 
the field(s) (e.g., recouping wealth and recognition). How do the actors compete 
in the acquisition of social capital to generate wealth and recognition? Third, the 
habitus of the agents must be analyzed to identify the different dispositions they 
have acquired and the kinds of capital they have accumulated. In this case, we 
need to identify the actors’ hyper-capitalist habitus as it is played out in the 
economic and social fields. 
Central in Bourdieu’s logic of practice is that we never know things in 
themselves; every idea is filtered and expressed though discourse, language, and 
other symbolic forms (Bourdieu, 1990b). Beliefs, thoughts, values and 
judgments are implicitly and explicitly interrelated and shaped in the field(s) of 
play. We can try to know the deep social structures that can be theoretically 
investigated. The researcher has: "to uncover the most profoundly buried 
structures ... as well as the mechanisms which tend to ensure their reproduction 
or their transformation" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.7). But Bourdieu 
claims that such structures exist in: the ‘objectivity of the first order’, that is as 
constituted by the distribution of capital, or the appropriation of surplus value. 
Further, they also exist in the ‘objectivity of the second order’, constituted by 
systems of categorization or the mental and bodily schemata of habitus, which 
function as symbolic templates for the practical activities of social actors 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.7). 
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Although each social field has its own structure of social positions and principles 
of functioning, there is a strong tendency towards homology. Hierarchical 
positions of power and advantage are replicated from one field to another, as 
one would expect given the transferability of capital across fields. Though there 
may be barriers to entry, fields are not solid but permeable. The most distinctive 
feature of the UAE field is that economics and politics are virtually 
indistinguishable. Both share the same dominant discourse—that of building 
and developing an ultra modern nation. The economic and political power is 
one, centered in the rulers. They make politically motivated appointments to 
business positions and funnel massive funds into various industries and projects. 
The economic field is subordinated to the political one. This is supported 
culturally, by widespread conspicuous consumption, fostered by an image or 
simulacra that UAE nationals want to portray to the world. The distinctions are 
supported by the abundance of wealth from oil revenues. 
Companies like ITCO, for the first two or three decades of UAE’s independence, 
could not raise private capital. Not until 2003, did a public stock exchange 
become active. But the state retains the ultimate power to supply funds and 
control the direction of the stock exchange, since most of the companies traded 
are state owned. Thus, by controlling private capital, the state reduced the ‘free 
market economy’ to simulacra. The political field maintains tight rules and 
control, not allowing the economic field much autonomy. The rulers have 
created a semi-autonomous economic field by creating so-called independent 
companies that are state controlled and managed by executives who only act on 
directions from the rulers. The rulers decided in the last decade to open up the 
economy up to foreign companies and they started to massively invest in real 
estate and projects. They encouraged the influx of funds by foreign capital asset 
companies and banks, opening new lines of credit to the local banks.  
ITCO has been driven by the demand for new technologies in the UAE. The 
speed and intensity of local and global flows was enormous during the boom 
years. Consumption of both material and immaterial goods was accompanied by 
urgency, intensity, and a drive for the fast accumulation of wealth. Individuals 
pursued their self-interest with no checks and balances. In ITCO, the logic of 
sales and revenue growth dominated; to be an effective participant in the field it 
was essential to conform to its logic. Focusing on promotions, higher salaries, 
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prestige, and recognition was required. While investing in one’s country of 
origin and looking for higher rates of returns was sanctioned. 
ITCO’s servicing and implementing of projects, required large lines of credit in 
order to support the accounts receivable of the company. Once completed, 
customers were expected to pay their receivables on time. ITCO was ‘leveraged’. 
ITCO managed to show growth in sales revenue and assets. Banks were eager to 
extend lines of credit, earning hand over foot via their high interest rates. While 
projects were ITCO’s main end-product, their financials were largely ignored. 
The processes of selling solutions, implementing projects, and financial 
reporting, were completely independent.  ‘Leveraging’ allowed ITCO’s actors to 
maximize sales revenues. ITCO’s structure was built around the vice president 
of services, who was in charge of the delivery of projects– and the vice president 
of sales – who was responsible for relations with suppliers and vendors. As 
revenues grew in three digit figures, year after year, ITCO’s executives and 
managers associated the maximizing of revenues with success. The hyper-
capitalist context supported rapid expansion and easy access to credit. The 
habitus generated the business practices, practices that were evaluated, and 
practices that, in turn, were used to evaluate the social world, thus reproducing 
it. The habitus was primarily economic and social. Hyper-capitalism is a habitus 
that takes getting used to. The actor has to be sufficiently proficient to embody 
its assumptions in practice and to have “a sense of playing the game which is at 
once active and non-discursive” (Calhoun, 1993, p. 74). 
Bourdieu did not spell out uses of habitus as a research method. As Reay (2004, 
p. 432) observes, habitus “is probably Bourdieu’s most contested concept.” 
Everyday experiences are crucial. Ways actors embody structure, or what 
Bourdieu calls structure-structuring, are part of habitus. Habitus embodies 
structural limits for action and habitus generates aspirations, perceptions and 
practices. Dispositions then reflect the social context in which they are acquired. 
Habitus refers to the way of being in the world; our predisposed ways of 
thinking, acting, and moving in. It encompasses posture, outlook and tastes. 
Informing both the smallest and largest of actions (Sweetman, 2003). Acquired 
dispositions enable actors to function smoothly within a structure of relations, 
leading to the process of social reproduction that in turn leads to practices that 
reinforce the dispositions. The term ‘disposition’ is key for Bourdieu, as it 
suggests structure and propensity – or the predefined and voluntary.  
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Habitus is a relational concept. The formulation: (Habitus x Capital) + Field = 
Practice, stresses the context or field(s). The hyper-capitalism habitus contains a 
set of dispositions leading to its actual practices. These practices indicate a 
subjective gestalt and action potentials that are inscribed in forms of capital. 
ITCO’s managers and executives almost all came from a low- to lower middle- 
class background and their families are far from being wealthy. They became 
managers by meeting sales targets or through playing their cultural and/or 
social, rather than economic, capital. Coming from poorer Arab countries 
compared to the UAE, the executives and managers were born with low 
economic, social, and cultural capital. In their countries of origin, ethnic and 
cultural hierarchies are important for one’s status and social position. The 
mechanism of social stratification is such that one’s social capital determines 
one’s access to jobs, relationships, and economic resources. These executives and 
managers tried to attend the best schools and universities in their country of 
origin, to gain better positions later. In most of their countries, leading 
universities like the American University of Beirut or Cairo are affiliated with 
US based universities; the education is based largely on a capitalist perspective. 
These universities try to reproduce American social and cultural values.  
ITCO’s managers and executives believe that the present wealth from oil 
revenues will not last forever. The UAE rulers have invested billions of dollars to 
convert their country from being a pure oil exporter to becoming a tourist 
destination. Statistics show that oil reserves in the UAE could last for another 
ninety years.15 The fear of the ‘end of oil’ is an important element in the 
predominant dispositions, although it does not produce a more cautious kind of 
investor. To the contrary, it seems to produce a ‘last waltz on the Titanic’ spirit. 
What is possible right now may never be possible again.  
The western educated UAE nationals have become the CEOs of newly 
established companies and have learned to use the capitalist’s language and 
labels in dealing with others. But the political structure has not changed. The 
ruling families remain the decision makers on all matters. Their social capital 
has held its own, as they still maintain similar relationships with their allies and 
networks.  
                                                            
15The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), January, 2013((EIA), 2013). 
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ITCO’s managers formed strong intra-organizational and societal networks. 
They often had stronger ties with their suppliers’ salesmen and their colleagues 
in other organizations (even competitors) than within ITCO. Vendors and 
suppliers could maximize their revenues by establishing strong ties with ITCO’s 
sales managers. The latter could concentrate on selling the suppliers’ products 
rather than those of others. Throughout Abu Dhabi, managers ‘chatted’ about 
potential opportunities for better pay.  
Economic capital could be measured in terms of property ownership; cultural 
capital by educational credentials; social capital by the network of relationships, 
and symbolic capital by how visible the other forms of capital are how easily they 
can be converted to one’s advantage. For example, how easily can one’s ‘expert’ 
status be converted to financial luxury, or how can one ‘buy’ a place within 
the elite? 
Capital is always contingent on the playing field. Some forms of capital accrue 
more ‘interest’ than others. The value of any capital increases, or decreases, 
through its scarcity or abundance. In ITCO’s field(s) of play, managers and 
consultants sought to accumulate capital, depending on their trajectory16, but 
mostly centering on economic capital, with social capital following suit. The 
habitus emphasized the benefits of hyper-capitalism. All expats were dependent 
on UAE nationals who make all the political decisions, from the approval and 
entry of expatriates to the legislative rules on who has the right to bid for 
projects in the lucrative oil sector. As expat, the best you could do was getting 
close to a UAE national, to share some of his social clout. Social networks were 
crucial to sales, though branding did have some pull. 
In hyper-capitalism accumulated economic capital is transferred into cultural 
and social capital (e.g. providing a privileged position within the newly created 
market economy). During the boom, the UAE nationals who had money 
(economic capital) and possessed strong ties with the ruling families, increased 
their income by buying into the real estate market. Their strong social ties gave 
                                                            
16 Within a field, individuals occupy a specific position at any one point in time and also a trajectory 
of positions through time. The position of an individual is shaped by the network of relationships and capital. In 
this sense, the individual's biography, including both the objective resources he starts with and the uses he 
makes of them, describes a trajectory through the space of objective positions in the field, which itself may be 
developing and changing. This trajectory is produced partly by the way the individual plays the game, and by 
material factors (Bourdieu, 1993).  
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them access to market information on what was being planned whereby they 
could make informed decisions on where to invest. Once the 2008 crisis hit the 
UAE, many saw their fortunes tumble. But people close to the ruling family were 
protected from bankruptcy. The banks were told that they were not allowed to 
foreclose on them. 
In UAE’s hyper-capitalism, social capital was the dominant form of capital. You 
had to have strong relationships to succeed in the marketplace. When it came to 
giant IT projects, the principal market of ITCO, money did not really play a big 
role. The amounts of money involved were enormous and all players had that 
sort of money. If you didn’t you just could not even entertain entering the field. 
ITCOs vice presidents and managers could only play as ITCO, as individuals 
they were nothing and they knew it. Even the president had very limited social 
capital. He was afraid in the crisis period (2009) that he would become the fall 
man; and might even go to prison. Because UAE has no bankruptcy laws, if 
ITCO went under someone would have to be legally charged. That could never 
be the owner and thus the president’s fear. He could flee ITCO, treating it as a 
sinking ship, and run to Lebanon, but he felt obligated to do everything he could 
to save the firm. But, if it came down to criminal charges, he wondered whether 
he should stay and be convicted or flee. The owner’s social capital saved the day. 
The banks were told from ahigh to back off whereby ITCO had the financial 
space and possibilities to save it.  
ITCO’s cultural capital has been reduced by hyper-capitalism. Back in 2004, 
ITCO was fairly unique, but over the years international IT consulting firms 
have entered the market. Better trained consultants have been brought in from 
Europe. ITCO never invested in training or keeping its consultants up-to-date. 
Their level of professional proficiency is not really very high. Professionals with 
better and higher university degrees and more sophisticated practice have 
entered the market. The old adage that no one was ever fired in Abu Dhabi for 
incompetence is no longer so certain. Quality of workmanship becomes more 
important the more open and competitive the field becomes.  
While ITCO had the social capital needed to survive the economic crisis, it came 
out of the crisis reduced to less than 10% of what it once was. It lost a lot of 
symbolic capital as it was reputed as economically weak and no longer a 
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powerhouse in the IT market. ITCO’s doxa of sales and more sales, supported by 
always growing revenues, could not weather the 2009 hyper-capitalist storm.  
ITCO was during 2002-2008 a ‘fish in water’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992): not 
conscious of the water around it because it was perfectly at home in it. The 
managers coped effortlessly with their situation, having embodied a practical 
sense of working in the field of play. But 2009 introduced new elements and 
individuals found themselves in different ‘water’. During the years 2009-2010, 
the field(s) surrounding ITCO jittered and new rules and conditions came into 
place. ITCO’s internal discourse turned from success to survival. Many found 
themselves like fish out of water, struggling to survive.  
During my February 2013 visit to the UAE, after an absence of almost three 
years, I met with ITCO’s president and vice president of sales. ITCO had become 
a company of less than fifty employees with no salespeople. Bank negotiations 
had led the banks to drop more than half of ITCO’s debt. The vice president of 
sales talked about the great potential in the market and his eagerness to acquire 
new brands. He was ever more optimistic of the future potential in the UAE. I 
listened to the discussions between the president and the vice president. The 
president was less enthusiastic in tone, but had just come back from a meeting 
with a senior UAE official for a US $20 million project that he had discussed in 
the parking lot inside the official’s car. The vice president kept defending his 
belief in another UAE boom and the need to be ready.  
ITCO had lost much of its social capital. Economically, ITCO could not report 
profit for 2010. As a gravy train for expatriates; executives, managers, 
consultants and administrative staff, ITCO was deeply diminished. Power was 
still distributed exactly the same; the UAE national owners still had the power, 
knowing that banks and creditors could easily have sued, but that this was 
politically unacceptable. Some expats had earned well, but none of them had 
actually managed to escape their dependency positions.  
Hyper-capitalism would roll on, with or without ITCO. The irony of ITCO’s 
hyper-capitalism is that everything and nothing was economic. In hyper-
capitalism there is unlimited money and economic activity or growth on an 
unheard of scale. Business is hyper-booming. But in Abu Dhabi business is 
consumed rather than produced. All the business activity was not producing 
new wealth; it was consuming oil dollars. Supposedly all the economic activity 
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would eventually produce new wealth. But there was no proof that it would ever 
get there. The managers and consultants at ITCO could act the way they did 
because money had no real value to the owners. The airport, or the police, or the 
army supposedly needed advanced IT systems because that was ‘how it is 
supposed to be’ according to the standards of Europe or America. The airport or 
airline did not have to make a profit; they had to be big, modern, impressive and 
‘successful.’ The money came from oil, not from all the rest. The money was a 
precondition of hyper-capitalism and not a product of hyper-capitalism. ITCO 
and its clients (except for the oil industry) did not produce wealth, they 
consumed it.  
When I tried to understand ITCO as any other capitalist company that had to 
make a profit, I was wrong. Abu Dhabi was capitalism turned on its head – 
companies had to seem to do things economic, but did not really have to do any 
such thing. There was no scarcity of economic capital, nor was there really 
competition for it. You might think that such hyper-capitalism would be 
liberating. The value of what the consultants produced was probably lower than 
their salaries. Labor was definitely not being exploited. But ITCO was never 
creative, remained socially fearful, and I saw it as culturally and humanly ‘stuck.’ 
  
 
  
CHAPTER 4 
Complexity of ITCO 
 
The analysis in Chapter 3 is valid as a modernist description of ITCO. It 
examined the social construction of identity first on a more micro level or the 
level of self and relationships, and subsequently on the more societal, socio-
economic and cultural level. These analyses produced systems’ insights into 
ITCO, where ITCO appears unto itself somewhat stable. The economic crisis of 
2008 eventually reached ITCO and forced change. But change, as far as it went, 
came from without and not from within. It seems that ITCO was internally fairly 
stable. Given that it never really made a profit and that most of its projects never 
really worked as they should have, this is a remarkable conclusion. ITCO was a 
story of ‘sufficing’. It just kept getting by, even though it seemed as though it 
simply could not.  
But the conclusion that forms of capital and how they relate to one another and 
to circumstance determines what we can see and know about ITCO is not very 
satisfying. Most notably, it destroys the relationship between scarcity and excess 
as a key factor. Scarcity and excess are reduced in Bourdieu to aspects of forms 
of capital. ITCO as a living phenomenon is reduced to epiphenomena of the play 
of the forms of capital. Bourdieu’s habitus is singularly unlived-in. I want to 
conclude with descriptors that bring me closer to ITCO and the people who 
‘lived there’. Chapter 3 is not wrong or false as such, but I feel I may have lost 
touch with experienced existence in its analysis. Thus, my challenge in Chapter 4 
is to rediscover the dynamics of ITCO’s hyper-real, hyper-capitalist existence.  
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To achieve this we must turn to the study of dynamics – of social occurrence as 
change, movement and motion. My theoretical baggage is social complexity 
theory. Complexity theory asserts that there are various types of attractors. An 
attractor works as a sort of metaphorical magnet on the persons, groups, 
organizations, etc. under observation. The actant is ‘attracted’ to certain goals or 
behaviors. The attraction can be direct and causal (‘a leads directly to b’), but it 
can also be circular (a chain, for instance of thesis-antithesis-synthesis always 
repeats itself), or polar (to and fro, repeated over and over), or unpredictable. 
The last option, the so-called ‘strange attractor’, provides for change, innovation 
and the new. It is the emergent attractor and qua social or historical 
transformation that is the most interesting. The concept of the strange attractor 
transcends modernism – it asserts that the new will happen and change will 
occur. Existence is not entirely analytically comprehensible. Society and history 
are not bound by Newtonian physics; the new, unknown and unique, will 
emerge. Change is real. 
By applying the theory of attractors to my case study, it is clear that point or 
fixed attractors pertain to simple causality: stimulus/response, change 
determined by technology push, the effects of economic growth, etc. While the 
UAE’s economic boom formed a crucial contextual element in the ITCO case, 
attitudes and responses were not a simple effect of the economics of excess. 
Cyclical or periodical attractors produce repeating patterns. (Neo-)Marxists 
view capitalism as a repeating polar pattern of growth and bust, or bear and bull 
markets. UAE’s hyper-capitalism may have experienced a hiccup in 2008, but 
there was no crisis. ITCO underwent a mini-crisis but today still exists, although 
in a smaller form. But the attitudes and assumptions of the managers and 
consultants at ITCO – or those no longer at ITCO – have not changed or 
developed, as far as I have been able to ascertain (and I have tried to follow as 
many persons as possible). Thus if there is a pattern, I do not know what it is; I 
only see repetition without difference. Certainly there has not been any political 
shift of awareness in the (ex-)employees or managers. Life in hyper-capitalism 
has not been disrupted, nor have any of the players voiced any economic or 
political critique of the boom years. Before and after there was no political 
awareness or interest by anyone. The focus on the ‘fast-buck’, if anything, has 
intensified.  
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ITCO could be regarded as under the attractor of the deskilling of labor. The 
cycle supposedly runs from ‘craftsman labor, to skilled industrial labor, to 
deskilled labor’. The theory, the basis of labor process theory, argues that 
advanced capitalism destroys skilled labor and professionalism as it 
‘industrializes’ all production. Just as Henry Ford made skilled labor 
unnecessary to build automobiles, contemporary IT systems are making legal, 
medical, etc. skills redundant. Similarly, it could be argued, based on French 
social theory, that ITCO is an illustration of ‘proletariatization’. Stiegler (2011) 
argues that knowledge is being usurped by management and put into IT 
technology. Management decides what happens, when and exactly what is 
produced. Workers lose all control of production and cease to have any input 
into what is produced. Skilled work is remade into unskilled work. Pride of 
workmanship is reduced to routine and deadening automatism. Stiegler asserts 
that this cycle is proletariatizing lawyers, doctors, architects, engineers and 
teachers. Employers and corporate interests control and manipulate, as they 
please, the work of the former professionals now re-baptized ‘knowledge 
workers’. However, ITCO’s professionals were not really professionals at all. 
They did not have the knowledge-base, pride of workmanship or self-awareness 
needed to be real professionals. They can be viewed as a new proletariat. But the 
idea that this is a socio-economic cycle that is repeating itself is problematic. The 
UAE did not experience the industrial revolution. Thus, there is definitely not a 
socio-economic pattern here repeating itself. Only if we look at ITCO as a 
European object of study can we make use of Stiegler’s argument. And I, 
personally, do not want to proceed that way. Significantly, almost no one 
involved in the ITCO story was European. Maybe European patterns were 
repeating themselves, but it is apparent that none of the players actually 
experienced matters in that way.  
There is the case of strange attractors. Strange attractors are creative. They 
attract events to the new, unexpected and creative. A problem that for instance 
Letiche and Lissack (2011) had in their social complexity analysis was that 
organizations did unexpected and new things. Organization was emergent. But 
ITCO was not very emergent. Despite change in its business environment, ITCO 
stayed qua its basic social rationality the same. Even now, after being scaled 
down and having lost its prominence, the consultants and managers that are still 
there, think, act and seem to understand themselves and others exactly as they 
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did a decade ago. Despite changes in the circumstances, the people and 
organization resist all change.   
Social complexity theory has defined three different concepts of how to deal with 
complexity. Letiche and Lissack (2011) call for complex dialogue, Dekker (2011) 
calls for intensified diversity and Cilliers (2007) calls for an ethics of slowness. I 
submit that all three do not apply to this case study. Letiche and Lissack think 
that lived (versus ascribed) emergence destabilizes assumptions, vocabulary and 
awareness. History and circumstances constantly afford different possibilities 
and actions. The trick is to identify these, see them on time and make wise use of 
possibilities. That is difficult because the ‘possible’ is, by definition, not-yet-
clear, indefinite and uncertain. Thus, social complexity is an epistemological 
problem. No-one can know what is changing ahead of time. Only that which 
remains unchanged is linearly known in advance. Organizations and societies, 
they assert, really change and they call that change ‘emergence’. Their claim is 
that living with, and within, emergence is necessary for the potential of change 
to be made humanly understandable and to bend change as far as possible in the 
interest of human existence and society. But their focus on dialogical 
relationships in acknowledged situations of change has nothing to do with my 
case study. The key factor in my case study is no matter how much social or 
economic change there was in the environment, the people and organization 
denied its existence and they survived via this denial. Everyone is still there, they 
are all still focused on profiting from hyper-capitalism and no critical 
conversation has occurred or seems likely to occur. On their personal micro 
level the denial of change, circumstance and emergence seems sustainable and 
successful within the boundaries of their goals.  
As for Dekker, he claims that change and emergence can best be met by 
encouraging diversity and making diversity into an activity. In the UAE there is 
certainly enough diversity and (idem) ditto in ITCO. But both exist by denying 
the diversity and refusing to acknowledge it.  
Finally, Cilliers’ ethics of slowness argues that in non-linear emergent realities, 
small individual actions or events can make a big difference. Not the logic of big 
numbers or the masses, but the logic of creativity, initiative-taking and creativity 
is crucial to emergence’s effects. However, in ITCO there is no individual 
creativity, but instead collective focus on immediate wealth. Everyone, apart and 
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separate from the others, is doing the same thing. Thus, there is enormous 
conformity and individualism at the same time. Each person seems focused on 
his/her individual task and profit, and because they are all the same there is no 
source of creativity or change. There is only more and more of the same. What 
Letiche and Lissack, Dekker and Cilliers all agree on is the identification of 
complexity with time, history, flow and change. They assume a European 
concept of time, event and progress. Emergence is another word in their 
vocabulary for how society changes or develops through time. However, this 
perspective does not work in ITCO. The UAE is essentially without a history. 
There were nomads with no recorded history, and now there is hyper-
capitalism. Examining life from the perspective of how one gets from here to 
there through time is not applicable in the UAE. If there is no European 
historical concept of time, social complexity theory as I have received it, does not 
work. Trying to understand ITCO via point, cyclical (or polar) or strange 
attractors just does not work. The case of ITCO is not a history of a point 
attractor. There was no one principle that explained ITCO. Social capital may 
have allowed it to survive, but why did the owner create companies that he, then, 
more or less neglected? That expat managers and consultants feel no 
commitment to the institutions of Abu Dhabi is logical enough. The Gulf States 
treat expats as expendable labor. They have no rights, are excluded from all 
decision-making and have no reason to consider themselves citizens. Their only 
social involvement is through shopping. They work and consume. Their only 
civil society is with other expats from the same country of origin. They live in a 
world with no direct civil society for them and their reaction to their condition is 
rather predictable. Thus, the expat managers and consultants can be seen as 
governed by the point attractor of economic dependence. But this is true of 
many knowledge workers including workers who are not expats. When work 
becomes all-consuming and other facets to life are repressed by it, the same 
dehumanization occurs as described here. 
Work that used to be characterized by independent judgment, high levels of 
cognitive skills and exacting standards of craftsmanship is being reduced to 
check-lists, protocols and standardization. Evidence-based practice amounts to 
regulated routine and the professional loses her or his involvement, passion and 
interest. This used to be called ‘alienation’. When this occurs, only consumption 
remains as an interest. Work is boring and undesirable, but necessary and 
sought after. Stiegler argues that ‘desire’ collapses in such a regime. There is no 
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opportunity to create, to achieve unicity or to be involved. Marketing can wet 
our appetites only for so long. The products have little intrinsic value. Thanks to 
planned obsolescence most products are shabby, temporary and fairly 
uninteresting. As desire crimps, human will diminishes. Work is routine. Life is 
just getting by. Indifference gains the upper hand. The point attractor gets 
weaker and weaker. Depression becomes the most common social sickness, with 
its companion, hyper-nervousness, prevailing amongst the lonely, neglected and 
isolated youth.  
Stiegler’s psycho-social description of contemporary society is, of course, rather 
bleak. However, it does match a hyper-capitalist society driven by a point 
attractor. Stiegler argues that a crucial failure of such a society is its inability to 
educate its youth. The young get parked in front of televisions and video games, 
and are robbed of an education. The older generation is incapable of truly caring 
about what happens to them. The historical role of the older generation as those 
who pass on skills, knowledge and awareness is abandoned. The social capital 
produced since the enlightenment is abandoned and left neglected. Hereby, the 
historical cycle of making, passing on and continuing invention dies. The 
cyclical attractor of modernism is abandoned.  
When Hugo got the ITCO vice presidents and executives to talk, they chose to 
talk about the education of their children. They were concerned about what their 
children learned and would become. The intergenerational passing on of skills 
and awareness was at the heart of the issue. But it was each of them apart. They 
shared no common concern, plans or ideas. Interestingly they all talked, if they 
talked, about their children and their up-bringing; however, the discussion was 
entirely serial. At no point did they even think of sharing their concerns or of 
formulating any joint action. They existed as monads – perhaps as nuclear 
families of monads – yet still as monads. If there was a cyclical attractor here (a 
repeated flow of action from one generation to another, or from one group of 
people to others) it was not shared or collective. There was no ‘we’. Hence, 
Stiegler maintains, the cycle will grind to a halt. Cyclical attractors have to 
maintain their movement or energy from person to person, generation to 
generation, situation to situation. If they run out of energy, they just stop. No-
one at ITCO was actively passing anything on to anyone else. ITCO existed for 
its personnel as a means to an end. It was a way to gain money fast. No-one was 
interested in investing self, energy or idealism either in ITCO or in Abu Dhabi. 
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The human energy needed to launch and sustain a cyclical pattern of 
development and growth was lacking. 
Thus, either ITCO had no attractor – which more or less means that it was in a 
state of entropy or approaching death – or it had a strange attractor. A strange 
attractor it will not be. ITCO was not out of control, quite the opposite, it was 
socially very structured. The same patterns repeated themselves over and over. 
The ‘guile’ with which consultants informed me that projects were proceeding 
excellently when they were a total mess, and the way in which I was led to think 
that risk analysis was being used when it had long landed in the waste-baskets, 
appalled me. I was angry. But the ‘guile’ was a fixed, stable and constantly 
repeated pattern. I saw the lack of change or any real business development as 
‘stuckness’; nevertheless, ITCO ‘flourished’ for more than ten years by doing the 
same things over and over. Companies and organizations that probably had no 
real need for Oracle, Siebel or SAP got versions of these installed that only 
partially worked. But as soon as one project was ‘completed’ another would start. 
All this IT contracting was just as much prestige driven as based on any real 
necessities. Thus, the one more or less failed roll-out was followed upon by the 
next one. The IT companies, like ITCO, made their money as this process was 
repeated. In this manner, there was a cycle of half-baked IT installations, a 
process that repeated itself but went nowhere.  
A strange attractor refers to a history that produces something new and 
unexpected; where new technologies or organizational forms are produced. At 
ITCO nothing inventive or creative ever occurred. Despite the challenge of 
hyper-capitalism – an economic boom such as the world has rarely witnessed – 
there was no creativity. All the expertise was bought in. The locals did not design 
anything, propose anything or make anything that was new or unique. Abu 
Dhabi bought stuff from America and Europe. Ultimately they even bought 
some quality architecture and museums, i.e. the Frank Gehry Guggenheim and 
Jean Nouvel Louvre but neither of these is, as yet, open. They appear to be pure 
prestige objects, with no links to the local community. In effect, they are 
fabulous collectors’ items for the ruling families.  
So what sort of attractor, if any, fits ITCO? The problem with the ‘point’, 
‘cyclical’, and ‘strange attractor’ is that they are all modernist constructs. 
Modernism understands existence in terms of time. From Kant to Hegel, 
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modernist thought is grounded in the discovery of how existence takes place in 
time. Time flows, happens, evolves and progresses. The attractors are, simply, 
different ways for time to occur. It can be thought of as having a telos, an end 
and a point through which it is directed. Or it can be thought of as a process or 
cycle that repeats itself: from birth to maturity to death, from scarcity to growth 
to wealth, from agriculture to industry to post-industrial society, etc. The 
‘strange attractor’ asserts that time is not linear and that existence can create 
something new, previously un-thought of and fundamentally creative. In all 
these cases, the attractors typify passage through time. 
But what happens if there is no time? ITCO and hyper-capitalism, I submit, are 
timeless constructs. This is why Bourdieu was so applicable. Bourdieu, despite 
his Marxist heritage, was fundamentally a modernist structuralist. Moreover his 
way of seeing ITCO would be as a structure, i.e. a system. Bourdieu believed that 
systems were driven by conflict and that exploitation and class struggle 
ultimately drove humanity from field to field. But in Chapter 3, I, as many other 
scholars have done before me, deliberately omitted this Marxist element and 
chose to solely undertake the structural analysis. But in ITCO the various social 
layers do not interact with one another. Each layer has its own position which 
cannot be fundamentally changed. A consultant can work his way up to vice 
president, but he/she stays an expat with no ability for independent action. He 
or she will earn a bit more; have a bit more economic-social status, but his/her 
fundamental social position will stay the same. There are minimal opportunities 
for social mobility in Abu Dhabi. The outward appearances of the city changed 
dramatically, but the human condition was fixed and inflexible. If you want to 
develop yourself as a person, if you want to be creative, if you want to have 
spiritual influence upon others, then UAE is the wrong place for you. There is 
symbolic stasis in Abu Dhabi.  
ITCO is a world without history. That is why everyone thought that the 
economic crisis would pass it by. Things happened: ITCO grew, almost 
disappeared and now exists as a shadow of what it was. But there is no one trying 
to understand ITCO as history. History requires people who take time and 
change through time seriously. Events do not enter into history if there is no 
symbolic capital, i.e. if no one notices, writes-up, analyses, discusses and debates. 
In fact there are no ‘events’ if occurrence is not symbolized. An ‘event’ is a slice 
of time that is storied by someone with a beginning, middle and an end. If the 
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storying does not take place, an endless flow of occurrences result without any 
history. 
There is almost no social science research about the UAE and its history. Things 
happen but they are not recorded, witnessed or attended to. ITCO is a neglected 
object. No-one finds it necessary to know about it, think about it, study it or 
understand it. ITCO is not in time; it is not part of a story that matters to 
anyone. No-one really cares about ITCO. It is an object of indifference. And the 
people in ITCO see it that way too; and they see themselves in ITCO, that way. 
ITCO is characterized by a ‘dead attractor’. Complexity theory assumes activity, 
emergence and vitality. Complexity asserts that the second law of 
thermodynamics is for societies wrong. Social life is not subject to entropy but 
becomes more and more complex. There is evermore energy in society and not 
less. Globalization and post-industrial society complexify society. They are 
forms of added complexity, inter-relatedness and holist interaction. But ITCO 
wants none of this. It was local, narrowly materialist and rather lifeless.  
Theoretically, the ‘dead attractor’ is an important discovery. Complexity theory 
may have been needlessly optimistic by only assuming (post-)modernist 
attractors wherein time lives, moves and has motility. ITCO was (and is) 
senseless. It wants nothing to do with ‘sense-making’. It does not want to know 
it. ITCO, for its employees, is a wealth-producing machine. ITCO is an 
assemblage with no effects. Nothing that it did mattered significantly to anyone. 
There are no effects. The only person in this book who was angered, worried, 
passionate and wanted to do things was myself.17 Even Bruno just wanted to 
repeat his text and make as much money as he could by doing so. He refused to 
engage with what happened to him when interacting with the ITCO managers.  
I entered ITCO as a management consultant, which means that I assumed I was 
there to change things. Obviously, after the fact, I conclude that my assumption 
was wrong. ITCO was locked into its ‘changelessness’ and wanted to stay that 
way. ITCO, in fact, grew and shrank, dominated the local IT market and fell into 
disrepute, and through all of this it actually did not change significantly. The 
assumptions, way of operating and behavior all remained more or less the same. 
My management training, including an elite Canadian MBA, all taught change. 
                                                            
17 Hugo may have been ‘affected’ just a bit by his experience; but it was one afternoon and he was 
just passing through.  
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It saw business as many change processes, to be influenced, controlled and/or 
determined by management. However, I was confronted by ‘stuckness’ or 
‘changelessness’: things I was entirely unprepared for. 
My fall-back critical position was social complexity theory. It did not assume 
managerial control or linear rationality. Complexity theory at least offered the 
possibility that ITCO could self-organize and that a business organization is not 
necessarily a product of managerial strategy and commands. But complexity 
theory is also a change theory. It was born from the dilemma of bifurcation. 
How can one explain that an organization stayed almost endlessly the same, and 
then suddenly shifted dramatically to a new state? Bifurcations were explained 
by seeing organizations as paradigms, i.e. as a stable model, form or gestalt that 
when it shifts, shifts to another paradigm or stage of phase change. 
Metaphorically: either it is water or ice. At a key point it shifts from one to the 
other. A very small temperature change can make all the difference while a very 
large temperature change can make no difference at all. An organization can be 
so thoroughly locked into a plateau in its fitness landscape that it does not 
change quickly. That is, ITCO can be so totally adapted to Abu Dhabi and what 
sort of business it affords that it will not change easily into anything else. But I 
was not prepared for such an overwhelmingly tight fit. After all, complexity 
theory is set up to explain change and not the lack of change. In both Letiche 
and Lissack (2011) and Goldstein (1994) the research describes and debates 
change.  
To use complexity thinking, I needed to turn it on its head, and ask about 
‘changelessness’. How do I explain ITCO’s social structural permanence? To do 
so I needed to open the black box of the projects more than I had done thus far. I 
was hired as a management consultant. My job was to understand issues of 
profitability, project control and success. I was not meant to study, and did not 
have total access to, the nitty-gritty of the projects. But given my personal 
history at Oracle as a project manager, and before that as an IT consultant, I did 
talk to the consultants about their work. It emerged that what was contracted for 
by the clients was almost always functionality that the client could never use if 
they had to. The projects called for a level of sophistication that ITCO’s 
consultants could not adequately deliver and the clients could not use efficiently. 
The contracts were simulacra of a high-tech world that only existed in the 
fantasy of the clients’ senior management. Abu Dhabi’s hyper-capitalism 
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pretends to be hypermodern, state-of-the-art, top-notch, etc. In reality the actual 
work processes, all the way down the line, are mediocre. The pretence to 
hypermodernity is, just that, a pretence. If you open the black box and look at 
what functionality gets implemented and used, it is all very basic. Therefore, 
there was a fundamental disjoint between the contracts and the actual use of the 
IT. No project delivered what was promised and no client actually needed or 
wanted what it had contracted. Moreover, the contracts were ‘hyper-real’; what 
was written into them was more real than real. That level of IT was not actually 
needed, wanted or ever implemented.  
Sidney Dekker (2011) has written a complexity book about ‘drift’. His claim is 
that organizations do not so much ‘change’ as they ‘drift’. There is movement 
from here to there, but it is mostly gradual, imperceptible and surreptitious. 
Often we only discover change when something suddenly in our perception 
crashes, i.e. it stops working. Complexity, Dekker asserts, drifts more than it 
changes. ITCO did drift from small to big and back again and it almost crashed, 
but not quite. ITCO, as a prestige object of its owner, persists. To be important 
in Abu Dhabi you have to have businesses. You have to pretend that your wealth 
is earned and not purely gratuitous. You have to take socially visible action to 
assert your existential presence. ITCO has to be there to prove that its owner 
exists. ITCO is more an artefact of social and symbolic capital than an object of 
economic capital. And none of that has changed. ITCO’s president, vice 
presidents and senior management are the Rosencratz and Guildensterns of the 
drama. Just as in Hamlet, these are figures that hover around the hero and who 
only exist in relationship to him. They have no agency of their own and really do 
not understand the drama about them. They are bit players in someone else’s 
play. That was ITCO’s role in regards to its owner. I took ITCO to be a company 
like any other company, an organization funded to make a profit for its 
shareholder(s). But I was wrong. ITCO was pre- or post-capitalist, but it was not 
capitalist. It did not really exist to make a return of 14% on the dollar. I insisted 
that ITCO was business-as-usual, but it was not and no-one else really believed 
that it was.  
Does ITCO point to our economic future or is it just a freak? ITCO is doing 
business without scarcity. It shows what happens to a (quasi) modernist 
organization when the capitalist constraints are withdrawn. Instead of becoming 
a community and generating beneficial work circumstances, ITCO tended to 
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degrade into meaninglessness, inefficiency and absurdity. After all, it was selling 
projects that the clients did not need or want, and it knew that, and it knew that 
it could never deliver what it supposedly promised. All human integrity and 
ability to relate seems to have collapsed under the weight of all the simulacra. 
But everyone profited and no-one wanted either to tell the story or to 
acknowledge its existence.  
Is hyper-capitalism inherently dead and/or deadening? One case obviously does 
not give us enough data to answer such a sweeping question. Hyper-capitalism, 
we could imagine, ought to be enthralling. No scarcity; the sky (literally) was the 
limit. Nevertheless, at ITCO the wealth brought out grasping behavior, ugly 
opportunism and nihilism. Freed of our dependence on economic capital, social 
capital simply raised its head all the more strongly. The lack of symbolic capital 
was crucial; there was no philosophy, politics, debate or spirit. The close to 
unlimited access to goods and services seemed to paralyze the spirit. If time is 
measured in our striving for material rewards, making those rewards instantly 
and almost totally accessible seems to destroy time. And that is deadening. 
Hyper-capitalism was in ITCO the ‘dead attractor’. In ITCO the simulacra went 
wild and everyone colluded to keep it that way. Is ITCO a harbinger of what is to 
come? This economy of excess was definitely not creative, liberal or progressive. 
Without accountability, imposed by the logic of scarcity, work was ineffective 
and social relatedness tended towards petty feuds and rivalries. The advantage of 
the ‘dead attractor’ thesis above Bourdieu’s analysis of habitus is that it remains 
an attractor. There is still a possibility of motion in the conceptualization. Even 
if the attractor is ‘damping down’ all motion, the system could drift into a phase 
shift. Having fought all my life to escape scarcity, it has been quite a shock to 
discover that the escape (at least in this case) was not at all what I’d expected it to 
be. Hyper-capitalist excess turned out to be at least as restricting and unfree as 
business-as-usual. I had hoped to gain more distance from Mead/Bourdieu by 
turning to complexity theory. What up to now has emerged at ITCO has not 
been generative, creative or impressive. Despite the potential of excess, it has not 
produced a “society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each 
can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general 
production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another 
tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the 
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evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming 
hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic” (Marx & Engels, 1964, p. 53).  
Further research is needed to open the black box of the substantive economy of 
excess without scarcity. Pride of workmanship did not motivate the IT 
knowledge workers to excellence. Work remained an extrinsic motivator, with 
less rather than more interest in training, learning and expertise. Management 
just did not want to know what happened in the primary process of project 
implementation. There was less leadership rather than more. Management was 
totally indifferent to excellence or professional pride. The economic 
anthropology of the UAE now has a beginning. Everything I had learned in my 
MBA, and thought I ought to do, more or less failed at ITCO. ITCO only 
destroys shareholder monetary value, but it drifts onward. The professionals 
deskilled themselves to the lowest common denominator, with no punishment 
for doing so. Efficiency and effectiveness were flaunted but nobody really cared. 
Complicated IT systems were partially implemented in a way that most of their 
functionality was lost, and that suited the end users just fine. In the hyper-
capitalism mirror of Abu Dhabi many certainties of business studies falter. Is 
this the exception that (dis-)proves the rule? Substantive economic anthropology 
has a long way to go before the results of comparative studies might tell us more 
about scarcity, excess and the role of so-called business basics. I have taken a 
small first step, I hope others will follow.  
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DUTCH SUMMARY 
'IK', ITCO & HYPERKAPITALISME 
Een Onderzoek naar het Uitoefenen van Consultancy in de Golfstaten 
 
Dit boek gaat over verantwoordelijkheid en organisatie in hyperkapitalisme. 
Kenmerkend  aan het  hyperkapitalisme is overmaat; oftewel, de afwezigheid van 
schaarste. Het onderzoek vindt plaats in de Verenigde Arabische Emiraten, 
gelegen in het Midden-Oosten. De VAE wordt gekenmerkt door een 
enkelvoudige sector exporteconomie. Olieopbrengsten zijn bijna onbeperkt; alle 
andere economische activiteiten blijven secundair.  
In de formalistische betekenis van economie verkopen mensen iets met 
marktwaarde om hun bestaansmiddelen te verkrijgen. Het grootste deel van de 
tijd is er schaarste --- dat betekent dat het inkomen niet aansluit bij de 
gepercipieerde behoeften.  
Aan de andere kant verwijst het substantivistische concept van economie naar 
de relatie die de mens heeft met natuur en maatschappij ‘in zoverre dit resultaat, 
waarin men wordt voorzien van materiële middelen, voldoening vraagt’.   
Mijn onderzoek richt zich op de relatie tussen deze twee concepten. Ik 
veronderstelde dat bedrijven in de VAE ‘spaarzaam’ zouden zijn in zowel de 
formalistische als de substantivistische zin. Ik werkte in een soort economisch 
paradijs, waar schaarste vrijwel irrelevant was. Maar zoals ik in dit boek aan het 
licht zal brengen, was dit ‘paradijs’ niet wat ik dacht dat het zou zijn. Ik zou mijn 
ervaring kenmerken als dat van een samenleving die ‘vast’ zit en waar relaties 
door ‘bedrog’ worden gekenmerkt.  
Er zijn drie contexten in dit boek. De context van Abu Dhabi, waar het grootste 
deel van het onderzoek plaatsvond, ikzelf als context en de gebruikte 
onderzoeksmethoden.  
Het boek is gebaseerd op een empirische casestudie, wat op zijn beurt weer 
gebaseerd is op mijn consultancy ervaring in Abu Dhabi. De studie focust  zich 
op ITCO --- de naam die ik geef aan het VAE bedrijf waar ik vele jaren actief 
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was. Mijn toegang tot ITCO was uitstekend. Ik had toegang tot email materiaal 
en frequente bezoeken, als mijn bronnen.  
Ik noem Abu Dhabi hyperkapitalistisch vanwege de enorm snelle economische 
groei; van 2001 tot 2008 is het BBP verdriedubbeld. De handel bloeide. Alleen in 
2009 was er een jaar crisis, veroorzaakt door een enorme daling in olieverkoop 
als gevolg van de wereldwijde economische crisis van 2008. De binnenlandse 
economische activiteit buiten de oliehandel bleef daarna echter groeien. Dit is te 
zien aan de gigantische bouwprojecten – musea, luchthaventerminals, 
winkelcentra. Rijkdom wordt gegenereerd en verbruikt op een onovertroffen 
schaal.  
Abu Dhabi is een soort ‘Disneyland’ -- dat wil zeggen, het is kunstmatig, 
gepland, gedisciplineerd en gedefinieerd door zijn uiterlijk.  
Ik ben gevormd door hard werken en strijd. Ik heb een Libanese achtergrond. Ik 
heb een sterke werkethiek en ben ervan overtuigd dat uitbuiting wenselijk noch 
duurzaam is. Ik heb altijd moeten werken voor mijn levensonderhoud --- 
schaarste, als de noodzaak om te werken, als afhankelijk zijn van het hebben van 
een baan en als gebrek aan sociale en politieke veiligheid, spelen een essentiële 
rol in mijn leven.  
Ik was een ervaren Oracle projectuitvoerder, die al zo’n tien jaar in de regio had 
gewerkt, maar ik had besloten te verhuizen en me te vestigen in Canada. Voor 
mij als consultant was de situatie frustrerend en voor mijn professionele trots 
was het niet erg bevorderlijk. Ik werd echter afdoende betaald en ik mocht 
vrijwel alles zien wat ik wilde zien, waarschijnlijk omdat ik niet erg belangrijk 
was. Derhalve was mijn positie ideaal voor het doen van onderzoek. Op deze 
manier had ik het materiaal dat ik nodig had voor het schrijven van een 
etnografie over ITCO. ITCO leverde een verhaal: van bloei tot neergang. 
Enorme groei die plotseling tot stilstand kwam toen de economische crisis ook 
dit bedrijf bereikte in 2010. ITCO kromp totdat er bijna niets over was. Er was 
dus drama, maar waren de belangrijkste spelers in dit drama veranderd, 
aangepast of opnieuw geanalyseerd? Ik kon proberen dat uit te vinden.  
Ik noem dit werk etnografie omdat het mijn doel was de overtuigingen en 
sociale rangschikking van het onderwerp te begrijpen. Verder wilde ik begrijpen 
hoe zij hun situatie en handelingen ervoeren en begrepen. De studie van een 
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cultuur als die bij ITCO vergde een bepaald niveau van intimiteit met 
groepsleden die zich ontwikkelde gedurende de tijd dat ik als actief lid van de 
groep met hen werkte. De belangrijkste motivatie voor het gebruiken van de 
etnografische benadering was de overtuiging dat ik alleen door met de actoren 
binnen ITCO samen te werken, te interacteren en hen te ervaren, dit alles in hun 
eigen omgeving, hun manier van leven echt kon begrijpen. Ik moest details van 
het fenomeen onderzoeken die vaak moeilijk over te brengen zijn bij 
gebruikmaking van kwantitatieve methoden van onderzoek.  
Derhalve heb ik geen werkende hypothese geformuleerd of een researchplan 
opgesteld, waarin interventies en methoden voor het verzamelen van gegevens 
uit de doeken zijn gedaan. Integendeel, ik heb de kansen die ik in mijn dagelijks 
werk en in bijeenkomsten met collega’s en cliënten kreeg, gebruikt om deel te 
nemen aan veel verschillende gesprekken.   
Toen ik arriveerde bij ITCO had ik te maken met een belangrijk IT bedrijf in de 
VAE met één miljard dollar winst per jaar, een bedrijf dat beter management 
nodig had. Het middenmanagement leek onverschillig te staan tegenover de 
kwaliteit van het opgeleverde werk. ITCO verkocht grote IT 
(informatietechnologie) implementatieprojecten aan grote spelers in de regio. 
Denk aan Oracle of SAP tot aan grote banken, vliegvelden en telecombedrijven. 
Dit waren contracten met een waarde van miljoenen. ITCO importeerde en 
verkocht ook IT producten van bedrijven als Lenovo, Nokia en Erikson; 
toentertijd zeker winstgevend.   
ITCO kende echter wat problemen en ik werd gevraagd dit te verbeteren. ITCO 
leverde niet wat aan klanten was beloofd, projecten waren nooit op tijd 
afgerond, waardoor er bemiddeling of meerwerk aan te pas kwam. Na afronding 
bleek bijna ieder project verlies te hebben gedraaid! Dus ben ik gevraagd ernaar 
te kijken en aanbevelingen te doen voor verbetering. Als consultant wilde ik 
ITCO ‘redden‘: het bedrijf stabiel, winstgevend, effectief en duurzaam maken. Ik 
wilde dat ITCO een ‘goede‘ plek zou zijn om te werken en een bevredigende 
omgeving voor de ontwikkeling van de werknemers. Maar het bedrijf verdiende 
helemaal geen geld. De cashflow van nieuwe projecten bleef binnenkomen, dus 
op dat vlak waren er geen problemen. En het was pas toen de economische crisis 
170 
 
van 2008 het bedrijf bereikte (in 2010), dat ik gevraagd werd om in detail naar de 
boeken te kijken. Zo ontdekte ik hoe slecht het er echt voorstond.   
Er vonden gedurende een lange tijd diverse ingrepen plaats. Van reorganisatie, 
training en workshops door externe consultants tot diverse dialoogsessies met 
managers en de eigenaren uit de VAE. ITCO stond echter onverschillig 
tegenover mijn doelen als consultant. Zolang de hoeveelheid geld die door het 
bedrijf stroomde bleef groeien, waren ze content. Dat de handelsvorderingen 
nog sneller groeiden maakte hen niets uit. Botweg gesteld, ITCO kon objectief 
gezien bankroet zijn, het management zag zichzelf nog steeds als succesvol. De 
‘echte’ economische situatie bleef onzichtbaar.  
Later, werkend aan dit boek, begon ik de dominante cultuur bij ITCO ‘bedrog’ 
en ‘vastzittend’ te noemen. Consultants en (midden)managers beweerden alles, 
zeiden alles, ongeacht de waarheid, om te kunnen zeggen dat ‘alles in orde was’. 
Er leek weinig tot geen verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel te bestaan. Blijkbaar was er 
geen angst voor ontdekking of bestraffing. Niemand is ooit ontslagen door de 
eigen incompetentie. Men scheen er geen problemen mee te hebben te beweren 
dat een probleem niet hun fout was.  
Ongeacht wat ik probeerde aan vaardigheidstrainingen, veranderingen in 
management of reorganisatie, alles bleef hetzelfde. In wezen, ongeacht wat ik 
probeerde, bleef ITCO gericht op cash-flow en zonder bewezen succesvolle 
projecten. Het opgeleverde professionele niveau nam niet noemenswaardig toe. 
De houding van ‘we improviseren wel’ zonder zorgvuldigheid, discipline of zorg 
om de kwaliteit van het resultaat bleef. Het management wist dat 
projectresultaten niet adequaat waren, maar zolang het geld bleef 
binnenstromen trok het zich daar niets van aan.  
Economische antropologie richt zich meer op Afrika (in werk zoals dat van 
MarshalSahlins (1972, 2000) of op Europa (zoals in het werk van  Paul Jorion 
(2003) of Luc Boltanski& Eve Chaipello (2007)) dan op de economie van de 
VAE.  
Gebruikmakend van het sociaal interactionisme van Mead en de concepten en 
theorieën van Bourdieu, probeer ik te begrijpen wat ik met modernistische 
sociale studies heb omschreven. Eerst probeer ik identiteiten binnen ITCO te 
begrijpen middels psychologische antropologie en ten tweede vanuit het 
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perspectief van gezelligheid; hoe identiteit sociaal wordt opgebouwd door 
relaties. Bourdieu’s studies met betrekking tot het economisch, sociaal en 
cultureel kapitaal hielpen me begrijpen hoe ITCO’s actoren al dan niet 
vertegenwoordigd zijn in symbolisch kapitaal, binnen de specifieke 
actiegebieden die hun habitus vormen.  
Mijn analyse lijkt valide genoeg als een modernistische beschrijving van ITCO. 
Deze analyses gaven inzicht in de systemen binnen ITCO, waar ITCO op 
zichzelf redelijk stabiel lijkt. De economische crisis van 2008 bereikte 
uiteindelijk ITCO en dwong verandering af. Maar verandering, voor zover 
aanwezig, kwam van buiten en niet van binnen. Het leek erop dat ITCO intern 
redelijk stabiel was. Gezien het feit dat het nooit echt winst maakte en dat de 
meeste projecten nooit echt werkten zoals bedoeld, is dit een zeer opvallende 
conclusie. ITCO is een verhaal over ‘toereikend zijn’. Het bleef steeds net genoeg 
doen om door te gaan, al leek het er sterk op dat dit niet zou lukken.   
Buiten het olierijke Midden-Oosten, zou ITCO volgens mij nooit hebben 
kunnen bestaan zoals het bestaat. De expats waren allemaal in de VAE omdat ze 
er zoveel meer konden verdienen dan thuis. Op het werk waren managers en 
consultants sociaal georganiseerd langs etnische lijnen.  
Waar er in Europa vakbonden, politieke partijen of andere vormen van sociale 
samenhang zijn, is er in de VAE alleen iemands expat status en etnische 
identiteit.   
Sociaal kapitaal heeft voor het overleven hiervan gezorgd, maar waarom heeft de 
VAE eigenaar bedrijven gesticht die hij, vervolgens, min of meer heeft 
genegeerd? Dat expat-managers en -consultants geen toewijding hebben aan de 
instituties van Abu Dhabi is logisch genoeg. De Golfstaten behandelen expats als 
dure arbeid. Ze hebben geen rechten, worden uitgesloten bij alle besluitvorming, 
en hebben geen reden om zichzelf burger te voelen. Hun enige sociale 
betrokkenheid is door middel van consumptie.  
Maar de conclusie dat vormen van kapitaal, en hoe deze onderling en met de 
omstandigheden verbonden zijn, bepalen wat we kunnen zien en weten van 
ITCO, is niet erg bevredigend. In ieder geval vernietigt het de relatie tussen 
schaarste en overmaat als belangrijke factor. Schaarste en overmaat zijn 
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gereduceerd bij Bourdieu tot aspecten als vormen van kapitaal. ITCO is van een 
levend fenomeen gereduceerd naar een epiphenomena van het spel der vormen 
van kapitaal.  
Toch is ITCO op een of andere manier veranderd, de analyse is niet verkeerd of 
fout, maar ik wilde dichter bij ITCO zijn en de mensen die daar ‘leefden’.   
Om dit te bereiken, wendde ik mij tot de studie van de dynamiek, over sociale 
gebeurtenissen als verandering en beweging. Ik heb gebruik gemaakt van de 
sociale complexiteitstheorie. De complexiteitstheorie verklaart dat er meerdere 
soorten attractoren zijn, die direct en causaal kunnen zijn (‘a leidt direct tot b’), 
circulair of polair (herhalend), of onvoorspelbaar. Het is de emergente attractor 
als een sociale en historische transformatie wat het meest interessant is. Het 
toont aan dat het nieuwe zal gebeuren, dat verandering plaatsvindt.  
Bij toepassing van de complexiteitstheorie kan men concluderen dat ITCO niet 
voldeed aan een dekpuntattractor of een directe attractor, noch aan circulaire 
attractoren. We zien dat, hoewel de economische ‘boom’ van de VAE een 
cruciaal contextueel element in de ITCO casus vormde, attitudes en reacties niet 
simpelweg een gevolg waren van de economie van de overvloed. Het 
hyperkapitalisme in de VAE mag dan wel een kleine oprisping hebben 
doorgemaakt in 2008, er was geen sprake van een crisis.  
ITCO onderging een mini-crisis maar bestaat vandaag de dag nog steeds, hoewel 
in een kleinere vorm. De attitudes en aannames van de managers en consultants 
bij ITCO (of diegenen die niet langer bij ITCO werkzaam zijn), zijn niet 
veranderd of ontwikkeld, ik zie slechts herhaling zonder verschil. Het leven in 
het hyperkapitalisme is niet verstoord, noch heeft een van de spelers enige 
economische of politieke kritiek over de ‘boom-jaren’ te berde gebracht.  
Derhalve had ITCO ofwel geen attractor, min of meer zou hetgeen betekenen 
dat het zich in een entropische staat bevond, dat er sprake was van een 
naderende dood, of het had een zeer vreemde attractor. Een vreemde attractor 
zal het niet zijn geweest. ITCO was niet oncontroleerbaar geworden, 
integendeel, het bedrijf was sociaal zeer gestructureerd. De ‘slinksheid’ waarmee 
consultants me vertelden dat projecten uitstekend verliepen terwijl ze een 
rommeltje waren of dat men me liet denken dat risicoanalyse werd toegepast 
terwijl deze al lang in de prullenbak was beland, vervulde mij met afschuw. Ik 
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was kwaad. Maar de ‘slinksheid’ was een vast, stabiel en voortdurend herhalend 
patroon. Ik zag het gebrek aan verandering of echte ontwikkeling van het bedrijf 
als ‘vastzitten’, maar ITCO maakte nog meer dan tien jaar een bloeiperiode door.  
Bedrijven en organisaties die waarschijnlijk geen echte behoefte hadden aan 
Oracle, Siebel of SAP kregen versies hiervan die slechts deels werkten. Maar 
zodra een project was ‘afgerond’ kon een ander beginnen. Al deze IT contracten 
werden net zo zeer door prestige gedreven  als dat ze gebaseerd waren op 
werkelijke behoeften. De sociale complexiteitstheorie heeft drie verschillende 
concepten gedefinieerd. Het concept van Letiche en Lissack dat vraagt om 
complexe dialoog; Dekker (2011) vraagt om geïntensiveerde diversiteit en 
Cilliers (2007) vraagt om een traagheidsethiek. Geen van drieën is van 
toepassing op mijn casus. Letiche en Lissack denken dat geleefde (versus 
toegeschreven) emergentie, aannames, woordenschat en bewustzijn 
destabiliseert.   
Tijdens de dialoogsessies bij ITCO waren managers bezorgd over wat hun 
kinderen leerden en zouden worden. Het aan een volgende generatie doorgeven 
van vaardigheden en bewustzijn was een issue voor hen. Maar wel voor elk van 
hen apart. Ze deelden geen gemeenschappelijke zorgen, plannen of ideeën. Op 
geen enkel moment dachten ze zelfs maar aan het delen van hun zorgen of het 
bedenken van gezamenlijke actie. Zij leefden als individuen. Er was geen ‘wij’. 
Volgens Letiche en Lissack bieden geschiedenis en omstandigheden constant 
verschillende mogelijkheden en acties. Organisaties en gemeenschappen, stellen 
zij, veranderen daadwerkelijk en zij noemen die verandering ‘emergentie’. En ze 
beweren dat het leven met en tijdens een periode van ‘emergentie’  noodzakelijk 
is voor de potentie van verandering om menselijkerwijs begrijpelijk te kunnen 
worden gemaakt.  
Maar de belangrijkste factor in mijn casus was dat ongeacht hoeveel sociale of 
economische verandering er in de omgeving was, de mensen en de organisatie 
het bestaan ervan ontkenden. Iedereen is er nog steeds, nog steeds gefocust op 
het profiteren van het hyperkapitalisme. Er hebben geen kritische gesprekken 
plaatsgevonden en het lijkt er niet op dat deze nog gaan komen. Dekker beweert 
dat verandering en emergentie het best kunnen worden bereikt door diversiteit 
te bevorderen en diversiteit tot een activiteit te maken. In de VAE is er zeker 
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genoeg diversiteit, evenals binnen ITCO. Maar beiden bestaan door het 
ontkennen van de diversiteit en het weigeren deze te erkennen.  
De traagheidsethiek van Cillier beargumenteert dat in non-lineaire emergente 
werkelijkheden, kleine individuele acties of gebeurtenissen een groot verschil 
kunnen maken. Maar binnen ITCO is er geen individuele creativiteit, de focus 
ligt op onmiddellijke rijkdom. Iedereen, apart en los van de anderen doet 
hetzelfde.  
Wat Letiche-Lissack, Dekker en Cilliers allen gemeen hebben is dat ze 
complexiteit identificeren als tijd, geschiedenis, stroming en verandering. Zij 
veronderstellen een Europees concept voor tijd, gebeurtenis en vooruitgang. 
Maar dit perspectief werkt niet binnen ITCO. De VAE is in wezen zonder 
geschiedenis, er waren nomaden zonder vastgelegde geschiedenis, en nu is er 
hyperkapitalisme.  
Ondanks veranderingen in zijn zakelijke omgeving, bleef ITCO op het gebied 
van zijn sociale rationaliteit hetzelfde. Zelfs nu, na inkrimping en verlies van de 
standing, lijken de consultants en managers die er nog zijn, nog steeds hetzelfde 
te denken en handelen als tien jaar geleden. Ook hun begrip van zichzelf en 
anderen is in die tijd niet veranderd. Ondanks de uitdagingen van het 
hyperkapitalisme, een economische ‘boom’ zoals de wereld zelden zag, was er 
geen creativiteit. De plaatselijke bewoners ontwierpen niets, kwamen niet met 
voorstellen, maakten niets dat nieuw of uniek was. Abu Dhabi kocht spullen uit 
Amerika en Europa. Uiteindelijk kochten ze zelfs toparchitectuur en topmusea. 
Bijvoorbeeld het Frank Gehry Guggenheim en Jean Nouvel Louvre, maar geen 
van deze is op dit moment open. Het lijken pure prestigeobjecten te zijn, zonder 
link naar de lokale gemeenschap.  
Dus wat voor attractor past bij ITCO, als er überhaupt een is? In alle 
bovenstaande casussen typeren de attractoren de voortgang door de tijd. Maar 
wat als er geen tijd is. Ik stel dat ITCO en hyperkapitalisme tijdloze constructen 
zijn. Daarom was Bourdieu ook zo toepasbaar. Ondanks zijn marxistische 
erfgoed was Bourdieu in wezen een modernistische structuralist. En zijn manier 
om naar ITCO te kijken zou zijn als kijken naar een structuur, ofwel een 
systeem.   
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Er is weinig tot geen sociale mobiliteit in Abu Dhabi. Het uiterlijk 
verschijningsbeeld van de stad veranderde dramatisch, maar de menselijke 
conditie was vast en rigide. Er heerst een symbolische stasis in Abu Dhabi.  
ITCO groeide, verdween bijna en bestaat nu voort als schaduw van wat het ooit 
was. Er is geen symbolisch kapitaal, dat wil zeggen: als niemand er op let, over 
schrijft, het analyseert, bediscussieert en erover debatteert, bevindt ITCO zich 
niet in de tijd. Het maakt geen deel uit van een verhaal dat voor iemand van 
belang is.   
En de mensen binnen ITCO zien het zo; en ze zien zichzelf op die manier binnen 
ITCO. ITCO wordt gekarakteriseerd door een dode attractor. Globalisatie en 
post-industrialisme maken de samenleving complex. Ze zijn vormen van 
toegevoegde complexiteit, onderlinge verbondenheid en holistische interactie. 
Maar ITCO wil niets van dit alles.  
In theorie is de ‘dode attractor’ een belangrijke ontdekking. De 
complexiteitstheorie mag dan nodeloos optimistisch zijn geweest door slechts 
(post-)modernistische attractoren te bekijken, waarin tijd leeft en beweegt, 
ITCO was (en is) zinloos. Het wil ook niets van doen hebben met ‘zingeving’. 
Het wil het niet weten. Voor de medewerkers was ITCO een machine die 
rijkdom produceerde.   
De enige persoon in dit boek die boos, bezorgd, gepassioneerd en bereid tot actie 
was, was ikzelf.  
Hoe moet ik ITCO dan verklaren? Om dit te doen moet ik de zwarte doos van de 
projecten openen, ofwel wat ITCO dag en nacht deed. Het was niet de bedoeling 
dat ik de dagelijkse beslommeringen van de projecten bestudeerde en ik had er 
ook niet echt toegang toe. Ik praatte met de consultants over hun werk. Het 
bleek dat wat er contractueel met klanten was afgesproken bijna altijd 
functionaliteit was die de klant niet zou kunnen gebruiken op het moment dat 
dit nodig was. De projecten vroegen om een niveau van geavanceerdheid dat de 
consultants van ITCO niet echt konden leveren, en de klanten niet konden 
gebruiken. De contracten waren een schijnbeeld van een high-tech wereld die 
alleen bestond in de fantasie van het hogere management van de klant. Het 
hyperkapitalisme van Abu Dhabi pretendeert hypermodern, state-of-the-art, 
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top-notch, etcetera, te zijn, maar de eigenlijke werkprocessen, door de gehele 
lijn, zijn middelmatig. De schijn van hypermoderniteit is precies dat: schijn. Als 
je de zwarte doos opent en kijkt naar de functionaliteit die wordt 
geïmplementeerd en gebruikt, is het allemaal zeer basaal. Er was dus een 
fundamentele afstand tussen de contracten en het daadwerkelijk gebruik van de 
technologie. De contracten waren derhalve ‘hyper-echt’, wat erin geschreven 
stond was echter dan de werkelijkheid. Dat niveau van IT was niet echt nodig, 
gewenst, en werd nooit geïmplementeerd.   
Sidney Dekker heeft een complexiteitsboek geschreven over ‘afdrijven’ (Dekker, 
2011). Zijn bewering is dat organisaties niet zo zeer ‘veranderen’ als wel 
‘afdrijven’. Er is beweging van hier naar daar, maar die beweging is meestal 
gradueel, onmerkbaar en heimelijk. Vaak ontdekken we verandering alleen als 
iets in onze perceptie ineens crasht, ofwel stopt met werken. Complexiteit, zo 
verzekert Dekker ons, drijft meer af dan ze verandert. ITCO dreef af, van klein 
naar groot en weer terug en het bedrijf crashte bijna, maar niet helemaal. ITCO 
als prestigeobject van de eigenaar blijft bestaan. Om belangrijk te zijn in Abu 
Dhabi heb je bedrijven nodig. Je dient te doen alsof je rijkdom verdiend is, en 
niet volledig ongerechtvaardigd.   
ITCO is er om te bewijzen dat de eigenaar bestaat. ITCO is meer een artefact van 
sociaal en symbolisch kapitaal dan een object van economisch kapitaal. Expats 
hebben geen eigen vertegenwoordiging en begrijpen het drama hieromtrent niet. 
ITCO was slechts een speler zonder eigen vertegenwoordiging. Ik veronderstelde 
dat ITCO een bedrijf als andere bedrijven was, een organisatie opgericht om 
winst voor zijn aandeelhouder(s) te genereren. Maar ik zat fout. ITCO was pre- 
of post-kapitalistisch, maar niet kapitalistisch. Het bestond niet daadwerkelijk 
om een ROI van 14% op een dollar te genereren.  
Wijst ITCO op onze economische toekomst of is het een freak? ITCO doet zaken 
zonder schaarsheid. Het toont aan wat er gebeurt met een (quasi) 
modernistische organisatie als de kapitalistische beperkingen worden 
teruggetrokken. In plaats van het verworden tot een gemeenschap en voordelige 
werkomstandigheden te creëren, verzandde ITCO in betekenisloosheid, 
inefficiëntie en absurditeit. Alle menselijke integriteit en relativeringsvermogen 
lijken ineen te zijn geklapt onder het gewicht van alle schijnbeelden. Maar 
Dutch Summary    177 
 
 
iedereen profiteerde en niemand wilde het verhaal vertellen of het bestaan ervan 
erkennen.  
Is het hyperkapitalisme intrinsiek dood en/of dodelijk? Eén casus geeft ons 
uiteraard niet genoeg data om een dergelijke veelomvattende vraag te 
beantwoorden. Hyperkapitalisme kunnen we ons voorstellen als boeiend. Geen 
schaarste; ‘the sky (letterlijk) was the limit’. Maar bij ITCO bracht de rijkdom 
graaigedrag, lelijk opportunisme en nihilisme tevoorschijn. Bevrijd van onze 
afhankelijkheid van economisch kapitaal, stak sociaal kapitaal simpelweg nog 
duidelijker de kop op. Het gebrek aan symbolisch kapitaal was cruciaal. Er was 
geen filosofie, politiek, debat of levenskracht. De bijna onbeperkte toegang tot 
goederen en diensten scheen de levenskracht te verlammen. Als tijd gemeten 
wordt in ons streven naar materiele beloningen, lijkt het onmiddellijk en vrijwel 
totaal toegankelijk maken van deze beloningen de tijd te vernietigen. En dat is 
dodelijk.  
Bij ITCO was hyperkapitalisme de ‘dode attractor’. Binnen ITCO sloegen de 
schijnbeelden op hol en spande iedereen samen om het zo te houden. Deze 
economie van overvloed was zeker niet creatief of progressief. Zonder 
rekenschap, opgelegd door de logica van schaarste, was werk ineffectief en 
neigde sociale verbondenheid naar kleinzielige vetes en rivaliteiten.   
Het voordeel van de ‘dode attractor’ theorie boven Bourdieu’s analyse van 
reproductie en habitus is dat het een attractor blijft. Er is nog steeds een 
mogelijkheid van beweging in de conceptualisatie. Zelfs als de attractor alle 
beweging blokkeert, kan het systeem afdrijven richting een faseverschuiving. Na 
mijn hele leven gevochten te hebben om schaarste te ontvluchten, was het een 
flinke schok om te ontdekken dat die ontsnapping niet datgene was wat ik ervan 
verwacht had. Hyperkapitalistische overvloed bleek minstens zo beperkend en 
onvrij te zijn als business-as-usual. Ik hoopte meer afstand te scheppen tot 
Mead/Bourdieu door me tot de complexiteitstheorie te wenden. Maar wat tot nu 
toe tevoorschijn kwam bij ITCO was niet generatief, creatief of indrukwekkend.   
Verder onderzoek is noodzakelijk om de zwarte doos van de substantivistische 
economie van overvloed zonder schaarste te openen. De trots op hun 
vakmanschap motiveerde de IT kenniswerkers niet naar excellente resultaten. 
178 
 
Het management wilde eenvoudigweg niet weten wat er in het primaire proces 
van projectimplementatie gebeurde. De economische antropologie van de VAE 
heeft nu een begin. Alles wat ik geleerd heb in mijn MBA en wat ik dacht te 
moeten doen, mislukte min of meer. ITCO vernietigt slechts geldelijke waarde 
voor aandeelhouders, maar drijft voort. In de hyperkapitalistische spiegel van 
Abu Dhabi wankelen veel zekerheden van bedrijfswetenschappen. Is dit de 
uitzondering die de regel bevestigt, of weerlegt? 
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'Me', ITCO and Hyper-capitalism is a book about responsibility and organiza
in hyper-capitalism. Hyper-capitalism is characterized by excess; that is, the 
absence of scarcity. The research takes place in the United Arab Emirates, located in 
the Middle East where oil revenues are almost unlimited; all other economic 
	
remain secondary. 
The book explores the rela	 between formal and substanve economics. It is 
a story of a hyper-stra
 society, where every class and group is assigned a place 
on the social ladder, which is meant to be immobile. It is a sort of 'Disneyland' -- 
that is, it is 	 planned, regimented and de
 by its appearances. Wealth 
is generated and consumed on a scale unheard of elsewhere. The ethnography 
describes what happens to a (quasi) modernist organiza when the capitalist 
constraints are withdrawn. ITCO was in some trouble and several c
interven were implemented to improve maers. The ethnography reveals a 
dominant work culture of 'guile' and 'stuck-ness'; a lack of change. ITCO 	

for more than ten years, declaring pr to its shareholders year aer year. ITCO 
was doing business without scarcity.
In the hyper-capitalism mirror of the UAE many certain
 of business studies 
falter. Is this the excep that (dis-)proves the rule? Does ITCO point to our 
economic future or is it a freak? Is hyper-capitalism inherently dead and/or 
deadening? 
Through the lens of Mead’s social inter	 the analysis reveals the iden

in ITCO via psychological anthropology; how iden is socially constructed in 
interrela	ps. Applying Bourdieu’s theories and concepts the analysis aempts 
to reveal the 'stuck-ness' and whether ITCO’s actants are (or are not) represented in 
symbolic capital. But such analysis destroys the rela	 between scarcity and 
excess. The ques remains as to how we should understand ITCO? ITCO did 
change somehow, and to understand this change, social complexity theory is used 
to reveal the kind of aractor that emerges producing the paern of behaviour that 
is characterisTCO.
‘ME’, ITCO and HYPER-CAPITALISM
A Study of Doing Consultancy in the Gulf State
